CN117151698A - Comprehensive information processing system based on data analysis - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a comprehensive information processing system based on data analysis, which relates to the technical field of military information processing and comprises an information acquisition module, a server, a hidden danger sensing module, a comprehensive analysis module and an early warning module; and the information acquisition module is used for acquiring a plurality of pieces of operation data information of a controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system. According to the invention, through monitoring the running state of the controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system, when the potential for abnormal hidden danger exists in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, relevant flight personnel are prompted, and meanwhile, relevant operation and maintenance management personnel are arranged to conduct operation and maintenance management on the military aircraft controller with the potential for abnormal hidden danger in advance, so that the military aircraft controller can be ensured to run stably and efficiently, serious flight accidents caused by aircraft manipulation problems are effectively prevented, and the situation that the life safety of crew and ground personnel is endangered is caused.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of military information processing, in particular to a comprehensive information processing system based on data analysis.
Background
The comprehensive information processing system based on data analysis is a complex data processing and distributing system, and is generally used for monitoring, analyzing and distributing various types of data so as to meet the requirements of different terminal devices and users.
The comprehensive information processing system has wide application in the field of military industry, and can help to improve the efficiency of military operation, the accuracy of decision making and the management of resources.
A controller is a component in an integrated information handling system that typically includes multiple components for collecting, storing, processing, and distributing information to support decision making and operation. The controller is responsible for managing the operation of the whole comprehensive information processing system, can coordinate the communication and cooperation among different components, and ensures that all parts of the system work cooperatively. In military applications, the controller may be responsible for scheduling various tasks, such as flight tasks, reconnaissance tasks, or army deployments, and may formulate mission plans based on various factors, such as resource availability, tactical requirements, and risk assessment. The controller may manage communication with external systems and data sources. This may include connection to satellites, radars, sensor networks, etc. devices, as well as communication with other forces or command centers.
On military aircraft, controllers in integrated information handling systems play a critical role in managing and monitoring the flight operations of the aircraft, can receive instructions from pilots and automatic flight systems, and then adjust the control surfaces (e.g., ailerons, elevators, and rudders) of the aircraft to maintain the stability and maneuverability of the aircraft.
The prior art has the following defects: in the prior art, a controller for a military aircraft is vital in a comprehensive information processing system, and when the controller for the military aircraft has abnormal hidden danger in the comprehensive information processing system and is not perceived, the controller may cause control problems (such as out of control, unstable flight or incapacitation of flight tasks) of the aircraft, which may cause serious flight accidents, cause the aircraft to be damaged or crashed, and endanger the life safety of crew members and ground personnel.
The above information disclosed in the background section is only for enhancement of understanding of the background of the disclosure and therefore it may include information that does not form the prior art that is already known to a person of ordinary skill in the art.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a comprehensive information processing system based on data analysis, by monitoring the running state of a controller used by a military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system, when potential abnormal hidden danger exists in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, relevant flight personnel are prompted, and meanwhile, relevant operation and maintenance management personnel are arranged to conduct operation and maintenance management on the military aircraft controller with the potential abnormal hidden danger in advance, so that the military aircraft controller can run stably and efficiently, serious flight accidents caused by aircraft manipulation problems are effectively prevented, the situation that the aircraft is damaged or crashed, and the life safety of crew and ground personnel is endangered is solved.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions: the comprehensive information processing system based on data analysis comprises an information acquisition module, a server, a hidden danger sensing module, a comprehensive analysis module and an early warning module;
the information acquisition module is used for acquiring a plurality of pieces of operation data information, including aviation performance parameter information and communication information, of a controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system, and after acquisition, processing the aviation performance parameter information and the communication information and uploading the processed aviation performance parameter information and communication information to the server;
the server comprehensively analyzes the processed aviation performance parameter information and communication information when a controller used by the general aircraft runs in the comprehensive information processing system, generates hidden danger coefficients and transmits the hidden danger coefficients to the hidden danger sensing module;
the hidden danger sensing module is used for comparing and analyzing hidden danger coefficients generated by a controller used by the military aircraft when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system with a preset hidden danger coefficient reference threshold value to generate a high hidden danger signal or a low hidden danger signal and transmitting the signals to the comprehensive analysis module;
the comprehensive analysis module is used for continuously acquiring a plurality of hidden danger coefficients generated when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system through the server after receiving the high hidden danger signals generated when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system, establishing an analysis set, comprehensively analyzing hidden danger coefficients in the analysis set, generating accidental signals or non-accidental signals, transmitting the signals to the early warning module, and sending early warning prompts to the non-accidental signals through the early warning module.
Preferably, the aviation performance parameter information of the controller used for the military aircraft in the integrated information processing system comprises a flight control abnormal concealment index and a response performance abnormal variation index, the communication information of the controller used for the military aircraft in the integrated information processing system comprises a communication frequency deviation index, and after acquisition, the information acquisition module respectively marks the flight control abnormal concealment index and the response performance abnormal variation index asAnd->Calibrating the communication frequency offset index to +.>。
Preferably, the logic for the flight control anomaly concealment index acquisition is as follows:
s101, acquiring actual longitudes, actual latitudes and actual speeds of the military aircraft controller at different moments in the T time in the aircraft control process, and calibrating the actual longitudes, the actual latitudes and the actual speeds of the military aircraft controller at different moments in the T time in the aircraft control process as respectively、/>And +.>，xA number representing the actual longitude of the military aircraft controller at various times during the aircraft control process at time T,x=1、2、3、4、……、m，mis a positive integer which is used for the preparation of the high-voltage power supply,ythe number representing the actual latitude of the military aircraft controller at different times during the aircraft control process at time T,y=1、2、3、4、……、n，nis a positive integer, z represents the number of the military aircraft controller to the actual speed at different moments in time T during the aircraft control process, and z=1, 2, 3, 4, … …, p，pIs a positive integer;
s102, acquiring preset longitude, preset latitude and preset speed corresponding to the actual longitude, the actual latitude and the actual speed at the same time in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, and calibrating the preset longitude, the preset latitude and the preset speed as respectively、/>And +.>；
S103, calculating a flight control abnormal state concealment index, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:
wherein, the method comprises the steps of, wherein,，/>。
preferably, the logic for obtaining the response performance anomaly variability index is as follows:
s201, acquiring a plurality of actual response time durations generated in a T time period in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, and calibrating the actual response time durations as，kA number representing a number of actual response durations generated during the aircraft control process by the military aircraft controller during time T,k=1、2、3、4、……、q，qis a positive integer;
s202, calculating a response time standard deviation and a response time average value for actual response time acquired in a T time in the aircraft control process by a military aircraft controller, and calibrating the response time standard deviation and the response time average value as respectivelyAnd->Then: />Then: />；
S203, calculating a response time length variation coefficient of a response time length standard deviation and a response time length average value which are calculated in a T time in the aircraft control process by a military aircraft controller, wherein the calculated expression is as follows: Wherein->Representing a response time variation coefficient;
s204, calculating a response performance abnormality variation index, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:。
preferably, the logic for obtaining the communication frequency offset index is as follows:
s301, acquiring actual communication frequencies and standard communication frequencies corresponding to the actual communication frequencies at different moments in T time in the aircraft control process of a military aircraft controller, and calibrating the actual communication frequencies and the standard communication frequencies corresponding to the actual communication frequencies as respectivelyAnd->，jRepresenting the number of the actual communication frequency and the standard communication frequency corresponding to the actual communication frequency at different times in the T time during the control process of the military aircraft,j=1、2、3、4、……、h，his a positive integer;
s302, calculating a communication frequency offset index, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:in which, in the process,hrepresenting the total number of actual communication frequencies acquired during the aircraft control process by the military aircraft controller over time T.
Preferably, the server obtains the flight control anomaly concealment indexResponse performance abnormality index->Communication frequency offset index->Afterwards, will->、/>And +.>Formulating to generate hidden danger coefficient->The formula according to is: />Wherein->、/>、/>Respectively is a flight control abnormal state concealment index- >Response performance abnormality index->Communication frequency offset index->Is a preset proportional coefficient of>、/>、/>Are all greater than 0.
Preferably, after the hidden danger sensing module obtains the hidden danger coefficient generated when the controller for the military aircraft runs in the comprehensive information processing system, comparing and analyzing the hidden danger coefficient with a preset hidden danger coefficient reference threshold value, wherein the analysis result is as follows:
if the hidden danger coefficient is greater than or equal to the hidden danger coefficient reference threshold, generating a high hidden danger signal through the hidden danger sensing module, and transmitting the signal to the comprehensive analysis module;
if the hidden danger coefficient is smaller than the hidden danger coefficient reference threshold, generating a low hidden danger signal through the hidden danger sensing module, and transmitting the signal to the comprehensive analysis module.
Preferably, after the comprehensive analysis module receives a high hidden danger signal generated when a controller for a military aircraft runs in the comprehensive information processing system, the comprehensive analysis module continuously acquires a plurality of hidden danger coefficients generated when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system through a server to establish an analysis set, and the analysis set is calibrated asFThen，sA number representing the hidden danger coefficient within the analysis set,s=1、2、3、4、……、u，uis a positive integer;
calculating standard deviation and average value of hidden danger coefficients by analyzing a plurality of hidden danger coefficients in the set, and respectively calibrating the standard deviation and average value of hidden danger coefficients as And->(the detailed calculation process of the standard deviation of hidden danger coefficient and the average value of hidden danger coefficient refers to the standard deviation of response time length and the average value of response time length, which are not described in detail herein), and the hidden danger coefficient average value +.>Standard deviation of sum hidden trouble coefficient>Respectively corresponding to the preset hidden danger coefficient reference threshold value +.>And a preset standard deviation reference threshold +.>The results of the comparison analysis were as follows:
if it isGenerating an accidental signal through the comprehensive analysis module, transmitting the signal to the early warning module, and sending out an early warning prompt to the accidental signal without the early warning module;
if it does not meetAnd generating a non-accidental signal through the comprehensive analysis module, transmitting the signal to the early warning module, and sending an early warning prompt to the non-accidental signal through the early warning module to prompt relevant flight personnel.
In the technical scheme, the invention has the technical effects and advantages that:
according to the invention, through monitoring the running state of the controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system, when the potential for abnormal hidden danger exists in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, relevant flight personnel are prompted, and meanwhile, relevant operation and maintenance management personnel are arranged to operate and manage the military aircraft controller with the potential for abnormal hidden danger in advance, so that the military aircraft controller can run stably and efficiently, serious flight accidents caused by aircraft manipulation problems are effectively prevented, and the situation that the life safety of crew and ground personnel is endangered is caused;
According to the method, when the situation that the military aircraft controller has potential abnormal hidden trouble in the aircraft control process is monitored, frequent and non-high-reliability early warning conditions caused by accidental abnormal hidden trouble in the operation process of the military aircraft controller are eliminated by comprehensively analyzing the operation state of the military aircraft controller, the monitoring accuracy of the military aircraft controller is ensured, and the stable and efficient operation of the military aircraft controller is further ensured.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is apparent that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments described in the present application, and other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings for those skilled in the art.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an integrated information handling system based on data analysis according to the present application.
Detailed Description
Example embodiments will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, the exemplary embodiments may be embodied in many forms and should not be construed as limited to the examples set forth herein; rather, these example embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the concept of the example embodiments to those skilled in the art.
The invention provides a comprehensive information processing system based on data analysis, as shown in FIG. 1, which comprises an information acquisition module, a server, a hidden danger sensing module, a comprehensive analysis module and an early warning module;
the information acquisition module is used for acquiring a plurality of pieces of operation data information, including aviation performance parameter information and communication information, of a controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system, and after acquisition, processing the aviation performance parameter information and the communication information and uploading the processed aviation performance parameter information and communication information to the server;
the aviation performance parameter information of a controller used by a military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system comprises a flight control abnormal concealment index and a response performance abnormal variation index, and after the information is acquired, the information acquisition module respectively marks the flight control abnormal concealment index and the response performance abnormal variation index asAnd->。
When the controller of the military aircraft cannot maintain the consistency between the preset latitude and longitude coordinates and the actual latitude and longitude coordinates, a maneuvering problem may be caused, and serious flying accidents are finally caused, so that the life safety of crew members and ground personnel is endangered, and the following is a detailed explanation of why the situation may have serious consequences:
navigation and flight path: latitude and longitude coordinates are basic parameters that determine the position of an aircraft, and if there is a significant deviation between the actual position of the aircraft and the expected position, the flight control system will not ensure that the aircraft is flying in a predetermined flight path, which may cause the aircraft to deviate from a predetermined course into unsafe areas such as mountains, obstacles, or other aircraft paths, increasing the risk of accident;
Terrain and obstacle collisions: if the positional information of the aircraft deviates, the aircraft may fly over dangerous terrain or obstacles such as mountains, buildings, poles, etc., which may cause the aircraft to collide with ground obstacles, causing serious damage or crash;
flight conflict: deviations from the intended path may cause the aircraft to intersect or collide with the flight paths of other aircraft, increasing the risk of an air collision, which may jeopardize the safety of other aircraft and even cause multiple aircraft accidents;
pilot confusion: inconsistent navigational information can confuse pilots because the pilot's navigation system does not match the actual situation, which can lead to erroneous flight decisions, increasing the likelihood of an accident;
limited flight performance: to correct for positional deviations, the aircraft may need to perform unusual maneuvers, such as sharp turns or emergency climbs/falls, which may exceed the performance limits of the aircraft, resulting in stall, insufficient lift, or other performance problems;
personnel life safety: serious flight accidents can cause the crash of the aircraft, threaten the life safety of crewmembers and ground personnel, and can cause serious personnel injury even if the aircraft does not crash;
Therefore, the controller monitors the latitude and longitude of the aircraft flight and the set latitude and longitude, and can sense in time when the controller of the military aircraft cannot maintain the consistency between the preset latitude and longitude coordinates and the actual latitude and longitude coordinates;
when the controllers of the military aircraft cannot maintain the consistency between the actual speed and the set speed of the aircraft, steering problems may be caused, and serious flying accidents are finally caused, life safety of the crew and the ground personnel is endangered, and the following is a detailed explanation of why the situation may have serious consequences:
handling problems: the speed of an aircraft is one of the important factors affecting the operability thereof, and if there is a significant deviation between the actual speed and the set speed, the maneuvering characteristics of the aircraft may be affected, for example, too high or too low a speed may cause instability of the aircraft, which is difficult to control;
flight performance problems: inconsistent speed settings may affect aircraft performance, such as balance of lift and drag, speed deviations may result in insufficient or excessive lift, and thus, lift capability and flight characteristics of the aircraft, which may result in difficulty for the pilot to maintain the desired altitude and attitude;
Stall risk: too low a speed may cause the aircraft to stall, i.e. the lift of the aircraft is insufficient to support its weight, which may cause the aircraft to lose lift, start to fall, and the pilot needs to take emergency measures to restore the aircraft's flight status;
overspeed risk: excessive speeds may cause the aircraft to exceed its design limits, may cause structural damage or other unsafe conditions, and may occur particularly at high altitudes or in high speed flights;
the flight performance decreases: speed deviations may lead to reduced performance of the aircraft, such as difficulty in maintaining a predetermined speed, heading, or altitude, which may result in the aircraft failing to fly according to the flight plan, further increasing accident risk.
Therefore, the speed of the aircraft controlled by the controller and the set speed are monitored, and the aircraft can be perceived in time when the controller of the military aircraft cannot maintain the consistency between the preset speed and the actual speed.
The logic for the flight control anomaly concealment index acquisition is as follows:
s101, acquiring actual longitudes, actual latitudes and actual speeds of the military aircraft controller at different moments in the T time in the aircraft control process, and calibrating the actual longitudes, the actual latitudes and the actual speeds of the military aircraft controller at different moments in the T time in the aircraft control process as respectively 、/>And +.>，xA number representing the actual longitude of the military aircraft controller at various times during the aircraft control process at time T,x=1、2、3、4、……、m，mis a positive integer which is used for the preparation of the high-voltage power supply,ythe number representing the actual latitude of the military aircraft controller at different times during the aircraft control process at time T,y=1、2、3、4、……、n，nis a positive integer, z represents the number of the military aircraft controller to the actual speed at different moments in time T during the aircraft control process, and z=1, 2, 3, 4, … …,p，pIs a positive integer;
it should be noted that the GPS receiver is one of the core components of the aircraft navigation system, and can determine the actual position of the aircraft through satellite signals, including longitude and latitude, and the GPS also provides the ground speed information of the aircraft, and these data can be acquired in real time and used for navigation and flight control;
s102, acquiring preset longitude, preset latitude and preset speed corresponding to the actual longitude, the actual latitude and the actual speed at the same time in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, and calibrating the preset longitude, the preset latitude and the preset speed as respectively、/>And +.>；
It should be noted that, aircraft are generally equipped with advanced navigation systems, including inertial navigation systems (Inertial Navigation System, INS) and Global Positioning Systems (GPS), which can acquire navigation parameters in real time, including preset longitude and latitude coordinates and target speeds;
S103, calculating a flight control abnormal state concealment index, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:
wherein, the method comprises the steps of, wherein,，/>。
the calculation expression of the flight control abnormal state hidden index shows that the larger the appearance value of the military aircraft controller to the flight control abnormal state hidden index generated when the aircraft is operated in the T time in the aircraft control process is, the larger the abnormal hidden danger of the controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system is, and otherwise, the smaller the abnormal hidden danger of the controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system is.
The poor stability of the response time of the military aircraft controller may cause the handling problem of the aircraft, eventually causing serious flight accidents, endangering the life safety of the crew and ground personnel, and the following is a detailed explanation of why this situation may have serious consequences:
handling problems: the response time of the controller refers to the time required by the control system from receiving the instruction to executing the instruction, if the response time is unstable or overlong, the maneuverability of the aircraft may be affected, and the instability of the response time may cause inconsistent maneuvering input of the aircraft in flight, so that the pilot is difficult to accurately control the aircraft;
Flight performance problems: instability in the response time may cause the control system to react too quickly in some cases and too slowly in other cases, which may affect the flight performance of the aircraft, such as altitude control, heading control, and speed control, and the aircraft may not be able to execute maneuver commands in the intended manner, resulting in flight problems;
flight safety problem: instability of the response time length may cause the aircraft to fail to respond to the pilot's instruction or adjustment of an automatic control system in an emergency, which may cause unavoidable flight accidents such as mountain collision, stall, runaway, etc. in dangerous situations, which may pose a threat to the life safety of crew members and ground personnel;
navigation and risk avoidance problems: under the conditions of navigation and danger avoidance, instability of response time duration can cause that an airplane cannot adjust heading or altitude in time, so that collision risks with obstacles, other airplanes or severe weather conditions are increased;
human error and confusion: instability in response time can confuse pilots because pilots have difficulty predicting the response of the control system, which can lead to erroneous maneuvering decisions, exacerbating flight problems;
The risk of accident increases: unstable response durations can increase the likelihood of accidents, especially during highly dynamic flight phases such as take-off, landing, air combat, or emergency situations.
Therefore, the response performance of the controller during the control of the aircraft is monitored, and the response time of the military aircraft controller can be perceived in time when the stability of the response time is poor.
The logic for response performance anomaly variability index acquisition is as follows:
s201, acquiring a plurality of actual response time durations generated in a T time period in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, and calibrating the actual response time durations as，kA number representing a number of actual response durations generated during the aircraft control process by the military aircraft controller during time T,k=1、2、3、4、……、q，qis a positive integer;
it should be noted that, the FDR is a device on an aircraft, and is used for recording various data in the flight process, including control input and system response, and by analyzing the data of the FDR, the actual response time length, including the response time of the aircraft control system to pilot input, can be determined;
s202, calculating a response time standard deviation and a response time average value for actual response time acquired in a T time in the aircraft control process by a military aircraft controller, and calibrating the response time standard deviation and the response time average value as respectively And->Then: />Then: />；
S203, calculating a response time length variation coefficient of a response time length standard deviation and a response time length average value which are calculated in a T time in the aircraft control process by a military aircraft controller, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:wherein->Representing a response time variation coefficient;
the response time length variation coefficient can be known that the larger the performance value of the response time length variation coefficient generated in the T time in the aircraft control process by the military aircraft controller is, the worse the stability of the military aircraft controller to a plurality of actual response time lengths generated in the T time in the aircraft control process is, and otherwise, the better the stability of the military aircraft controller to a plurality of actual response time lengths generated in the T time in the aircraft control process is;
s204, calculating a response performance abnormality variation index, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:。
the calculation expression of the response performance abnormality variation index shows that the larger the expression value of the response performance abnormality variation index generated when the military aircraft controller operates in the T time in the aircraft control process, the larger the abnormal hidden danger of the controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system is indicated, and the smaller the abnormal hidden danger of the controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system is indicated otherwise.
The communication information of the controller used by the military aircraft in the integrated information processing system comprises a communication frequency offset index, and after acquisition, the information acquisition module marks the communication frequency offset index as。
The communication frequency offset in a controller used by a military aircraft refers to the difference or offset between the actual communication frequency in the communication system and the standard communication frequency at which it should be, which frequency offset is typically expressed in hertz (Hz) or kilohertz (kHz), and the occurrence of the communication frequency offset may cause communication problems, potentially affecting flight safety, in which the military aircraft needs to communicate frequently with ground control centers, other aircraft or related communication sites to receive navigation instructions, exchange flight information, report flight status, etc., and the communication system must operate at a prescribed standard frequency in order to ensure accuracy and reliability of the communication.
The greater communication frequency offset may cause the maneuvering problem of the aircraft, thereby causing serious flight accidents, endangering the life safety of the crew and the ground personnel, and the following is a detailed explanation of why the communication frequency offset may have serious influence on the flight safety:
Navigation and communication problems: the aircraft must make frequent communication with the ground control center, other aircraft and related communication sites in flight, wherein the communication includes navigation instructions, flight plan update, weather information, emergency report and the like, and the deviation of the communication frequency can cause the aircraft and the communication party to not accurately conduct information communication, thereby causing navigation misunderstanding, wrong instruction execution or losing important information;
instruction misunderstanding: communication frequency offset may cause the pilot to hear incorrect instructions or misunderstand with the ground control center, which may cause the pilot to perform incorrect operations, such as changing altitude, heading, or speed, to accommodate the incorrect instructions, which may have a serious negative impact on flight safety;
coordination and collision avoidance problems: communication frequency offset may cause coordination and collision avoidance problems between the aircraft and other aircraft, which may increase the risk of air collisions if the aircraft fails to properly receive the other aircraft's position and intent reports, particularly in busy airspace;
navigation misguidance: communication frequency offset may also lead to navigation misdirection, as inaccuracy of the navigation instructions may cause the aircraft to deviate from the planned route, which may lead to the aircraft entering an unsafe pilot, altitude, or path, increasing the risk of contact with obstacles, other aircraft, or adverse weather conditions;
Pilot confusion: frequency offset can confuse pilots because pilots may not be able to clearly hear and understand communications on the console, which can lead to erroneous flight decisions and maneuver inputs, compromising flight safety;
emergency response problem: in emergency situations, inaccuracy in the communication frequency may lead to difficulty in communication between the pilot and the ground control center, thereby delaying the response of the emergency situation, which may lead to exacerbations of serious conditions such as runaway, stall, fire, etc.
Therefore, the difference or the offset between the actual communication frequency and the standard communication frequency which the controller controls the aircraft to fly is monitored, and the difference between the actual communication frequency and the standard communication frequency of the military aircraft controller can be perceived in time when the difference is large.
The logic for communication frequency offset index acquisition is as follows:
s301, acquiring actual communication frequencies and standard communication frequencies corresponding to the actual communication frequencies at different moments in T time in the aircraft control process of a military aircraft controller, and calibrating the actual communication frequencies and the standard communication frequencies corresponding to the actual communication frequencies as respectivelyAnd->，jRepresenting the number of the actual communication frequency and the standard communication frequency corresponding to the actual communication frequency at different times in the T time during the control process of the military aircraft, j=1、2、3、4、……、h，hIs a positive integer;
it should be noted that, the aircraft is equipped with special devices for communication, such as a communication transceiver, and these devices typically display the actual communication frequency currently used on a display screen, so that the pilot can view the actual frequency through the interface or control panel of the device;
aviation communication plans are formulated by aviation authorities or ground control centers for specifying standard communication frequencies for use in different phases of flight and in the air, these plans being provided to pilots and flight controllers, typically in written form, who can review the aviation communication plans during the pre-aviation planning phase to see how often it should be used at that particular phase;
secondly, the military aircraft controller carries out the same subscript on the actual communication frequency in the aircraft control process and the standard communication frequency corresponding to the actual communication frequency at the same moment;
s302, calculating a communication frequency offset index, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:in which, in the process,hrepresenting actual communication frequency acquired during T time during aircraft control by military aircraft controllerTotal number.
The calculation expression of the communication frequency offset index shows that the larger the expression value of the communication frequency offset index generated when the military aircraft controller operates in the T time in the aircraft control process, the larger the abnormal hidden danger of the controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system is indicated, and otherwise, the smaller the abnormal hidden danger of the controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system is indicated.
And the server comprehensively analyzes the processed aviation performance parameter information and communication information when a controller for the general aircraft runs in the comprehensive information processing system, generates hidden danger coefficients and transmits the hidden danger coefficients to the hidden danger sensing module.
The server obtains the abnormal concealing index of the flight controlResponse performance abnormality index->Communication frequency offset index->Afterwards, will->、/>And +.>Formulating to generate hidden danger coefficient->The formula according to is: />Wherein->、/>、/>Respectively is a flight control abnormal state concealment index->Response performance abnormality index->Communication frequency offset index->Is used for the control of the temperature of the liquid crystal display device,、/>、/>are all greater than 0.
As can be seen from the calculation formula, the greater the abnormal concealing index of the military aircraft controller for the flight control generated during the operation in the T time in the aircraft control process, the greater the abnormal variation index of the response performance and the greater the communication frequency offset index, namely the hidden danger coefficient generated during the operation in the T time in the aircraft control process by the military aircraft controllerThe larger the expression value of the controller used by the military aircraft is, the larger the potential abnormality hazard exists in the comprehensive information processing system, and otherwise, the smaller the potential abnormality hazard exists in the comprehensive information processing system.
It should be noted that, the selection of the above-mentioned T time is a time period with a relatively short time, and the time in the time period is not limited herein specifically, and may be set according to practical situations, so as to monitor the situation of the military aircraft controller in the T time during the aircraft control process, thereby monitoring the operation status of the military aircraft controller in different time periods (within the T time) during the aircraft control in real time.
The hidden danger sensing module is used for comparing and analyzing hidden danger coefficients generated by a controller used for the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system with a preset hidden danger coefficient reference threshold value after acquiring the hidden danger coefficients, generating a high hidden danger signal or a low hidden danger signal, and transmitting the signals to the comprehensive analysis module.
After the hidden danger sensing module acquires hidden danger coefficients generated when a controller for the military aircraft runs in the comprehensive information processing system, the hidden danger coefficients are compared with a preset hidden danger coefficient reference threshold value for analysis, and the analysis results are as follows:
if the hidden danger coefficient is greater than or equal to the hidden danger coefficient reference threshold, generating a high hidden danger signal through the hidden danger sensing module, and transmitting the signal to the comprehensive analysis module;
If the hidden danger coefficient is smaller than the hidden danger coefficient reference threshold, generating a low hidden danger signal through the hidden danger sensing module, and transmitting the signal to the comprehensive analysis module;
the comprehensive analysis module is used for continuously acquiring a plurality of hidden danger coefficients generated when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system through the server after receiving the high hidden danger signals generated when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system, establishing an analysis set, comprehensively analyzing hidden danger coefficients in the analysis set, generating accidental signals or non-accidental signals, transmitting the signals to the early warning module, and sending early warning prompts to the non-accidental signals through the early warning module.
After the comprehensive analysis module receives a high hidden danger signal generated when a controller used by a military aircraft runs in the comprehensive information processing system, continuously acquiring a plurality of hidden danger coefficients generated when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system through a server to establish an analysis set, and calibrating the analysis set asFThen，sA number representing the hidden danger coefficient within the analysis set,s=1、2、3、4、……、u，uis a positive integer.
Calculating standard deviation and average value of hidden danger coefficients by analyzing a plurality of hidden danger coefficients in the set, and respectively calibrating the standard deviation and average value of hidden danger coefficients as And->(the detailed calculation process of the standard deviation of hidden danger coefficient and the average value of hidden danger coefficient refers to the standard deviation of response time length and the average value of response time length, which are not described in detail herein), and the hidden danger coefficient average value +.>Standard deviation of sum hidden trouble coefficient>Respectively corresponding to the preset hidden danger coefficient reference threshold value +.>And a preset standard deviation reference threshold +.>The results of the comparison analysis were as follows:
if it isGenerating an accidental signal through the comprehensive analysis module, transmitting the signal to the early warning module, and not sending an early warning prompt to the accidental signal through the early warning module, wherein when the accidental signal is generated by the comprehensive analysis module, the accidental abnormality of the military aircraft controller in the aircraft control process is indicated, and the operation and maintenance management of the military aircraft controller is not required in advance;
if it does not meetGenerating a non-accidental signal by the comprehensive analysis module and transmitting the signal to the early warning module,the early warning module sends out early warning prompt to the non-accidental signals to prompt relevant flight personnel, and when the comprehensive analysis module generates the non-accidental signals, the early warning module indicates that abnormal hidden dangers possibly appear in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, and operation and maintenance management needs to be carried out on the military aircraft controller in advance.
According to the invention, through monitoring the running state of the controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system, when the potential for abnormal hidden danger exists in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, relevant flight personnel are prompted, and meanwhile, relevant operation and maintenance management personnel are arranged to conduct operation and maintenance management on the military aircraft controller with the potential for abnormal hidden danger in advance, so that the military aircraft controller can be ensured to run stably and efficiently, serious flight accidents caused by aircraft manipulation problems are effectively prevented, and the situation that the life safety of crew and ground personnel is endangered is caused.
According to the method, when the situation that the military aircraft controller has potential abnormal hidden trouble in the aircraft control process is monitored, frequent and non-high-reliability early warning conditions caused by accidental abnormal hidden trouble in the operation process of the military aircraft controller are eliminated by comprehensively analyzing the operation state of the military aircraft controller, the monitoring accuracy of the military aircraft controller is ensured, and the stable and efficient operation of the military aircraft controller is further ensured.
The above formulas are all formulas with dimensions removed and numerical values calculated, the formulas are formulas with a large amount of data collected for software simulation to obtain the latest real situation, and preset parameters in the formulas are set by those skilled in the art according to the actual situation.
The formula:the method is characterized in that a large amount of data are collected for software simulation to obtain and select a formula which is close to a true value, wherein the formula is obtained by collecting a plurality of groups of sample data by a person skilled in the art and setting a corresponding preset proportionality coefficient for each group of sample data, and the specific calculation process is as follows: the obtained abnormal concealing index of the flight control and abnormal variation index of response performance and communication frequency offsetSubstituting the index into a formula, forming a ternary once equation set by any three formulas, and screening and averaging the calculated preset proportional coefficient to obtain the preset proportional coefficient +.>、/>、/>Since each set of sample data is different, the specific values of the preset scaling factor for different sample data are also different.
The above embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any other combination. When implemented in software, the above-described embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product comprises one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer program are loaded or executed on a computer, the processes or functions described in accordance with embodiments of the present application are produced in whole or in part. The computer may be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable apparatus. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website site, computer, server, or data center to another website site, computer, server, or data center by wired or wireless means (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.). The computer readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server, data center, etc. that contains one or more sets of available media. The usable medium may be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy disk, hard disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium. The semiconductor medium may be a solid state disk.
It should be understood that, in various embodiments of the present application, the sequence numbers of the foregoing processes do not mean the order of execution, and the order of execution of the processes should be determined by the functions and internal logic thereof, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the various illustrative elements and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, or combinations of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the solution. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present application.
The foregoing is merely illustrative of the present application, and the present application is not limited thereto, and any person skilled in the art will readily recognize that variations or substitutions are within the scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.
While certain exemplary embodiments of the present invention have been described above by way of illustration only, it will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that modifications may be made to the described embodiments in various different ways without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Accordingly, the drawings and description are to be regarded as illustrative in nature and not as restrictive of the scope of the invention, which is defined by the appended claims.
Claims (8)
1. The comprehensive information processing system based on data analysis is characterized by comprising an information acquisition module, a server, a hidden danger sensing module, a comprehensive analysis module and an early warning module;
the information acquisition module is used for acquiring a plurality of pieces of operation data information, including aviation performance parameter information and communication information, of a controller used by the military aircraft in the comprehensive information processing system, and after acquisition, processing the aviation performance parameter information and the communication information and uploading the processed aviation performance parameter information and communication information to the server;
the server comprehensively analyzes the processed aviation performance parameter information and communication information when a controller used by the general aircraft runs in the comprehensive information processing system, generates hidden danger coefficients and transmits the hidden danger coefficients to the hidden danger sensing module;
The hidden danger sensing module is used for comparing and analyzing hidden danger coefficients generated by a controller used by the military aircraft when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system with a preset hidden danger coefficient reference threshold value to generate a high hidden danger signal or a low hidden danger signal and transmitting the signals to the comprehensive analysis module;
the comprehensive analysis module is used for continuously acquiring a plurality of hidden danger coefficients generated when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system through the server after receiving the high hidden danger signals generated when the controller runs in the comprehensive information processing system, establishing an analysis set, comprehensively analyzing hidden danger coefficients in the analysis set, generating accidental signals or non-accidental signals, transmitting the signals to the early warning module, and sending early warning prompts to the non-accidental signals through the early warning module.
2. The data analysis-based integrated information processing system according to claim 1, wherein the aviation performance parameter information of the controller for the military aircraft in the integrated information processing system comprises a flight control anomaly concealment index and a response performance anomaly variation index, the communication information of the controller for the military aircraft in the integrated information processing system comprises a communication frequency offset index, and the information acquisition module respectively calibrates the flight control anomaly concealment index and the response performance anomaly variation index to be after acquisition And->Calibrating the communication frequency offset index to +.>。
3. The data analysis-based integrated information handling system of claim 2, wherein the logic for flight control anomaly concealment index acquisition is as follows:
s101, acquiring actual longitudes, actual latitudes and actual speeds of the military aircraft controller at different moments in the T time in the aircraft control process, and calibrating the actual longitudes, the actual latitudes and the actual speeds of the military aircraft controller at different moments in the T time in the aircraft control process as respectively、/>And +.>，xA number representing the actual longitude of the military aircraft controller at various times during the aircraft control process at time T,x=1、2、3、4、……、m，mis a positive integer which is used for the preparation of the high-voltage power supply,ythe number representing the actual latitude of the military aircraft controller at different times during the aircraft control process at time T,y=1、2、3、4、……、n，nis a positive integer, z represents the number of the military aircraft controller to the actual speed at different moments in time T during the aircraft control process, and z=1, 2, 3, 4, … …,p，pIs a positive integer;
s102, acquiring preset longitude, preset latitude and preset speed corresponding to the actual longitude, the actual latitude and the actual speed at the same time in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, and calibrating the preset longitude, the preset latitude and the preset speed as respectively 、/>And +.>；
S103, calculating a flight control abnormal state concealment index, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:
wherein, the method comprises the steps of, wherein,，/>。
4. the integrated information handling system based on data analysis of claim 3, wherein the logic for responding to performance anomaly variability index acquisition is as follows:
s201, acquiring a plurality of actual response time durations generated in a T time period in the aircraft control process of the military aircraft controller, and calibrating the actual response time durations as，kA number representing a number of actual response durations generated during the aircraft control process by the military aircraft controller during time T,k=1、2、3、4、……、q，qis a positive integer;
s202, calculating a response time standard deviation and a response time average value for actual response time acquired in a T time in the aircraft control process by a military aircraft controller, and calibrating the response time standard deviation and the response time average value as respectivelyAnd->Then: />Then: />；
S203, calculating a response time length variation coefficient of a response time length standard deviation and a response time length average value which are calculated in a T time in the aircraft control process by a military aircraft controller, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:in which, in the process,representing a response time variation coefficient;
s204, calculating a response performance abnormality variation index, wherein the calculated expression is as follows: 。
5. The integrated information handling system based on data analysis of claim 4, wherein the logic for communication frequency offset index acquisition is as follows:
s301, acquiring actual communication frequencies and standard communication frequencies corresponding to the actual communication frequencies at different moments in T time in the aircraft control process of a military aircraft controller, and calibrating the actual communication frequencies and the standard communication frequencies corresponding to the actual communication frequencies as respectivelyAnd->，jRepresenting the number of the actual communication frequency and the standard communication frequency corresponding to the actual communication frequency at different times in the T time during the control process of the military aircraft,j=1、2、3、4、……、h，his a positive integer;
s302, calculating a communication frequency offset index, wherein the calculated expression is as follows:in which, in the process,hrepresenting the total number of actual communication frequencies acquired during the aircraft control process by the military aircraft controller over time T.
6. The integrated information handling system based on data analysis of claim 5, wherein the server obtains a flight control anomaly concealment indexResponse performance abnormality index->Communication frequency offset indexAfterwards, will->、/>And +.>Formulating to generate hidden danger coefficient->The formula according to is:
Wherein->、/>、/>Respectively is a flight control abnormal state concealment index->Response performance abnormality index->Communication frequency offset index->Is a preset proportional coefficient of>、/>、/>Are all greater than 0.
7. The comprehensive information processing system based on data analysis according to claim 6, wherein after the hidden danger sensing module obtains a hidden danger coefficient generated when a controller for a military aircraft runs in the comprehensive information processing system, the hidden danger coefficient is compared with a preset hidden danger coefficient reference threshold value for analysis, and the analysis result is as follows:
if the hidden danger coefficient is greater than or equal to the hidden danger coefficient reference threshold, generating a high hidden danger signal through the hidden danger sensing module, and transmitting the signal to the comprehensive analysis module;
if the hidden danger coefficient is smaller than the hidden danger coefficient reference threshold, generating a low hidden danger signal through the hidden danger sensing module, and transmitting the signal to the comprehensive analysis module.
8. The data analysis-based heddle of claim 7The integrated information processing system is characterized in that after an integrated analysis module receives a high hidden danger signal generated by a controller used by a military aircraft when the controller runs in the integrated information processing system, the integrated analysis module continuously acquires a plurality of hidden danger coefficients generated by the controller when the controller runs in the integrated information processing system through a server to establish an analysis set, and the analysis set is calibrated as follows FThen，sA number representing the hidden danger coefficient within the analysis set,s=1、2、3、4、……、u，uis a positive integer;
calculating standard deviation and average value of hidden danger coefficients by analyzing a plurality of hidden danger coefficients in the set, and respectively calibrating the standard deviation and average value of hidden danger coefficients asAnd->And average hidden danger coefficient ++>Standard deviation of sum hidden trouble coefficient>Respectively corresponding to the preset hidden danger coefficient reference threshold value +.>And a preset standard deviation reference thresholdThe results of the comparison analysis were as follows:
if it isGenerating accidental signals through the comprehensive analysis module and transmitting the signals to the early warning module without passing throughThe early warning module sends out early warning prompt to the accident signal;
if it does not meetAnd generating a non-accidental signal through the comprehensive analysis module, transmitting the signal to the early warning module, and sending an early warning prompt to the non-accidental signal through the early warning module to prompt relevant flight personnel.
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