CN103944712B - Method for generating MBE-SSP (Multi Band Excitation-Service Switching Point) control code sequence - Google Patents
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种MBE‑SSP控制码序列产生方法:步骤1、分配与协商阶段;步骤2、初始密钥序列生成:Alice将初始值x0和参数值μ送入混沌系统,并迭代N次,得到N个实数,并从中选取n个实数X1a,X2a,...,Xna,将X1a,X2a,...,Xna分别进行二值化处理,生成二进制初始密钥序列S0a;步骤3、核对码序列与控制码序列生成;步骤4、核对码序列传输与认证;步骤5、控制码序列移位循环产生抛弃码字过程。本发明利用混沌系统对初始状态和参数有极度敏感性以及混沌序列良好的随机性生成初始密钥序列,通过分组、异或、抽取得到核对码序列和控制码序列,再通过量子信道传输核对码序列,以确保通信双方的合法性和控制码序列的有效性。
The invention discloses a method for generating an MBE-SSP control code sequence: step 1, allocation and negotiation stage; step 2, initial key sequence generation: Alice sends the initial value x 0 and parameter value μ into the chaotic system, and iterates N times to get N real numbers, and select n real numbers X 1a , X 2a ,...,X na from them, and perform binary processing on X 1a , X 2a ,...,X na respectively to generate binary initial encryption key sequence S 0a ; step 3, generation of verification code sequence and control code sequence; step 4, transmission and authentication of verification code sequence; step 5, process of shifting and cyclically generating discarded codewords in control code sequence. The invention utilizes the extreme sensitivity of the chaotic system to the initial state and parameters and the good randomness of the chaotic sequence to generate the initial key sequence, obtains the check code sequence and the control code sequence through grouping, XOR, and extraction, and then transmits the check code through the quantum channel sequence to ensure the legitimacy of both parties in communication and the validity of the control code sequence.
Description
技术领域technical field
本发明属于量子保密通信领域,具体涉及一种MBE-SSP控制码序列产生方法,该方法包括基于混沌和量子特性的控制码序列生成方法及控制码序列循环抛弃算法。The invention belongs to the field of quantum secure communication, and in particular relates to a method for generating an MBE-SSP control code sequence. The method includes a method for generating a control code sequence based on chaos and quantum characteristics and a control code sequence cyclic discarding algorithm.
背景技术Background technique
量子通信是量子信息学中重要的一个研究方向,近二十年来得到了飞速的发展,为保密通信系统提供了一种新的思路。密钥分配和量子机密共享便是其中重要的两个研究方向,在理论以及实验上都取得了重要的进展,具有广泛的应用前景。Quantum communication is an important research direction in quantum information science. It has developed rapidly in the past two decades and provides a new way of thinking for secure communication systems. Key distribution and quantum secret sharing are two important research directions, which have made important progress in theory and experiment, and have broad application prospects.
文献1“陈攀.量子密钥分配及量子机密共享的理论研究[D].清华大学,2006.”公开了一种六态测量基加密量子密钥分配方案(Measuring basis encryption-six statesprotocol),简称MBE-SSP,通过控制码来选择三种不同的测量基,在无噪无窃听的情况下,通信效率能达到百分之百,并且对于窃听者来说,需要从三种测量基中选出一种,命中概率只有13,所以该方案不仅通信效率高而且安全。但需要在控制码序列严格保密的前提下进行,并且这个方案的控制码序列生成方式单一,在控制码序列作用下产生的密钥序列长度为定值,所以,在实际应用中常常需要重复使用控制码序列,控制码序列存在泄漏的风险;文献2“赵龙.量子密钥分配及量子签名理论的研究[D].西北大学,2012.”说明了通过其它量子密钥分配协议(如BB84)获得的控制码序列的方法,其长度与安全系数之间存在不可调和的矛盾,安全系数越高,控制码序列的长度就越短,越需要重复使用,而这样又会造成更多信息量的泄露。方案通过控制码序列分组异或的方法增强了控制码序列的安全性,但所传输的密钥序列长度仍然为定值,控制码序列重复使用频次高,存在泄漏的风险大。Document 1 "Chen Pan. Theoretical Research on Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Secret Sharing [D]. Tsinghua University, 2006." discloses a Measuring basis encryption-six states protocol, Abbreviated as MBE-SSP, three different measurement bases are selected through the control code. In the case of no noise and no eavesdropping, the communication efficiency can reach 100%, and for the eavesdropper, it is necessary to select one of the three measurement bases. , the hit probability is only 13, so the scheme is not only highly efficient but also safe. However, it needs to be carried out on the premise that the control code sequence is strictly confidential, and the control code sequence generation method of this scheme is single, and the length of the key sequence generated under the action of the control code sequence is a fixed value, so it often needs to be used repeatedly in practical applications. Control code sequence, there is a risk of leakage in the control code sequence; Document 2 "Zhao Long. Research on Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Signature Theory [D]. Northwest University, 2012." ) method of obtaining the control code sequence, there is an irreconcilable contradiction between its length and the safety factor, the higher the safety factor, the shorter the length of the control code sequence, the more it needs to be reused, and this will cause more information leak. The scheme enhances the security of the control code sequence through the grouping XOR method of the control code sequence, but the length of the transmitted key sequence is still a fixed value, the frequency of repeated use of the control code sequence is high, and there is a high risk of leakage.
发明内容Contents of the invention
针对上述现有技术中存在的缺陷或不足,本发明提出了一种MBE-SSP控制码序列生成方法,该方法基于混沌和量子特性,解决了现有的MBE-SSP控制码序列生成方法中存在的一些问题。Aiming at the defects or deficiencies in the above-mentioned prior art, the present invention proposes a method for generating MBE-SSP control code sequences. some problems.
一种MBE-SSP控制码序列产生方法,具体包括如下步骤:A kind of MBE-SSP control code sequence generation method, specifically comprises the steps:
步骤1、分配与协商阶段:发送方Alice和接收方Bob通过可信赖的认证中心CA获得共享的初始值x0;Alice和Bob通过量子信道协商,获得混沌系统的参数值μ、迭代次数N和初始密钥序列长度n;Step 1, allocation and negotiation phase: the sender Alice and the receiver Bob obtain the shared initial value x 0 through the trusted certification center CA; Alice and Bob obtain the parameter value μ, the number of iterations N and Initial key sequence length n;
步骤2、初始密钥序列生成:Alice将初始值x0和参数值μ送入混沌系统,并迭代N次,得到N个实数,并从中选取n个实数X1a,X2a,...,Xna;将X1a,X2a,...,Xna分别进行二值化处理,生成二进制初始密钥序列S0a;同时,Bob将初始值x0和参数值μ送入与Alice相同的混沌系统,并迭代N次得到N个实数,并用与Alice相同的方式从这N个实数中选取n个实数X1b,X2b,...,Xnb,将X1b,X2b,...,Xnb进行与X1a,X2a,...,Xna相同的二值化处理,生成二进制初始密钥序列S0b;Step 2. Initial key sequence generation: Alice sends the initial value x 0 and parameter value μ into the chaotic system, and iterates N times to get N real numbers, and selects n real numbers X 1a , X 2a ,..., X na ; Binarize X 1a , X 2a ,...,X na respectively to generate binary initial key sequence S 0a ; at the same time, Bob sends the initial value x 0 and parameter value μ into the same Chaotic system, and iterate N times to get N real numbers, and select n real numbers X 1b , X 2b ,...,X nb from the N real numbers in the same way as Alice, and set X 1b , X 2b ,... .,X nb performs the same binarization process as X 1a , X 2a ,...,X na to generate a binary initial key sequence S 0b ;
步骤3、核对码序列与控制码序列生成:Alice通过分组、异或和抽取处理,从初始密钥序列S0a中生成核对码序列S1a和控制码序列S2a;同时,Bob也通过与Alice同样的方法,从初始密钥序列S0b中生成核对码序列S1b和控制码序列S2b;序列S2a、S2b作为Alice和Bob之间通信的控制码序列;Step 3, check code sequence and control code sequence generation: Alice generates the check code sequence S 1a and control code sequence S 2a from the initial key sequence S 0a through grouping, XOR and extraction processing; meanwhile, Bob also passes Alice In the same way, the verification code sequence S 1b and the control code sequence S 2b are generated from the initial key sequence S 0b ; the sequences S 2a and S 2b are used as the control code sequences for communication between Alice and Bob;
步骤4、核对码序列传输与认证:Alice将核对码序列S1a通过量子信道传送给Bob;Bob将接收到的核对码序列S1a与步骤3生成的核对码序列S1b进行比对,并将比对结果反馈给Alice;当S1a与S1b相同时,认为控制码序列S2a与控制码序列S2b相同;将控制码序列S2a以及控制码序列S2b均记为控制码序列K;Step 4. Transmission and authentication of the verification code sequence: Alice transmits the verification code sequence S 1a to Bob through the quantum channel; Bob compares the received verification code sequence S 1a with the verification code sequence S 1b generated in step 3, and sends The comparison result is fed back to Alice; when S 1a and S 1b are the same, it is considered that the control code sequence S 2a is the same as the control code sequence S 2b ; both the control code sequence S 2a and the control code sequence S 2b are recorded as the control code sequence K;
步骤5、控制码序列移位循环产生抛弃码字过程:Alice和Bob均通过控制码序列K选择测量基序列,生成密钥序列;在密钥序列生成过程中,如果所需要的密钥序列长度大于控制码序列K控制的测量基序列长度,则采用控制码序列K移位循环抛弃算法生成不同的控制码序列以备使用。Step 5, the process of generating discarded codewords by shifting and cyclically shifting the control code sequence: both Alice and Bob select the measurement base sequence through the control code sequence K to generate a key sequence; in the process of generating the key sequence, if the required key sequence length If it is greater than the length of the measurement base sequence controlled by the control code sequence K, the control code sequence K is shifted and cyclically discarded to generate different control code sequences for use.
进一步的,所述步骤1中,所述初始值x0∈[-1,1]。Further, in the step 1, the initial value x 0 ∈[-1,1].
进一步的,所述步骤1中,所述混沌系统的参数值μ∈[1.42,2],初始密钥序列长度n为偶数,且n<N。Further, in the step 1, the parameter value of the chaotic system μ∈[1.42, 2], the initial key sequence length n is an even number, and n<N.
进一步的,所述初始值x0=0.8835,参数值μ=1.92,迭代次数N=500次,初始密钥长度n=20。Further, the initial value x 0 =0.8835, the parameter value μ=1.92, the number of iterations N=500, and the initial key length n=20.
进一步的,所述步骤2中,Alice和Bob选择的混沌系统为Logistic映射,
进一步的,所述步骤2中,所述二值化处理的操作:设定一个阈值k,当初始密钥中的某个实数值大于k时,映射为1,当初始密钥中的某个实数值小于等于k时,映射为0;具体形式表示如下:Further, in the step 2, the operation of the binarization process: set a threshold k, when a certain real value in the initial key is greater than k, it is mapped to 1, when a certain real value in the initial key When the real value is less than or equal to k, the mapping is 0; the specific form is as follows:
式中,yi为二进制数值,xi为实数值,i表示初始密钥中的实数的序号。In the formula, y i is a binary value, x i is a real value, and i represents the serial number of the real number in the initial key.
进一步的,所述步骤3中,所述Alice通过分组、异或和抽取处理,从初始密钥序列S0a中生成核对码序列S1a和控制码序列S2a的具体步骤如下:Further, in the step 3, the specific steps of Alice generating the verification code sequence S 1a and the control code sequence S 2a from the initial key sequence S 0a through grouping, XOR and extraction processing are as follows:
将初始密钥序列S0a中的二进制码字依次两两分为一组,并分别将每组中的两个二进制码字进行异或运算,得到序列S1a;再对初始密钥序列S0a进行抽取,得到序列S2a,抽取规则:当序列S1a中某一位为1时,则抽取该位对应组的两个二进制码字中的第二位;当S1a中某一位为0时,则抽取该位对应组的两个二进制码字中的第一位;将序列S2a作为Alice和Bob之间通信的控制码序列,将序列S1a作为核对码序列。Divide the binary codewords in the initial key sequence S 0a into two groups in turn, and perform XOR operation on the two binary codewords in each group respectively to obtain the sequence S 1a ; then the initial key sequence S 0a Perform extraction to obtain sequence S 2a , extraction rule: when a certain bit in sequence S 1a is 1, then extract the second bit in the two binary code words corresponding to the bit; when a certain bit in S 1a is 0 , then extract the first bit in the two binary code words corresponding to the bit; use the sequence S 2a as the control code sequence for communication between Alice and Bob, and use the sequence S 1a as the check code sequence.
进一步的,所述步骤4中,所述步骤4的量子信道采用HKH98协议。Further, in the step 4, the quantum channel in the step 4 adopts the HKH98 protocol.
进一步的,所述步骤5中,所述控制码序列K移位循环抛弃算法如下:Further, in the step 5, the control code sequence K shift cycle discarding algorithm is as follows:
将控制码序列K的第一位和第二位码字组合作为所要抛弃的组合,抛弃之后,当需要再次使用控制码序列时,将控制码序列K的第一位移至其最后一位并将剩余位依次前移,得到新的控制码序列K1;新的控制码序列K1的第一位和第二位码字的组合为所要抛弃的组合;当需要再次使用控制码序列时,依次类推,即是将上次的控制码序列的第一位移至其最后一位并将剩余位依次前移,得到新的控制码序列。The combination of the first bit and the second bit codeword of the control code sequence K is used as the combination to be discarded. After discarding, when the control code sequence needs to be used again, the first bit of the control code sequence K is shifted to the last bit and The remaining bits are moved forward sequentially to obtain a new control code sequence K 1 ; the combination of the first and second codewords of the new control code sequence K 1 is the combination to be discarded; when the control code sequence needs to be used again, sequentially By analogy, the first bit of the previous control code sequence is shifted to the last bit and the remaining bits are shifted forward sequentially to obtain a new control code sequence.
本发明利用混沌系统对初始状态和参数有极度敏感性以及混沌序列良好的随机性生成初始密钥序列,通过分组、异或、抽取得到核对码序列和控制码序列,再通过量子信道传输核对码序列,以确保通信双方的合法性和控制码序列的有效性。当密钥序列长度大于控制码序列所控制的测量基序列长度时,本发明对控制码序列采用了移位循环抛弃算法,使控制码序列在多次使用时所抛弃的组合都不同,控制码序列本身在不断的变化,对应的测量基序列也在不断变化。相较文献1和文献2所记载的方案,本发明中生成的控制码序列未在信道中传输,因此不会让窃听方获得有效信息。同时,通过移位循环抛弃生成不同的控制码序列,使得用一定长度的控制码序列能够传输更长的密钥序列而不出现重复,减少了控制码序列重复出现的频次,降低了信息泄露的风险;同时避免了现有技术中通过其它量子密钥分配协议获得的控制码序列的长度和安全系数之间所存在的不可调和的矛盾。本发明中,当控制码序列的长度为L、循环次数为M时,这时控制码序列有M种变化。The invention utilizes the extreme sensitivity of the chaotic system to the initial state and parameters and the good randomness of the chaotic sequence to generate the initial key sequence, obtains the check code sequence and the control code sequence through grouping, XOR, and extraction, and then transmits the check code through the quantum channel sequence to ensure the legitimacy of both parties in communication and the validity of the control code sequence. When the length of the key sequence is greater than the length of the measurement base sequence controlled by the control code sequence, the present invention adopts a shift cycle discarding algorithm for the control code sequence, so that the combinations discarded when the control code sequence is used for many times are all different, and the control code The sequence itself is constantly changing, and the corresponding measurement base sequence is also constantly changing. Compared with the solutions described in Document 1 and Document 2, the control code sequence generated in the present invention is not transmitted in the channel, so the eavesdropping party will not be able to obtain valid information. At the same time, different control code sequences are generated by shifting and cyclically discarding, so that a longer key sequence can be transmitted with a certain length of control code sequence without repetition, which reduces the frequency of repeated control code sequences and reduces the risk of information leakage. risk; at the same time, it avoids the irreconcilable contradiction between the length of the control code sequence obtained through other quantum key distribution protocols and the safety factor in the prior art. In the present invention, when the length of the control code sequence is L and the number of cycles is M, then the control code sequence has M kinds of changes.
附图说明Description of drawings
图1是步骤1的分配与协商阶段的示意图。FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the allocation and negotiation phase of step 1.
以下结合附图和具体实施方式对本发明进一步解释说明。The present invention will be further explained below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
具体实施方式detailed description
本发明的MBE-SSP控制码序列产生方法,包括以下步骤:MBE-SSP control code sequence generation method of the present invention, comprises the following steps:
步骤1、分配与协商阶段:如图1所示,发送方Alice和接收方Bob通过可信赖的认证中心CA(比如,文献2中所述的CA)获得共享的初始值x0(x0∈[-1,1]);Alice和Bob通过量子信道协商,获得混沌系统的参数值μ(μ∈[1.42,2])、迭代次数N和初始密钥序列长度n,其中,n为偶数,且n<N。Step 1. Allocation and negotiation phase: As shown in Figure 1, the sender Alice and the receiver Bob obtain the shared initial value x 0 (x 0 ∈ [-1,1]); Alice and Bob obtain the parameter value μ(μ∈[1.42,2]) of the chaotic system, the number of iterations N and the length of the initial key sequence n through quantum channel negotiation, where n is an even number, And n<N.
例如:设初始值x0=0.8835,参数值μ=1.92,迭代次数N=500次,初始密钥长度n=20;量子信道采用BB84协议;For example: set the initial value x 0 =0.8835, the parameter value μ=1.92, the number of iterations N=500, and the initial key length n=20; the quantum channel adopts the BB84 protocol;
步骤2、初始密钥序列生成:Alice将初始值x0和参数值μ送入混沌系统,并迭代N次,得到N个实数,并从中选取n个实数X1a,X2a,...,Xna,将X1a,X2a,...,Xna分别进行二值化处理,生成二进制初始密钥序列S0a;同时,Bob将初始值x0和参数值μ送入与Alice相同的混沌系统,并迭代N次得到N个实数,并用与Alice相同的方式从这N个实数选取n个实数X1b,X2b,...,Xnb,将X1b,X2b,...,Xnb进行与X1a,X2a,...,Xna相同的二值化处理,生成二进制初始密钥序列S0b;Step 2. Initial key sequence generation: Alice sends the initial value x 0 and parameter value μ into the chaotic system, and iterates N times to get N real numbers, and selects n real numbers X 1a , X 2a ,..., X na , perform binary processing on X 1a , X 2a ,...,X na respectively to generate a binary initial key sequence S 0a ; at the same time, Bob sends the initial value x 0 and parameter value μ into the same Chaotic system, and iterate N times to get N real numbers, and select n real numbers X 1b , X 2b ,...,X nb from these N real numbers in the same way as Alice, and set X 1b , X 2b ,... ,X nb performs the same binarization process as X 1a , X 2a ,...,X na to generate a binary initial key sequence S 0b ;
例如:Alice和Bob选择的混沌系统为Logistic映射,μ∈(0,2],xi∈[-1,1]。当μ∈[1.42,2]时,系统处于混沌状态。For example: the chaotic system chosen by Alice and Bob is Logistic mapping, μ∈(0,2], x i ∈[-1,1]. When μ∈[1.42,2], the system is in a state of chaos.
上述二值化处理的操作如下:设定一个阈值k=0,当初始密钥中的某个实数值大于k时,映射为1,当初始密钥中的某个实数值小于等于k时,映射为0。具体形式表示如下:The operation of the above-mentioned binarization process is as follows: set a threshold k=0, when a certain real value in the initial key is greater than k, it is mapped to 1; when a certain real value in the initial key is less than or equal to k, mapped to 0. The specific form is expressed as follows:
式中,yi为二进制数值,xi为实数值,i表示初始密钥中的实数的序号。设Alice和Bob生成的初始密钥序列S0a和S0b均为01010000101101101110。In the formula, y i is a binary value, x i is a real value, and i represents the serial number of the real number in the initial key. Assume that the initial key sequences S 0a and S 0b generated by Alice and Bob are both 01010000101101101110.
步骤3、核对码序列与控制码序列生成:Alice通过分组、异或和抽取处理,从初始密钥序列S0a中生成核对码序列S1a和控制码序列S2a;具体步骤如下:Step 3. Generation of verification code sequence and control code sequence: Alice generates verification code sequence S 1a and control code sequence S 2a from the initial key sequence S 0a through grouping, XOR and extraction processing; the specific steps are as follows:
将初始密钥序列S0a中的二进制码字依次两两分为一组,并分别将每组中的两个二进制码字进行异或运算,得到序列S1a;再对初始密钥序列S0a进行抽取,得到序列S2a,抽取规则:当序列S1a中某一位为1时,则抽取该位对应组的两个二进制码字中的第二位;当S1a中某一位为0时,则抽取该位对应组的两个二进制码字中的第一位;将序列S2a作为Alice和Bob之间通信的控制码序列,将序列S1a作为核对码序列;Divide the binary codewords in the initial key sequence S 0a into two groups in turn, and perform XOR operation on the two binary codewords in each group respectively to obtain the sequence S 1a ; then the initial key sequence S 0a Perform extraction to obtain sequence S 2a , extraction rule: when a certain bit in sequence S 1a is 1, then extract the second bit in the two binary code words corresponding to the bit; when a certain bit in S 1a is 0 , then extract the first bit in the two binary code words of the corresponding group; the sequence S 2a is used as the control code sequence for communication between Alice and Bob, and the sequence S 1a is used as the check code sequence;
例如生成的初始密钥序列S0a为01010000101101101110时,S0a被分组后为:01 0100 00 10 11 01 10 11 10;分别将每组中的两个二进制码字进行异或运算,得到的序列S1a为1100101101;再遵循上述对序列S2a的抽取规则对二进制序列S0a进行抽取。例如,序列S1a的第一位为1,该位对应二进制序列S0a中的第一组01,则抽取该对应组中的第二位1,如此依次抽取后,得到序列S2a为1100011010;For example, when the generated initial key sequence S 0a is 01010000101101101110, S 0a is grouped into: 01 0100 00 10 11 01 10 11 10; the two binary code words in each group are subjected to XOR operation to obtain the sequence S 1a is 1100101101; and then extract the binary sequence S 0a according to the above extraction rules for the sequence S 2a . For example, the first bit of the sequence S 1a is 1, which corresponds to the first group 01 in the binary sequence S 0a , then the second bit 1 in the corresponding group is extracted, and after such sequential extraction, the obtained sequence S 2a is 1100011010;
同时,Bob也通过与Alice同样的方法(即分组、异或和抽取处理),从初始密钥序列S0b中生成核对码序列S1b和控制码序列S2b;序列S2b作为Alice和Bob之间通信的控制码序列;At the same time, Bob also generates the verification code sequence S 1b and the control code sequence S 2b from the initial key sequence S 0b through the same method as Alice (that is, grouping, XOR and extraction processing); the sequence S 2b is used as the key between Alice and Bob. Inter-communication control code sequence;
核对码序列是由初始序列分组异或得到的,控制码序列是通过其对应的核对码序列抽取初始密钥序列得到的,只要Alice和Bob的核对码序列一致,那么Alice和Bob的控制码序列就应当是一致的。The check code sequence is obtained by grouping XOR of the initial sequence, and the control code sequence is obtained by extracting the initial key sequence through its corresponding check code sequence. As long as the check code sequences of Alice and Bob are consistent, then the control code sequences of Alice and Bob It should be consistent.
步骤4、核对码序列传输与认证:Alice将核对码序列S1a通过量子信道传送给Bob;本发明中,步骤4的量子信道采用HKH98协议;Bob将接收到的核对码序列S1a与步骤3生成的核对码序列S1b进行比对,并将比对结果反馈给Alice;当S1a与S1b相同时,认为控制码序列S2a和S2b都有效,并且控制码序列S2a与控制码序列S2b相同;将控制码序列S2a以及控制码序列S2b均记为控制码序列K;本发明中,核对码序列S1a通过HKH98协议传送。Step 4, transmission and authentication of the verification code sequence: Alice transmits the verification code sequence S 1a to Bob through the quantum channel; in the present invention, the quantum channel in step 4 adopts the HKH98 protocol; Bob transfers the received verification code sequence S 1a to Step 3 The generated verification code sequence S 1b is compared, and the comparison result is fed back to Alice; when S 1a and S 1b are the same, both the control code sequence S 2a and S 2b are considered to be valid, and the control code sequence S 2a is consistent with the control code The sequence S 2b is the same; the control code sequence S 2a and the control code sequence S 2b are both recorded as the control code sequence K; in the present invention, the check code sequence S 1a is transmitted through the HKH98 protocol.
步骤5、控制码序列移位循环产生抛弃码字过程:Alice和Bob均通过控制码序列K选择测量基序列,生成密钥序列;在密钥序列生成过程中,如果所需要的密钥序列长度大于控制码序列K控制的测量基序列长度,为了降低重复使用固定的控制码序列K的频次,采用控制码序列K移位循环抛弃算法生成不同的控制码序列。控制码序列K移位循环抛弃算法如下:Step 5, the process of generating discarded codewords by shifting and cyclically shifting the control code sequence: both Alice and Bob select the measurement base sequence through the control code sequence K to generate a key sequence; in the process of generating the key sequence, if the required key sequence length It is longer than the length of the measurement base sequence controlled by the control code sequence K. In order to reduce the frequency of repeated use of the fixed control code sequence K, the control code sequence K is shifted and cyclically discarded to generate different control code sequences. The control code sequence K shift cycle discarding algorithm is as follows:
将控制码序列K的第一位和第二位码字组合作为所要抛弃的组合,抛弃之后,当需要再次使用控制码序列时,将控制码序列K的第一位移至其最后一位并将剩余位依次前移,得到新的控制码K1;新的控制码K1的第一位和第二位码字的组合为所要抛弃的组合;当需要再次使用控制码序列时,依次类推,即是将上次的控制码序列的第一位移至其最后一位并将剩余位依次前移,得到新的控制码序列。The combination of the first bit and the second bit codeword of the control code sequence K is used as the combination to be discarded. After discarding, when the control code sequence needs to be used again, the first bit of the control code sequence K is shifted to the last bit and The remaining bits are moved forward in turn to obtain a new control code K 1 ; the combination of the first and second codewords of the new control code K 1 is the combination to be discarded; when the control code sequence needs to be used again, and so on, That is, the first bit of the previous control code sequence is shifted to the last bit and the remaining bits are shifted forward in sequence to obtain a new control code sequence.
例如,控制码序列K为1100011010时,其第一位为1,第二位也为1,则抛弃的码字组合为11;抛弃之后,剩余的控制码序列K′为00011010,由{00,01,10}三组码字组合而成,设它们与测量基的对应关系为:00对应,01对应,10对应,则控制码K′所控制的测量基排序为当需要再次使用控制码序列时,将控制码序列K的第一位移至最后一位,将第二位移至第一位得到新的控制码序列K1为1000110101;此时,其第一位为1,第二位为0,则抛弃的码字组合为10;抛弃之后,剩余的控制码序列K1′为00110101;控制码序列K1′由{00,01,11}三组码字组合而成,设它们与对应的测量基的对应关系为:00对应,01对应,11对应。则控制码K1′所控制的测量基排序为 For example, when the control code sequence K is 1100011010, the first bit is 1, and the second bit is also 1, then the discarded codeword combination is 11; after discarding, the remaining control code sequence K' is 00011010, which is defined by {00, 01,10} three groups of code words are combined, and the corresponding relationship between them and the measurement base is set as: 00 corresponds to , 01 corresponds to , 10 corresponds, then the order of the measurement bases controlled by the control code K' is When the control code sequence needs to be used again, the first bit of the control code sequence K is shifted to the last bit, and the second bit is shifted to the first bit to obtain a new control code sequence K 1 is 1000110101; at this time, its first bit is 1, the second bit is 0, then the discarded codeword combination is 10; after discarding, the remaining control code sequence K 1 ′ is 00110101; the control code sequence K 1 ′ is composed of {00,01,11} three groups of codewords are formed, and the corresponding relationship between them and the corresponding measurement base is set as: 00 corresponds to , 01 corresponds to , 11 corresponds to . Then the sequence of measurement bases controlled by the control code K 1 ′ is
以下是对本发明的方案进行的安全性分析:Following is the security analysis that the scheme of the present invention is carried out:
本发明的方法利用了混沌系统、Logistic映射,需要给通信双方Alice和Bob提供初始值和混沌参数,其中,初始值x0是通过可信赖的认证中心CA获得的,而参数μ的设置、迭代次数N、初始密钥长度n是由Alice和Bob双方协商得到的。其中安全性问题可能出现在以下2个阶段:The method of the present invention utilizes the chaotic system and Logistic mapping, and needs to provide initial values and chaotic parameters to Alice and Bob, where the initial value x0 is obtained through a trusted authentication center CA, and the setting and iteration of parameters μ The times N and the initial key length n are negotiated by Alice and Bob. Among them, security issues may appear in the following two stages:
1、分配与协商阶段(步骤1)。如果CA不可靠,CA所能获得的有效信息只是x0,不能得到混沌系统的参数μ、N和n,为了获得S0a和S0b序列,CA只能去窃听他没有参与的协商阶段,此时他的地位和别的窃听者是一样的。而通信双方协商参数是通过量子信道完成的,安全性可由海森堡测不准原理和量子不可克隆定理来保证。又由于混沌系统对参数具有极度敏感性,即使参数有微小的不同都会造成迭代出的实数值序列完全不同,所以步骤1能够有效防止不可靠CA及其他窃听者的窃听,来保障S0a和S0b是安全的。1. Allocation and negotiation phase (step 1). If the CA is unreliable, the effective information that the CA can obtain is only x 0 , and the parameters μ, N, and n of the chaotic system cannot be obtained. In order to obtain the S 0a and S 0b sequences, the CA can only eavesdrop on the negotiation phase that he does not participate in. At that time, his status was the same as that of other eavesdroppers. The communication parameters are negotiated through the quantum channel, and the security can be guaranteed by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the quantum non-cloning theorem. And because the chaotic system is extremely sensitive to parameters, even if the parameters are slightly different, the iterated real value sequence will be completely different, so step 1 can effectively prevent unreliable CA and other eavesdroppers from eavesdropping, to ensure S 0a and S 0b is safe.
2、核对码序列传输阶段(步骤4)。S1a的作用一是证明Alice的身份合法性,二是确保控制码序列S2a和S2b的一致性。Alice采用HKH98协议需要将S1a传输给Bob,如果存在窃听,在量子测不准和不可克隆原理的保证下,窃听行为将很容易被通信双方发觉;Eve若能获取信息,也只是S1a的不超过1/3的部分信息,对于Eve来说,这个信息并不是有效的信息,因为对S0a进行分段、异或、抽取,得到核对码序列S1a和控制码序列S2a,S1a的生成过程是不可逆的,即容易从S0a得到S1a,再根据S1a得到S2a,但是在获得S1a的情况下,反推不出S0a,也就推不出S2a。因此,即使S1a部分泄漏,也不会危及S2a。因此Eve不能从S1a的部分信息推导出S0a,也就不能推导出S2a。所以该阶段也是安全的。2. Check code sequence transmission stage (step 4). The function of S 1a is to prove the legitimacy of Alice’s identity, and to ensure the consistency of control code sequences S 2a and S 2b . Alice needs to transmit S 1a to Bob using the HKH98 protocol. If there is eavesdropping, under the guarantee of quantum uncertainty and non-cloning principles, the eavesdropping behavior will be easily detected by both communication parties; if Eve can obtain information, it is only S 1a . Part of the information not exceeding 1/3, for Eve, this information is not valid information, because S 0a is segmented, XORed, and extracted to obtain the check code sequence S 1a and the control code sequence S 2a , S 1a The generation process of is irreversible, that is, it is easy to obtain S 1a from S 0a , and then obtain S 2a according to S 1a , but in the case of obtaining S 1a , neither S 0a nor S 2a can be deduced. Therefore, even if S 1a partially leaks, S 2a will not be endangered. Therefore, Eve cannot deduce S 0a from the partial information of S 1a , and therefore cannot deduce S 2a . So this stage is also safe.
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