CN119183110A

CN119183110A - Apparatus and method in a federated chain system for interference traceback and coordination

Info

Publication number: CN119183110A
Application number: CN202310748922.XA
Authority: CN
Inventors: 陈可欣; 王威; 王硕; 孙晨
Original assignee: Sony Group Corp
Current assignee: Sony Group Corp
Priority date: 2023-06-21
Filing date: 2023-06-21
Publication date: 2024-12-24
Also published as: WO2024260411A1

Abstract

The present disclosure relates to an apparatus and method in a federated chain system for interference traceback and coordination. A method is described for a first operator device in a federated chain system that is subject to frequency interference by one or more operators. The method includes sending a request for monitoring data to a monitoring control device in the federated chain system in response to a detected value of the frequency interference being above an interference threshold, obtaining monitoring data from the monitoring control device, wherein the monitoring data was previously captured by one or more monitoring devices managed by the monitoring control device and stored at the monitoring control device, performing a summary mapping process on the obtained monitoring data and comparing a result of the summary mapping process with summary information of original monitoring data previously stored on the blockchain to determine whether the obtained monitoring data is accurately complete, and analyzing the monitoring data in response to determining that the obtained monitoring data is accurately complete, thereby determining a source and a type of the interference.

Description

Apparatus and method in a federated chain system for interference traceback and coordination

Technical Field

The present disclosure relates generally to devices and methods for use in federated chain systems, and in particular to techniques for monitoring and coordination of interference between operator devices in federated chain systems.

Background

In recent years, with the development of networks such as power wireless private networks, wireless services have been frequently used in various frequency bands. As an example, industries such as electricity, energy, or rail traffic may use the same or overlapping frequency bands. With the growth of wireless services in multiple industries, the spectrum resources of wireless communications have become somewhat scarce. To cope with this problem, wireless communication systems supporting spectrum sharing have emerged. However, in multi-industry devices (e.g., carrier devices) may interfere when sharing and sharing the public frequency band, thereby posing serious challenges to the communication and security of the private network.

Accordingly, there is a need for a system and method that enables interference monitoring and coordination to be performed safely and effectively.

Disclosure of Invention

The present disclosure proposes a scheme for interference monitoring and coordination in a federated chain system. More specifically, the present disclosure proposes techniques for proving and forensic evidence of interference between operator devices in a spectrum sharing system using blockchains, and corresponding interference coordination after analyzing specific sources and types of interference, thereby improving the accuracy and reliability of interference monitoring and coordination.

According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided an electronic device for a first operator device in a federated chain system, the first operator device being subject to frequency interference by one or more operator devices in the federated chain system that are different from the first operator device. The electronic device includes processing circuitry configured to cause a first carrier device to transmit a request for monitoring data to a monitoring control device in a coalition chain system in response to a detected value of frequency interference being above an interference threshold, to acquire monitoring data from the monitoring control device in response to a confirmation message returned by the monitoring control device for the request for monitoring data, wherein the monitoring data was previously captured by one or more monitoring devices managed by the monitoring control device and stored at the monitoring control device, to perform a digest mapping process on the acquired monitoring data and to compare a result of the digest mapping process with digest information of original monitoring data previously stored on a blockchain to determine whether the acquired monitoring data is accurately complete, and to analyze the monitoring data in response to determining that the acquired monitoring data is accurately complete to determine a source and type of interference experienced by the first carrier device.

Correspondingly, according to a first aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a method for a first operator device in a federated chain system, wherein the first operator device is subject to frequency interference by one or more operators in the federated chain system that are different from the first operator device. The method includes sending a request for monitoring data to a monitoring control device in a coalition chain system in response to a detected value of frequency interference being higher than an interference threshold, acquiring monitoring data from the monitoring control device in response to a confirmation message returned by the monitoring control device for the request for monitoring data, wherein the monitoring data was previously captured by one or more monitoring devices managed by the monitoring control device and stored at the monitoring control device, performing a summary mapping process on the acquired monitoring data, and comparing a result of the summary mapping process with summary information of original monitoring data previously stored on a blockchain to determine whether the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete, and analyzing the monitoring data in response to determining that the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete, thereby determining a source and a type of interference suffered by a first operator device.

According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, a federated chain system is provided that may be used for the traceback and coordination of spectrum interference. The alliance chain system comprises the first operator device, one or more operator devices interfering with the first operator device, a monitoring control device managing the one or more monitoring devices, and a supervisory device for coordinating frequency interference between the operator devices.

According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon one or more instructions that, when executed by one or more processors of an electronic device, cause the electronic device to perform a method according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.

According to a fourth aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a computer program product comprising program instructions which, when executed by one or more processors of a computer, cause the computer to perform a method according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.

The foregoing summary is provided to summarize some example embodiments to provide a basic understanding of aspects of the subject matter described herein. Accordingly, the above features are merely examples and should not be construed to narrow the scope or spirit of the subject matter described herein in any way. Other features, aspects, and advantages of the subject matter described herein will become apparent from the following detailed description of the subject matter when taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

Drawings

A better understanding of the present disclosure may be obtained when the following detailed description of the embodiments is considered in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. The same or similar reference numbers are used in the drawings to refer to the same or like parts. The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form a part of the specification, illustrate embodiments of the present disclosure and, together with the detailed description, serve to explain the principles and advantages of the present disclosure. Wherein:

FIG. 1 illustrates an example scenario diagram of a federated chain system using blockchains in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.

Fig. 2 illustrates an example diagram of functional modules of a plurality of devices in a federated chain system in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Fig. 3 illustrates an information interaction diagram for interference monitoring between operator devices in a federated chain system in accordance with the present disclosure.

Fig. 4 shows an interference signal power profile of a first operator device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Fig. 5 illustrates an information interaction diagram for interference coordination between operator devices in a federated chain system in accordance with the present disclosure.

Fig. 6 illustrates an exemplary electronic device for a first carrier device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Fig. 7 illustrates a flowchart of an example method for a first operator device in a federated chain system, in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Fig. 8 illustrates a flowchart of an example method for a first operator device in a federated chain system, in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Fig. 9 is a block diagram of an example structure of a personal computer as an information processing apparatus employable in an embodiment of the present disclosure;

Fig. 10 is a block diagram showing a first example of a schematic configuration of a base station to which the techniques of the present disclosure may be applied;

Fig. 11 is a block diagram showing a second example of a schematic configuration of a base station to which the techniques of the present disclosure may be applied;

While the embodiments described in this disclosure may be susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms, specific embodiments thereof have been shown by way of example in the drawings and are herein described in detail. It should be understood, however, that the drawings and detailed description thereto are not intended to limit the embodiment to the particular form disclosed, but on the contrary, the intention is to cover all modifications, equivalents and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the present invention as defined by the appended claims.

Detailed Description

Representative applications of various aspects of the apparatus and methods in accordance with the present disclosure are described below. These examples are described merely to increase the context and aid in understanding the described embodiments. It will be apparent, therefore, to one skilled in the art that the embodiments described below may be practiced without some or all of the specific details. In other instances, well-known process steps have not been described in detail in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the described embodiments. Other applications are possible, and the aspects of the present disclosure are not limited to these examples.

Typically, a wireless communication system comprises at least a network device and user devices, the network device being capable of providing communication services for one or more user devices.

In this disclosure, the term "network device" (or "base station") has its full breadth of ordinary meaning and includes at least a wireless communication station that is part of a wireless communication system or radio system to facilitate communication. As examples, the network device may be, for example, an eNB of a 4G communication standard, a gNB of a 5G communication standard, a remote radio head, a wireless access point, a drone control tower, or a communication apparatus performing similar functions. In this disclosure, "network device" and "base station" may be used interchangeably, or "network device" may be implemented as part of "base station". An application example will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings taking a network device as an example.

In the present disclosure, the term "User Equipment (UE)" or "terminal equipment" has the full breadth of its usual meaning and includes at least terminal equipment that is part of a wireless communication system or radio system to facilitate communication. By way of example, the user device may be a terminal device or element thereof, such as a mobile phone, a laptop, a tablet, an in-vehicle communication device, a wearable device, a sensor, etc. In the present disclosure, "user equipment" (hereinafter may be simply referred to as "UE") and "terminal equipment" may be used interchangeably, or "user equipment" may be implemented as part of "terminal equipment".

In the present disclosure, the term "network device side"/"base station side" has the full breadth of its usual meaning, generally indicating the side in the downlink of the communication system on which data is transmitted or the side in the uplink of the communication system on which data is received. Similarly, the term "user equipment side"/"terminal equipment side" has the full breadth of its usual meaning and may accordingly indicate the side in the communication system downlink receiving data or the side in the communication system uplink transmitting data.

It should be noted that although embodiments of the present disclosure are described below primarily based on a communication system comprising network devices and user devices, these descriptions may be correspondingly extended to the case of a communication system comprising any other type of network device side and user device side. For example, the operation on the network device side may correspond to the operation of the base station, while the operation on the user device side may correspond to the operation of the terminal device accordingly.

It should be understood that the various thresholds described below in this disclosure may be default thresholds for the system or thresholds calculated from a priori experience.

In accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure, a federated chain system includes multiple principals that may share spectrum. As depicted in fig. 1, multiple operators (e.g., a first operator and a second operator), spectrum monitoring departments, and regulatory departments may be included in a federated chain system. The bodies may communicate with each other via a wireless medium. Also, these principals can encrypt and store information on the blockchain, and decrypt and view information from the blockchain.

In particular, an operator in embodiments of the present disclosure may include multiple types of enterprises or organizations that provide wireless services. As an example, the operator may be a mobile network operator such as mobile, telecommunications, corporate, or private network operator of a power private network operator or other various industries. The operations of these operators may be performed by operator devices, e.g., base stations, network devices, etc. (e.g., base stations or network devices may communicate with user devices or terminal devices within an area, and may also control and manage communications between user devices or terminal devices). As another example, a CBRS device (CBSD) in a citizen broadband radio service (Citizen Band Radio Service, CBRS) system may also be used as an operator device.

The operator equipment is the subject of using spectrum resources. As described above, when spectrum resources are shared by operator devices in a plurality of industries, serious interference is likely to occur. For example, currently, two unlicensed frequency bands of 230MHz and 1.8GHz can be mainly used in an electric wireless private network, wherein the available bandwidth of the 1.8GHz frequency band is 20MHz, and the frequency band belongs to a common frequency band of multiple industries such as electric power, energy sources, rail transit and the like. Although the spectrum used by each industry has respective characteristics, the rapid growth of wireless services still causes problems such as frequency interference and signal leakage among operators. Because the existing interference monitoring means is insufficient, the evidence collection and the credible tracing of the interference are difficult, so that the coordination efficiency of the interference is low, and the development of wireless network service is limited.

To address this problem, the present disclosure utilizes blockchains to enable reliable monitoring and coordination of interference between operator devices. In this process, participation and collaboration of spectrum monitoring and regulatory authorities in the federated chain system is also required.

In particular, the spectrum monitoring department in embodiments of the present disclosure may be responsible for deploying monitoring radio signals within a certain area. As an example, the spectrum monitoring department may include a national radio monitoring center, a third party monitoring agency with spectrum monitoring capabilities, and so on. The operations of the spectrum monitoring department may be performed by the monitoring control device by managing one or more monitoring devices. For example, each monitoring device may monitor parameters such as signal power within a geographic range in the vicinity. As another example, CBSD witness in the CBRS system may be used as a monitoring device. Alternatively or in addition, the operator may also monitor its spectrum usage. In other words, the operator device may also act as a monitoring device for itself.

The regulatory authorities in embodiments of the present disclosure may be responsible for specifying spectrum allocation and usage policies (e.g., regulating spectrum resource transactions and frequency usage processes between operators), and may coordinate frequency interference between operators (e.g., first and second operators) and approve interference coordination requests, etc. As examples, regulatory authorities may include the communication authorities, radio authorities, the european telecommunication standardization institute, the federal communications commission in the united states, and the like. Operations of the regulatory authorities may be performed by the regulatory devices.

According to embodiments of the present disclosure, when a victim operator device (e.g., shown as a first operator device in fig. 1) is subject to frequency interference by an interfering operator (e.g., shown as a second operator device in fig. 1), a request for monitoring data may be sent to a monitoring control device, and the source and type of interference is known based on analysis of the monitoring data, thereby sending a coordination request to a supervising device such that the second operator device performs a corresponding adjustment to cancel the interference. It should be understood that the victim and interfering operator devices may be the same type of operator device or may be different types of operator devices. Throughout the above process, various information (e.g., device information, monitoring data requests, interference coordination requests, etc.) may be stored encrypted on the blockchain. In other words, the blockchain can be used for storing various information (especially uplink storing of monitoring data) among a plurality of subjects in the alliance chain system, so that the non-tamper property of the data is ensured when operators obtain evidence after being interfered, and therefore, the interference sources can be accurately traced, and efficient and reliable interference coordination is realized.

It should be understood that only an example of a federated chain system is shown in FIG. 1, and that many more types and possible arrangements are possible for its specific implementation. For example, there may be more or fewer types of devices or more or fewer numbers of devices in an actual federated chain system. Features of the present disclosure may be implemented in any of a variety of systems as desired. As one example, a victim operator (e.g., a first operator) may be interfered by multiple operators (e.g., a second operator, a third operator not shown in fig. 1, etc.). As another example, a second operator that interferes with a first operator may also be interfered with by other operators (e.g., a fourth operator not shown in fig. 1, etc.). In this example, the role of the second operator is changed to the disturbed operator, and similar operations to the first operator can be performed.

Corresponding to fig. 1, fig. 2 of the present disclosure shows an exemplary diagram of functional modules of a plurality of devices in a federated chain system in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.

According to embodiments of the present disclosure, functional modules of devices in a federated chain system may include a system initialization module, a spectrum management module, a data processing module, and a data storage module.

Specifically, the system initialization module may be used for registration of devices, uploading of information, and the like. The system initialization module can be subdivided into an identity registration module and an information certification module. Registration in the blockchain network may be achieved by the carrier device, the monitoring control device (and the monitoring device), and the supervisory device using an identity registration module. For example, during registration, an account and public-private key pair may be generated, where the public key is used to encrypt information and the private key is used to sign. This gives the device information of each device tamper-proof and easy to verify characteristics. The information certification module may provide functionality for devices (e.g., carrier devices, monitoring devices, etc.) to upload device information to the blockchain for certification.

The spectrum management module may provide corresponding spectrum management functions for different spectrum requirements. According to examples of the present disclosure, for frequency interference between operator devices, the spectrum management function module may be subdivided into an interference evidence module, and an interference coordination module. These three modules are briefly described below.

The monitoring control device can verify the credibility of each monitoring device, and the monitoring data of the monitoring device is uploaded through the interference certification module, for example, if the credibility is qualified.

Interference forensic module-the disturbed operator device may request monitoring data (this request is also referred to herein as an "interference forensic request") from the monitoring control device through the interference forensic module for interference analysis. Accordingly, the monitoring control device reviews the request and may return corresponding monitoring data.

An interference coordination module by which a victim operator device can request coordination of interference caused to it by an interfering operator. After the supervision equipment approves the request, the interference operator can complete the investigation and processing of the supervision equipment according to the scheme in the interference coordination request.

It should be noted that, according to embodiments of the present disclosure, all three modules described above may store information on or view information from the blockchain. For example, the tamper evidence module may perform summary mapping processing on the monitoring data of the monitoring device, and then upload summary information of the monitoring data to the blockchain, so that the tamper evidence module may compare the monitoring data stored offline from the monitoring device with the summary information stored on the blockchain, so as to determine whether the obtained monitoring data is accurate and reliable (e.g., whether the obtained monitoring data is real original monitoring data that has not been tampered with). For another example, both the interference evidence obtaining request generated by the interference evidence obtaining module and the interference coordination request generated by the interference coordination module can be initiated on the blockchain, so that the requests can be truly traced back, and the basis with reference value is reserved.

The data processing module may be used to encrypt, decrypt, sign, etc. the data and may be used to verify the validity of the identity of the request message. The data storage module can be used for storing data in the alliance chain system and providing corresponding data read-write rights for different devices.

The method for interference monitoring and coordination in a federated chain system presented by the present disclosure will be described in detail below in terms of four aspects, system initialization, interference evidence collection, and interference coordination, corresponding to the primary functional modules of the devices in the federated chain system.

System initialization

Operations in the system initialization process may be performed by a system initialization module of each device in the federated chain system.

Specifically, the operator device, the monitoring control device (and the monitoring device), and the supervisory device complete registration in the blockchain network. An account and public private key pair (PK, SK) may be generated during the registration process. Where public key PK may be used to encrypt information and private key SK may be used to sign information, this process may make the information tamper-resistant and easy to verify.

After registration is complete, multiple carrier devices (e.g., mobile carrier devices, private network carrier devices, CBSDs, etc.) in the federated chain system may store their respective device information on the blockchain. Similarly, the monitoring control device may store device information for one or more monitoring devices it manages on the blockchain. It should be understood that the device information herein includes a plurality of parameters of the device, and storing the parameters on the blockchain for certification can ensure that key information of the device is not tampered with.

According to an example of the present disclosure, the device information of each operator device may be represented as OP _info＝{ID_OP,loc_OP,f_c,OP,B_OP,P_max,OP,Mod_OP. Wherein ID _OP represents a device identifier of the operator device, loc _OP represents a geographical location of the operator device, f _c,OP represents a center frequency of operation of the operator device, B _OP represents a bandwidth, P _max,OP represents a maximum transmission power of the operator device, and Mod _OP represents a modulation mode of a transmission signal of the operator device. It should be appreciated that the device information of the operator device may also include more or fewer parameters than in the examples described above.

According to an example of the present disclosure, the device information for each monitoring device may be represented as MD _info＝{ID_MD,loc_MD,f_MD,B_MD,f_s,MD. Where ID _MD represents the device identifier of the monitoring device, loc _MD represents the geographic location of the monitoring device, f _MD represents the operating frequency band of the monitoring device, B _MD represents the monitoring signal bandwidth, and f _s,MD represents the sampling frequency of the monitoring device. It should be understood that the device information of the monitoring device may also include more or less parameters than in the examples described above.

After system initialization is complete, interference between operator devices in the federated chain system may be documented, forensic, and coordinated.

Syndrome of interference

The participants interfering with the certification process mainly include the monitoring control devices in the coalition chain system along with the monitoring devices they manage and the blockchain. In order to ensure the authenticity of the interference verification data, the interference verification process can be implemented on an intelligent contract deployed by the monitoring control device.

To ensure that the monitoring device is trusted, the present disclosure introduces an assessment mechanism for the trustworthiness of the monitoring device. According to embodiments of the present disclosure, a monitoring control device may set a reputation value for each monitoring device. As previously described, the monitoring device completes identity registration in the blockchain network during system initialization and submits relevant information such as monitoring frequency band, device model, etc. during the process. At the same time, the reputation value of the monitoring device is initialized. For example, the initialization may be based on an assessment of the accuracy of monitoring of the monitoring device and monitoring qualification. The monitoring control device may determine a candidate list of trusted monitoring devices based on reputation values (and/or other qualification audit scores) of a plurality of monitoring devices in the federated chain system. For example, the reputation values of the monitoring devices in the candidate list are each above a certain reputation threshold (also referred to herein as a "first reputation threshold").

In addition to being based on the reputation value of the monitoring device, the smart contract may also select one or more monitoring devices from a plurality of monitoring devices managed by the monitoring control device as trusted monitoring devices based at least on cross-validation of the data of the monitoring devices. The process of cross-validation of data for a plurality of monitoring devices will be described in detail below.

The process of cross-validation of data involves mutual validation of the monitored data of multiple monitoring devices to detect and troubleshoot the authenticity of the monitored data at the source.

In particular, according to embodiments of the present disclosure, the smart contract may randomly select several monitoring devices from a candidate list of trusted monitoring devices for cross-validation of data. It should be appreciated that the randomly selected monitoring devices may be locked in the smart contract so that the locations and corresponding data of the monitoring devices can be obtained in the smart contract at a later cross-validation. It should also be appreciated that the random selection of monitoring devices may be operated by means of hash calculations or the like, such that the random selection is as fair as possible.

According to an embodiment of the present disclosure, it is assumed that a number of monitoring devices selected at random are fully trusted and that other monitoring devices are cross-validated with these monitoring devices for determining the trustworthiness of the other monitoring devices. All monitoring devices in the federated chain system may upload respective monitoring data related information on the smart contract prior to cross-validation. By way of example, the monitoring data related information uploaded by each monitoring device may include one or more of summary mapping processing results of the monitoring data, monitoring time, monitoring location, monitoring frequency band, and data description.

For each monitoring device in the blockchain system other than the randomly selected trusted monitoring device (it should be understood that the monitoring device may or may not be in the candidate list of trusted monitoring devices), the smart contract may compare the monitoring data-related information uploaded by the monitoring device with the monitoring data-related information uploaded by the randomly selected trusted monitoring device. Alternatively, the trusted monitoring device used for comparison herein may be one or more of the randomly selected trusted monitoring devices that are located in proximity to the above-described monitoring device.

In one aspect, in the event that the monitoring data-related information uploaded by one monitoring device differs significantly (e.g., the values of one or more information parameters differ by more than a threshold) from the monitoring device-related information uploaded by any of the one or more trusted monitoring devices to which it was compared, the monitoring device does not pass cross-validation of the data. In other words, the monitoring device is considered to be untrusted and the monitoring data of the monitoring device is considered to be invalid. In this case, the smart contract may not change the reputation value of the monitoring device, or may turn down the reputation value of the monitoring device. On the other hand, in the case where the monitoring data-related information uploaded by one monitoring device differs less from the monitoring device-related information uploaded by all of the one or more trusted monitoring devices to which it is compared (e.g., the values of all information parameters differ by no more than a certain threshold), the monitoring device passes cross-validation of the data. In this case, the smart contract may update the reputation value of the monitoring device accordingly. By way of example, since the trustworthiness of a monitoring device that passes cross-validation of data is validated, the reputation value of the monitoring device may be raised.

Alternatively or additionally, the reputation value of the monitoring device may be associated with the aforementioned threshold value for determining the difference in information parameters. For example, the higher the reputation value of the monitoring device, the greater the threshold for the difference may be. In other words, the higher the previous confidence of the monitoring device, the greater the tolerance that allows it to make mistakes.

It should be appreciated that the cross-validation function of the data is one of the core functions of the smart contracts deployed by the monitoring control device and may be used to enable trust validation of the monitoring device. It should also be appreciated that means such as inverse distance weighting may be used in cross-validation.

According to embodiments of the present disclosure, the reputation value may be rechecked for the monitoring device after data cross-validation. If the reputation value of the monitoring device is above a certain reputation threshold (also referred to herein as a "second reputation threshold"), then the monitoring device is ultimately confirmed to be authentic, otherwise it is ultimately confirmed to be not authentic. It should be appreciated that the first reputation threshold and the second reputation threshold may be the same or different (e.g., the second reputation threshold may be lower or higher than the first reputation threshold).

Through the steps described above, the smart contract may select one or more trusted monitoring devices from the plurality of monitoring devices based at least on cross-validation of the reputation values and data of the plurality of monitoring devices in the federated chain system (e.g., the reputation values of the one or more monitoring devices are each above a reputation threshold (e.g., a second reputation threshold), and cross-validation of the data is passed), guaranteeing the trustworthiness of the one or more monitoring devices and their monitoring data. The monitoring data for the one or more monitoring devices that are confirmed as trusted by the smart contract may be stored offline at the monitoring control device.

After the smart contract selects one or more monitoring devices as trusted monitoring devices, the one or more monitoring devices may store summary information of the respective monitoring data on the blockchain as interfering certification data on the chain. It should be appreciated that due to the limited memory space on the blockchain, the data amount of the monitoring data stored on the chain may be compressed (e.g., using techniques such as digest mapping).

Summary information of its original monitoring data uploaded by each trusted monitoring device may be expressed as meta= { ID _MD,R,T,loc_MD,f_MD,B_MD,f_s,MD, size, URL }, according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. Where ID _MD represents a device identifier of the monitoring device, R represents a summary mapping processing result (e.g., hash value) of original monitoring data of the monitoring device, T represents monitoring time, loc _MD represents a monitoring place, f _MD represents an operating frequency band of the monitoring device, B _MD represents a monitoring signal bandwidth, f _s,MD represents a sampling frequency of the monitoring device, size represents a size of the original monitoring data, and URL represents an offline storage address (e.g., a storage address of the original monitoring data in a monitoring control device) of the original monitoring data. It should be appreciated that the summary information of the monitored data may also include more or less parameters than those in the examples described above.

It should be understood that uploading summary information of the monitoring data may be performed periodically, or the execution frequency may be adaptively adjusted according to factors such as the activity level of the monitoring device.

It should be noted that the above description of the interference certification process in a federated chain system is provided by way of example only and is not intended to be limiting. In practice, more or fewer steps may be included, and the steps may also be performed in a different order than described above. For example, the update (e.g., stay the same, turn up, or turn down) of the reputation value of the smart contract to the monitoring device may occur after cross-validation and before digest information uplinking verification (as previously described), or after digest information uplinking verification.

In the comprehensive view, in the interference certification process, one or more trusted monitoring devices are selected based on the cross verification of the credit value and the data, so that the monitoring data measured by the monitoring devices can be ensured to be true and trusted. In other words, the reliability of the data before the uplink certification is ensured. By uploading and verifying the summary information of the original monitoring data of the monitoring devices, the integrity and the non-tamper property of the summary data are ensured, and the true credibility of the data on the chain is further ensured.

Interference evidence collection

Fig. 3 illustrates an information interaction diagram for interference monitoring between operator devices in a federated chain system in accordance with the present disclosure. The interference evidence obtaining process will be described in detail below in connection with fig. 3.

After the carrier device detects frequency interference during frequency usage, interference evidence may be performed by means of data previously stored during interference evidence (e.g., including summary information of the monitoring data stored offline at the monitoring control device and the original monitoring data stored on the blockchain, etc., as shown in the dashed portion of fig. 3), thereby analyzing the type and source of interference.

As shown in fig. 3, the participants of the interference forensic process mainly include the disturbed operator device (e.g., the first operator device), the monitoring control device, and the blockchain in the federated chain system.

According to embodiments of the present disclosure, a victim operator device may detect frequency interference experienced by itself. When the value of the detected frequency interference is above the interference threshold, the victim operator device may send a monitoring data request (also referred to herein as an "interference evidence request") to a monitoring control device in the coalition chain system via the blockchain.

According to an example of the present disclosure, the monitor Data request may be represented as Data _req＝{ID_1OP,Time,loc_1OP,FB_OP. Where ID _1OP represents the device identifier of the victim carrier device, time represents the victim Time of the victim carrier device, loc _1OP represents the victim location of the victim carrier device, and FB _OP represents the victim frequency band of the victim carrier device. It should be appreciated that the monitoring data request may also include more or fewer parameters than those in the examples described above.

As an example, the victim carrier device can sign the monitor Data request Data _req using a private key resulting in a digital signature Sig _OP＝SK_OP{Data_req, where SK _OP is a signature function encrypted with the victim carrier's private key. The scrambled operator device may upload and save the signed monitoring data request on the blockchain. And if the intelligent approach is determined that the monitoring data request is legal, sending the monitoring data request to monitoring control equipment of a frequency spectrum monitoring department for approval, wherein the approval result is also stored on the blockchain.

The monitoring control device, upon receiving a request for monitoring data from a victim carrier device, may verify the request with the public key of the victim carrier device, and after confirming that there is no error, may return a confirmation message for the request for monitoring data. As an example, public key verification for an encrypted monitoring Data request may be denoted Data _req＝Dec_OP{Sig_OP, where Dec _OP is a function of decrypting with the public key of the victim carrier.

The disturbed operator equipment may obtain monitoring data from the monitoring control equipment in response to an acknowledgement message for the monitoring data request returned by the monitoring control equipment. As described in the foregoing interference certification process, these monitoring data are previously captured and stored at the monitoring control device by one or more monitoring devices that are managed by the monitoring control device and that are determined to be trusted. In addition, the victim carrier device may also view on the blockchain summary information of the original monitoring data previously stored during the tamper evidence phase (these summary information of the original monitoring data stored on the blockchain are considered highly trusted because they cannot be tampered with).

Thereafter, the interfering carrier device may perform integrity verification of the monitored data. Specifically, the interfering carrier device may perform a digest mapping process (e.g., calculate a hash value, specific algorithms including, but not limited to, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, DSA-SHA1, etc.) on the monitored data obtained from the monitoring control device, and then compare it to the result (e.g., hash value) of the digest mapping process included in the digest information of the original monitored data stored on the blockchain. If it is determined that the result of the digest mapping process of the acquired monitoring data coincides with the result of the digest mapping process of the original monitoring data included in the digest information of the original monitoring data stored on the blockchain, the victim carrier device may determine that the acquired monitoring data is accurately complete (in other words, the monitoring data stored in the monitoring control device off-line has not been tampered with). Otherwise, if it is determined that the result of the digest mapping process of the acquired monitoring data does not coincide with the result of the digest mapping process of the original monitoring data included in the digest information of the original monitoring data stored on the blockchain, the victim carrier device may determine that the acquired monitoring data is not accurately complete (in other words, the monitoring data stored offline at the monitoring control device is tampered with or pruned).

It should be appreciated that additionally or alternatively, in the event that it is determined that the acquired monitoring data is not exactly complete, or that the victim operator device finds itself nearby without a deployed monitoring device (e.g., no monitoring data available), the monitoring control device may temporarily mobilize itself trusted devices such as drones as the monitoring devices, and store the field acquired monitoring data at the monitoring control device and store its summary information on the blockchain, while transmitting the acquired monitoring data as accurate and reliable monitoring data to the victim operator device for subsequent interference analysis. It should be appreciated that these newly acquired monitoring data may be similar to the monitoring data stored during the tamper evidence phase and may continue for other subsequent tamper evidence processes.

After the disturbed operator equipment determines that it has acquired accurate and complete monitoring data, it can analyze these monitoring data. From the analysis, the victim operator device can determine the source and type of interference itself is subject to.

According to embodiments of the present disclosure, determining the type of interference experienced by the victim carrier device may be based on the interference graph. In particular, the victim operator device may draw an interference graph based on the acquired monitoring data determined to be accurate and reliable, wherein the interference graph may include at least a time domain interference graph or a frequency domain interference graph. The victim operator device may determine the type of interference based on the curved features of the interference graph. As examples, the types of interference may include at least spurious interference, blocking interference, or intermodulation interference.

Fig. 4 illustrates an interference signal power profile for a victim carrier device (e.g., a first carrier device) in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. It should be understood that fig. 4 is a frequency domain interference diagram, the horizontal axis is a frequency domain Resource Block (RB), and the vertical axis is signal power. As an example, the bandwidth of each resource block RB in fig. 4 is 200kHz (total bandwidth is 10MHz, divided into 50 resource blocks). The interference signal power distribution for 3 geographic areas (e.g., sector 1, sector 2, and sector 3) are shown, respectively.

According to an example of the present disclosure, the three aforementioned interference types are characterized as follows:

Spurious interference, in which the interference noise intensity usually appears as high left and low right or high left and low right in the frequency domain, and the interference frequency source is the side of the resource block RB where the background noise is high;

Blocking interference, which is generally a strong signal transmitted by a device of a different system operator with similar distance, is usually generated by overall high interference noise intensity in the whole frequency domain;

Intermodulation interference-typically there are multiple bumps in the frequency domain and the background noise level fluctuates. The protruding point of the intermodulation interference peak is an intermodulation drop point, and the interference frequency source of the type can be obtained through calculation of the formula of the intermodulation drop point.

In connection with fig. 4, the type of interference in each geographical range can be determined according to the curve characteristics in the corresponding range. For example, there is blocking interference in the range of sector 1 and sector 2 of the victim carrier device, and both blocking interference and spurious interference in the range of sector 3.

It should be understood that only one type of example of an interference pattern is shown in fig. 4. In practice, the method for identifying the interference type is not limited to the method for identifying the signal power distribution map of the physical resource block in fig. 4, but may also include, for example, an identification method based on a combination of signal modulation mode identification and positioning, an interference source identification method based on radio frequency fingerprint, and the like.

According to embodiments of the present disclosure, determining the source of interference experienced by the victim operator device may be based on the interference graph and device information stored on the blockchain during the system initialization phase.

In particular, the victim carrier may query device information (which is non-repudiatable and non-tamperable) of other carrier devices stored on the blockchain. Based on the queried device information and the plotted interference graph, the victim operator can determine from which operator device or devices in the federated chain system each type of interference originates. With continued reference to fig. 4, for example, the victim carrier determines that there is blocking interference within the range of sector 1, then compares the geographic range of sector 1 with the geographic locations of carrier devices recorded on the blockchain, and compares the frequency, time, etc. parameters of the two, and in case of consistent comparison results, can determine which carrier device or devices the source of the blocking interference is (also referred to as the interfering carrier devices).

It should be understood that the information interaction diagram shown in fig. 3 is provided by way of example only and is not intended to be limiting. More or fewer steps may be included in the figures, and steps may also be performed in a different order than depicted in the figures.

In the comprehensive view, in the interference evidence obtaining process of the present disclosure, by comparing the summary mapping processing result of the monitoring data obtained from the monitoring equipment under line with the summary information of the original monitoring data stored on the blockchain, reliable interference evidence obtaining can be realized, that is, the monitoring data obtained in the evidence obtaining stage is ensured to be the accurate and reliable original monitoring data without being tampered. By utilizing the real and credible data to perform interference analysis, the interfered equipment can analyze the source and the type of interference more accurately, so that interference coordination is requested more pertinently.

Interference coordination

Fig. 5 illustrates an information interaction diagram for interference coordination between operator devices in a federated chain system in accordance with the present disclosure. The interference coordination process will be described in detail below in connection with fig. 5.

As shown in fig. 5, the participants of the interference coordination process mainly include a victim operator device (e.g., a first operator device), an interfering operator device (e.g., a second operator device), a supervising device, and a blockchain in the federated chain system.

According to embodiments of the present disclosure, the victim operator equipment analyzes the interference during a previous interference evidence process, determining the type and source of the interference. Thus, the victim operator device may send an interference coordination request for the interfering operator to the supervising device via the blockchain for coordinating interference between the operator devices. Similar to the monitoring data request in the interference evidence process (interference evidence request), the interfered operator may encrypt the interference coordination request using the private key and upload and save the signed interference coordination request on the blockchain. Accordingly, the supervising device may decrypt and obtain the interference coordination request using the public key of the victim carrier device.

According to an example of the present disclosure, the interference coordination request may be denoted ：IC_req＝{ID_2OP,I_type,I_PRB,MC,Time,ID_1OP,Timestamp,Data_source,Interf_Analysis,Voter}. where the interference coordination request may include the following types of content:

Interference operator information the interference operator information may include a device identifier ID _2OP of the interference operator device, an interference type I _type, and a corresponding interference pattern I _PRB (e.g., a frequency domain interference pattern, a time domain interference pattern, etc., such as a signal power profile of a resource block). The inclusion of an interference pattern in the interference coordination request may more fully reflect the interfered condition of the interfered operator, which may be of significance for subsequent processing of interference coordination. In addition, whether the interference type is accurate or not can be easily judged according to the interference graph, so that the supervision equipment can judge and approve.

Coordination mode information the coordination mode information of the interference may comprise a specific coordination mode MC, which coordination mode may be analyzed by the disturbed operator equipment. In particular, different coordination approaches can be taken to solve the interference problem, depending on different interference conditions. For example, the coordination may include one or more of increasing antenna isolation of the interfering carrier devices, adjusting signal transmit power of the interfering carrier devices, briefly turning off the interfering carrier devices, and so on.

The victim carrier information may include information such as a device identifier ID _1OP of the victim carrier device, a victim Time of the victim carrier device, etc.

General information may include information such as a Timestamp.

Data information the interference coordination request may alternatively or additionally comprise data information of the monitoring data. For example, the interference coordination request may include a monitoring Data source data_source (e.g., the monitoring Data that has been proven to be accurate and reliable in the foregoing interference evidence collection process), a monitoring Data Analysis method Interf _analysis (including, but not limited to, the foregoing method based on physical resource block power distribution, the recognition method based on signal modulation mode recognition and positioning combination, the interference source recognition method based on radio frequency fingerprint, etc.), and information Voter of a mechanism that performs authentication on the interference Analysis result. This information can be used as evidence of interference for reference by the supervising device.

It should be appreciated that the interference coordination request may also include more or fewer parameters than those in the above examples.

With continued reference to fig. 5, the supervising device may verify and approve the information in the interference coordination request and store the approval results on the blockchain. If the approval passes, the interfering operator device will receive the positive approval result and the interference coordination request from the supervising device. Correspondingly and optionally, the supervising device may return a request success message to the victim operator device, otherwise a request failure message and reason may be returned.

The interfering operator device, after receiving the interference coordination request and verifying the signature, may adjust according to the coordination manner in the request. For example, the interfering carrier devices may shut down or reduce transmit signal power for a short period of time. The interfering carrier device may then send an interference coordination acknowledgement request to the victim carrier device via the blockchain.

The interfered operator device may detect a noise power value of its own operator device after receiving the interference coordination acknowledgement request. If the value of the frequency interference is below the interference threshold, indicating that the interference source determination is correct, the victim operator device may initiate on the blockchain and send an interference handling acknowledgement message to the supervising device. Conversely, if the value of the frequency interference is still above the interference threshold, the victim carrier device can send a new interference coordination request or interference complaint request to the supervisor device awaiting further investigation and processing.

It should be understood that the information interaction diagram shown in fig. 5 is provided by way of example only and is not intended to be limiting. More or fewer steps may be included in the figures, and steps may also be performed in a different order than depicted in the figures.

It should also be appreciated that only one example of an interfering operator is shown in fig. 5. In practice, there may be multiple interfering operators that create frequency interference to the same interfered operator. According to some examples of the present disclosure, the steps as shown in fig. 5 may be performed for each of the plurality of interfering operators such that the interfering operators adjust according to the manner suggested in the interference coordination request, gradually alleviating interference problems in the system. Alternatively, according to other examples of the present disclosure, information of a plurality of interfering operators may be included in the interference coordination request, such that each interfering operator obtains a coordination manner for itself from the interference coordination request and modulates, thereby solving interference problems in the system.

In summary, in the interference coordination process of the present disclosure, by including, in the interference coordination request, several pieces of information (such as an interference map, an interference type, device information of the operator device, and monitoring data) obtained in the pre-evidence-storing stage or the evidence-collecting stage, it is possible to help the supervisory device judge the interference situation and approve the interference coordination request. Because the information is verified in credibility or information is stored in the blockchain, interference operator equipment is difficult to repudiate interference facts in the coordination process, and therefore efficiency and accuracy of the whole process are improved.

Examples of interference evidence-storage, evidence-collection, and coordination in blockchain-based CBRS systems

One specific example of the proposed techniques for interference certification, forensics and coordination of the present disclosure will be briefly described in connection with a blockchain-based Citizen Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) system.

In accordance with examples of the present disclosure, a CBRS system may include a body of regulatory authorities such as the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA), etc., a Spectrum Access System (SAS) server, CBRS devices (CBSDs), and CBSD witness (which may include priority access Permission (PAL) level CBSDs and general access permission (GAL) level CBSDs), etc. In CBRS systems, SAS servers are under the supervision of regulatory authorities and may manage spectrum allocation policies, verify CBSD spectrum usage, and communicate with CBSDs and CBSD witness to enable allocation and management of spectrum resources. Thus, in a CBRS system, the CBSD may act as an operator device, CBSD witness may act as a monitoring device, and the SAS server may act as both a supervisory device and a monitoring control device.

In the system initialization stage, the above devices can complete registration on the blockchain, and the device information of CBSDs and CBSD witness can be uploaded to the blockchain, so that the key parameter information is ensured not to be tampered. It should be appreciated that the CBSD witness reputation value is initialized at this stage, which initialization may be based on evaluation of the qualification and monitoring accuracy of these devices.

During the interference certification phase, the SAS server may deploy intelligent contracts. The smart contract may determine a candidate list of trusted CBSD witness based on CBSD witness reputation values (typically, the monitoring devices in the candidate list are primarily PAL-level CBSDs) and randomly choose a number CBSD witness from them. The selected ones CBSD witness are used to cross-verify the data for other CBSD witness in the system. The reputation value may again be verified for CBSD witness that passed the data cross-validation, ultimately selecting one or more CBSD witness as trusted monitoring devices based on both the reputation value and the cross-validation. Therefore, the CBSD witness selected before the uplink certification and the monitoring data thereof can be ensured to be highly trusted. These trusted CBSD witness monitoring data may be stored off-line at the SAS server.

The selected trusted one or more CBSD witness may store summary information of its monitored data on the blockchain for use in interfering with data certification. Because the data on the blockchain cannot be tampered, the accuracy and the reliability of the monitored data (abstract information) after the uplink certification are ensured. It should be appreciated that the smart contract may update the reputation value of CBSD witness after cross-validation and prior to the uplink credit, or may update the reputation value of CBSD witness after the uplink credit.

In the interference evidence-taking phase, the disturbed CBSD may send a monitoring data request (also referred to herein as an "interference evidence-taking request") to the SAS server after detecting that the value of the frequency interference is greater than a predetermined interference threshold, and obtain the monitoring data of CBSD witness stored offline from the SAS server (after approval by the SAS server). The victim CBSD may perform a digest mapping process (e.g., hash computation, etc.) on the acquired monitor data and compare the result of the digest mapping process with digest information of the monitor data previously stored on the blockchain to determine whether the acquired monitor data is accurate and reliable. For example, in the event that the comparison results are consistent, the disturbed CBSD may determine that the acquired monitoring data is accurate and reliable, and may perform interference analysis based on these monitoring data to determine the specific source and type of interference.

In the interference coordination phase, after the victim CBSD determines that the interference originates from other one or more CBSDs, an interference coordination request may be sent to the one or more interfering CBSDs. The interference coordination request may at least include a plurality of information such as interference patterns, interference coordination modes, monitoring data sources, etc. for the SAS server to refer to and approve. Since these evidences have high reliability and strong traceability, the interfering CBSD is difficult to repudiate, so that the interfering CBSD can efficiently adjust itself (e.g., adjust its frequency, power, etc. parameters). Because the acquired monitoring data in the evidence obtaining stage is accurate and reliable, the interference graph drawn during analysis is also accurate, so that the reliability of the proposed coordination mode is higher. After the interference CBSD completes the adjustment, an interference coordination acknowledgement request may be initiated on the blockchain to the interfered CBSD. The victim CBSD may send an interference handling acknowledgement message to the SAS server if the value of the detected frequency interference is below an interference threshold, otherwise a new interference coordination request or an interference complaint request may be sent.

It should be appreciated that details regarding some of the operations of interference evidence, evidence-taking, and coordination in federated chain systems have been described in detail above and are not repeated here.

It should be understood that the foregoing examples are presented for ease of understanding only, and are presented to illustrate the application of the disclosed solution in CBRS systems and are not intended to limit the application scenario. For example, as previously described, the operator devices of the present disclosure may include, in addition to CBSD, various types of devices such as mobile network operator devices, industry private network operator devices, and the like. Correspondingly, the present disclosure may also be applied to various types of wireless traffic scenarios.

Technical effects of the present disclosure

According to the method for storing, acquiring and coordinating interference among the operator devices in the alliance chain system, when the disturbed operator devices detect serious spectrum interference, accurate and reliable monitoring data can be obtained in a tracing mode, the source and the type of the interference are analyzed based on the monitoring data, and an interference coordination request is sent to the supervision device, so that the interference operator devices can be correspondingly adjusted, and spectrum interference is reduced.

According to the embodiment of the disclosure, interaction and coordination work among multiple subjects can be realized by using the blockchain, so that information interaction among operator equipment, monitoring control equipment and supervision equipment becomes transparent and efficient. The scheme in the present disclosure ensures that the monitoring device that uploads the data is trusted, and that the data after uploading (e.g., summary information of the monitored data) is trusted. Therefore, the interference tracing is reliable, so that the coordination of the interference is accurate and efficient, and the vigorous development of various wireless services is facilitated.

In the present disclosure, various types of requests (such as a monitoring data request, an interference coordination confirmation request, an interference processing confirmation request, etc.) and various types of information (such as device information, summary information of monitoring data, etc.) can be stored on the blockchain, ensuring safe storage and non-tampering of critical information. The method can be based on circulation when the subsequent interference event or related dispute occurs, so that repudiation is avoided, and efficient identification, identification and tracing of interference are realized.

Exemplary apparatus

Fig. 6 illustrates an exemplary electronic device 600 for a first operator device in a federated chain system in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. The electronic device 600 shown in fig. 6 may include various units to implement embodiments in accordance with the present disclosure. In this example, the electronic device 600 may include a control unit 602, a communication unit 604, and a processing unit 606. In one implementation, the electronic device 600 is implemented as or part of a network device itself, or as or part of a device associated with a network device. The various operations described below in connection with the network device may be implemented by the units 602, 604, 606 of the electronic device 600 or by other possible units. It should be appreciated that the units 602, 604, and 606 may be included or integrated in the processing circuitry of the network device.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, a first operator device is subject to frequency interference by one or more operator devices in the federated chain system that are different from the first operator device. The control unit 602 may be configured to detect a value of frequency interference experienced by the first operator device and, in case the value is above a predetermined interference threshold, the control unit 602 may be configured to instruct the communication unit 604 to send a monitoring data request to a monitoring control device in the alliance chain system. Next, the communication unit 604 may be configured to obtain the monitoring data from the monitoring control device in response to receiving an acknowledgement message for the above-described monitoring data request from the monitoring control device. These monitoring data are previously captured by one or more monitoring devices managed by the monitoring control device and stored at the monitoring control device. The processing unit 606 of the electronic device 600 may be configured to perform a digest mapping process on the acquired monitoring data, such that the control unit 602 compares the result of the digest mapping process with digest information of the original monitoring data previously stored on the blockchain to determine whether the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete. Further, in case it is determined that the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete, the control unit 602 may be configured to analyze the acquired monitoring data to determine the source and type of interference suffered by the first operator device.

Additionally, the control unit 602 of the electronic device 600 may be configured to instruct the communication unit 604 to send an interference coordination request to the supervising device in the coalition chain system for coordinating interference between operator devices after determining the source and type of interference to which the first operator device is subjected.

In some embodiments, electronic device 600 may be implemented at the chip level or may also be implemented at the device level by including other external components (e.g., radio links, antennas, etc.). For example, each electronic device may operate as a communication device as a whole.

It should be noted that the above units are merely logic modules divided according to the specific functions implemented by the units, and are not intended to limit the specific implementation, and may be implemented in software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware, for example. In actual implementation, each unit described above may be implemented as an independent physical entity, or may be implemented by a single entity (e.g., a processor (CPU or DSP, etc.), an integrated circuit, etc.). Where processing circuitry may refer to various implementations of digital circuitry, analog circuitry, or mixed-signal (a combination of analog and digital) circuitry that perform functions in a computing system. The processing circuitry may include, for example, circuitry such as an Integrated Circuit (IC), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a portion or circuit of an individual processor core, an entire processor core, an individual processor, a programmable hardware device such as a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), and/or a system including multiple processors.

Exemplary method

Fig. 7 illustrates a flowchart of an example method 700 for a first operator device (or more specifically, electronic device 600) in a federated chain system in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. The first operator device is subject to frequency interference by one or more operator devices in the federated chain system that are different from the first operator device. As shown in fig. 7, the method 700 may include the first operator device sending a monitoring data request to a monitoring control device in the federated chain system in response to a value of the detected frequency interference being above an interference threshold (block S701). At block S702, the first operator device may obtain monitoring data from the monitoring control device in response to an acknowledgement message returned by the monitoring control device for the monitoring data request, wherein the monitoring data was previously captured by one or more monitoring devices managed by the monitoring control device and stored at the monitoring control device. Thereafter, the first operator device may perform a digest mapping process on the acquired monitoring data and compare the result of the digest mapping process with digest information of the original monitoring data previously stored on the blockchain to determine whether the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete (block S703). In response to determining that the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete, the first operator device may analyze the monitoring data to determine a source and type of interference experienced by the first operator device (block S704). Detailed example operations of the method may be described with reference to the operations above with respect to the victim carrier device (or first carrier device) (or more specifically, the electronic device 600) and are not repeated here.

Fig. 8 illustrates a flowchart of an example method 800 for a first operator device (or more specifically, an electronic device 600) in a federated chain system, in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. The first operator device is subject to frequency interference by one or more operator devices in the federated chain system that are different from the first operator device. As shown in fig. 8, the method 800 may include a first operator device, after determining the source and type of interference it is subjected to, sending an interference coordination request to a supervising device in a federated chain system for coordinating interference between operator devices (block S801). As an example, the interference coordination request may include at least interference operator information and coordination manner information, wherein the interference operator information may include a device identifier of each of the one or more operator devices, an interference type of the operator device, and a corresponding interference graph. Other information that the interference coordination request may include is referred to in the foregoing description of the interference coordination process and is not repeated here. The supervising device may approve the interference coordination request and, after the approval is passed, send an interference coordination request message to one or more operator devices interfering with the first operator device. At block S802, a first operator device may receive, from a blockchain, an interference coordination acknowledgement request initiated by one or more operator devices that have been adjusted according to a coordination manner in the interference coordination request. Thereafter, the first operator device may detect its own noise power value (block S803). At block S804, the first operator device may send an interference handling acknowledgement message to the supervising device in response to the value of the frequency interference being below the interference threshold, or may send a new interference coordination request or an interference complaint request to the supervising device in response to the value of the frequency interference being above the interference threshold. Detailed example operations of the method may be described with reference to the operations above with respect to the victim carrier device (or first carrier device) (or more specifically, the electronic device 600) and are not repeated here.

Aspects of the disclosure may be implemented in the following exemplary manner.

(1) An electronic device for a first operator device in a federated chain system, the first operator device being subject to frequency interference by one or more operator devices in the federated chain system that are different from the first operator device, the electronic device comprising processing circuitry configured to cause the first operator device to:

Transmitting a request for monitoring data to a monitoring control device in the alliance chain system in response to the detected value of the frequency interference being above an interference threshold;

Obtaining monitoring data from a monitoring control device in response to a confirmation message returned by the monitoring control device for a monitoring data request, wherein the monitoring data was previously captured by one or more monitoring devices managed by the monitoring control device and stored at the monitoring control device;

Performing summary mapping processing on the obtained monitoring data, and comparing the result of the summary mapping processing with summary information of the original monitoring data stored previously on the blockchain to determine whether the obtained monitoring data is accurate and complete, and

In response to determining that the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete, the monitoring data is analyzed to determine a source and type of interference experienced by the first operator device.

(2) The electronic device of (1), wherein the monitoring data request includes one or more of:

a device identifier of the first operator device;

The interfered time of the first operator device;

A disturbed location of the first operator device, and

The interfered frequency band of the first operator device.

(3) The electronic device of (2), wherein the monitoring data request is stored on a blockchain.

(4) The electronic device of (1), wherein determining whether the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete comprises:

determining that the acquired monitoring data is accurately complete in response to determining that the result of the digest mapping process of the acquired monitoring data is consistent with the result of the digest mapping process of the original monitoring data included in the digest information of the original monitoring data stored on the blockchain, or

In response to determining that the result of the digest mapping process of the acquired monitoring data is inconsistent with the result of the digest mapping process of the original monitoring data included in the digest information of the original monitoring data stored on the blockchain, determining that the acquired monitoring data is inaccurate and complete.

(5) The electronic device according to (1), wherein:

Before the first carrier device detects the frequency interference, the first carrier device and each of the one or more carrier devices store their device information on the blockchain, and the monitoring control device stores the device information of the one or more monitoring devices it manages on the blockchain.

(6) The electronic device of (5), wherein determining the type of interference experienced by the first operator device comprises:

drawing an interference pattern based on the acquired monitoring data, wherein the interference pattern at least comprises a time domain interference pattern or a frequency domain interference pattern, and

Based on the curve characteristics of the interference graph, a type of interference is determined, wherein the type of interference comprises at least spurious interference, blocking interference or intermodulation interference.

(7) The electronic device of (6), wherein determining the source of the interference experienced by the first operator device comprises:

Querying device information of operator devices stored on a blockchain, and

Based on the device information of the operator devices and the interference graph, it is determined from which one or more of the one or more operator devices in the federated chain system each type of interference originates.

(8) The electronic device of (1), wherein the one or more monitoring devices are trusted monitoring devices selected from a plurality of monitoring devices in the federated chain system by a smart contract based at least on cross-validation of reputation values and data of the plurality of monitoring devices, wherein the smart contract is deployed by the monitoring control device.

(9) The electronic device of (8), wherein the reputation values of the one or more monitoring devices are each above a reputation threshold and the one or more monitoring devices pass cross-validation of data.

(10) The electronic device of (8), wherein the smart contract uploads summary information of raw monitoring data captured by each of the one or more monitoring devices onto a blockchain based on raw monitoring data captured by the one or more monitoring devices that are trusted.

(11) The electronic device of (10), wherein summary information of the raw monitoring data for each monitoring device includes one or more of:

An identifier of the monitoring device;

The method comprises the steps of summarizing and mapping results of original monitoring data, wherein the results of summarizing and mapping processes comprise hash values;

Monitoring time;

monitoring a site;

monitoring a frequency band;

Monitoring a signal bandwidth;

monitoring a signal sampling rate;

size of original monitoring data, and

The storage address of the original monitoring data.

(12) The electronic device of (1), wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to cause the first carrier device to:

After determining the source and type of interference experienced by the first operator device, sending an interference coordination request to a supervising device in the alliance chain system for coordinating interference between the operator devices,

Wherein the interference coordination request comprises at least:

Interference operator information, wherein the interference operator information comprises a device identifier of each of the one or more operator devices interfering with the first operator device, an interference type of the operator device, and a corresponding interference pattern, and

Coordination manner information, wherein the coordination manner information includes a coordination manner for each of the one or more operator devices that interfere with the first operator device, including one or more of increasing antenna isolation for the operator device, decreasing transmit power for the operator device, and briefly shutting down the operator device.

(13) The electronic device of (12), wherein the interference coordination request further comprises at least:

The interfered time of the first operator device;

a device identifier of the first operator device, and

A time stamp.

(14) The electronic device of (12), wherein the interference coordination request further comprises at least:

Monitoring a data source;

Monitoring data analysis method, and

And information of a mechanism for completing authentication on the interference analysis result.

(15) The electronic device of (12), wherein the supervising device approves the interference coordination request and sends an interference coordination request message to the one or more operator devices interfering with the first operator device after the approval passes.

(16) The electronic device of (15), wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to cause the first carrier device to:

receiving an interference coordination acknowledgement request initiated by the one or more operator devices from a blockchain, wherein the one or more operator devices have been adjusted according to a coordination manner in the interference coordination request;

Detecting the noise power value of the own operator device, and

And sending a new interference coordination request or an interference complaint request to the supervision equipment in response to the value of the frequency interference being lower than the interference threshold value.

(17) The electronic device of (1), wherein the first operator device and the one or more operator devices comprise a mobile network operator base station, a power private network operator base station, an industry private network operator base station, or a citizen broadband radio service device (CBSD).

(18) A federated chain system using blockchains, comprising:

The first operator device according to any one of (1) - (17);

One or more carrier devices that generate frequency interference to the first carrier device;

A monitoring control device for managing one or more monitoring devices, and

And the supervision equipment is used for coordinating the frequency interference among the operator equipment.

(19) A method for a first operator device in a federated chain system, the first operator device being subject to frequency interference by one or more operators in the federated chain system that are different from the first operator device, the method comprising:

(20) A computer-readable storage medium storing one or more executable instructions that, when executed by one or more processors of an electronic device, cause the electronic device to perform the method of (19).

(21) A computer program product comprising executable instructions that, when executed by one or more processors of a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of (19).

It should be noted that the above application examples are only exemplary. Embodiments of the present disclosure may also be performed in any other suitable manner in the above application examples, and still achieve the advantageous effects obtained by the embodiments of the present disclosure. Moreover, embodiments of the present disclosure are equally applicable to other similar application examples, and still achieve the advantageous effects obtained by the embodiments of the present disclosure.

It should be understood that machine-executable instructions in a machine-readable storage medium or program product according to embodiments of the present disclosure may be configured to perform operations corresponding to the above-described apparatus and method embodiments. Embodiments of a machine-readable storage medium or program product will be apparent to those skilled in the art when referring to the above-described apparatus and method embodiments, and thus the description will not be repeated. Machine-readable storage media and program products for carrying or comprising the machine-executable instructions described above are also within the scope of the present disclosure. Such a storage medium may include, but is not limited to, floppy disks, optical disks, magneto-optical disks, memory cards, memory sticks, and the like.

In addition, it should be understood that the series of processes and devices described above may also be implemented in software and/or firmware. In the case of implementation by software and/or firmware, a program constituting the software is installed from a storage medium or a network to a computer having a dedicated hardware structure, such as a general-purpose personal computer 1100 shown in fig. 9, which is capable of executing various functions and the like when various programs are installed. Fig. 9 is a block diagram showing an example structure of a personal computer as an information processing apparatus employable in an embodiment of the present disclosure.

In fig. 9, a Central Processing Unit (CPU) 1101 executes various processes according to a program stored in a Read Only Memory (ROM) 1102 or a program loaded from a storage section 1108 to a Random Access Memory (RAM) 1103. In the RAM 1103, data required when the CPU 1101 executes various processes and the like is also stored as needed.

The CPU 1101, ROM 1102, and RAM 1103 are connected to each other via a bus 1104. An input/output interface 1105 is also connected to the bus 1104.

Connected to the input/output interface 1105 are an input section 1106 including a keyboard, a mouse, and the like, an output section 1107 including a display such as a Cathode Ray Tube (CRT), a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), and the like, and a speaker, and the like, a storage section 1108 including a hard disk, and the like, and a communication section 1109 including a network interface card such as a LAN card, a modem, and the like. The communication section 1109 performs communication processing via a network such as the internet.

The driver 1110 is also connected to the input/output interface 1105 as needed. A removable medium 1111 such as a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a magneto-optical disk, a semiconductor memory, or the like is installed on the drive 1110 as needed, so that a computer program read out therefrom is installed into the storage section 1108 as needed.

In the case of implementing the above-described series of processes by software, a program constituting the software is installed from a network such as the internet or a storage medium such as the removable medium 1111.

It will be understood by those skilled in the art that such a storage medium is not limited to the removable medium 1111 shown in fig. 9, in which the program is stored, which is distributed separately from the apparatus to provide the program to the user. Examples of the removable medium 1111 include a magnetic disk (including a floppy disk (registered trademark)), an optical disk (including a compact disk read only memory (CD-ROM) and a Digital Versatile Disk (DVD)), a magneto-optical disk (including a Mini Disk (MD) (registered trademark)), and a semiconductor memory. Or the storage medium may be a ROM 1102, a hard disk contained in the storage section 1108, or the like, in which the program is stored and distributed to users together with the device containing them.

The techniques of this disclosure can be applied to a variety of products.

For example, the electronic device 600 according to the embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented as or included in various network devices/base stations, and the methods as shown in fig. 7 and 8 may also be implemented by various network devices/base stations.

For example, the network devices/base stations mentioned in this disclosure may be implemented as any type of base station, such as an evolved node B (gNB). The gNB may include one or more Transmission and Reception Points (TRPs). The user equipment may be connected to one or more TRPs within one or more gnbs. For example, a user equipment may be able to receive transmissions from multiple gnbs (and/or multiple TRPs provided by the same gNB). For example, the gnbs may include macro gnbs and small gnbs. The small gnbs may be gnbs that cover cells smaller than the macro cell, such as pico gnbs, micro gnbs, and home (femto) gnbs. Alternatively, the base station may be implemented as any other type of base station, such as a NodeB and a base transceiver station (Base Transceiver Station, BTS). The base station may include a main body (also referred to as a base station device) configured to control wireless communications, and one or more remote radio heads (Remote Radio Head, RRH) disposed at a different location than the main body. In addition, various types of terminals, which will be described below, may operate as a base station by temporarily or semi-permanently performing a base station function.

For example, the user devices mentioned in this disclosure, also referred to as terminal devices in some examples, may be implemented as mobile terminals (such as smartphones, tablet Personal Computers (PCs), notebook PCs, portable gaming terminals, portable/dongle-type mobile routers and digital cameras) or vehicle-mounted terminals (such as car navigation devices). User equipment may also be implemented as terminals performing machine-to-machine (M2M) communication (also referred to as Machine Type Communication (MTC) terminals). Further, the user equipment may be a wireless communication module (such as an integrated circuit module including a single die) mounted on each of the above terminals. In some cases, the user equipment may communicate using a variety of wireless communication techniques. For example, the user device may be configured to communicate using two or more of GSM, UMTS, CDMA2000, wiMAX, LTE, LTE-A, WLAN, NR, bluetooth, etc. In some cases, the user equipment may also be configured to communicate using only one wireless communication technology.

Examples according to the present disclosure will be described below with reference to fig. 10 to 11.

Examples about base stations

It should be understood that the term base station in this disclosure has its full breadth of common meaning and includes at least a wireless communication station used to facilitate communication as part of a wireless communication system or radio system. Examples of base stations may be, for example, but not limited to, a base station may be one or both of a Base Transceiver Station (BTS) and a Base Station Controller (BSC) in a GSM system, one or both of a Radio Network Controller (RNC) and a Node B in a WCDMA system, an eNB in an LTE and LTE-Advanced system, or a corresponding network Node in a future communication system (e.g., gNB, eLTE eNB, etc. that may occur in a 5G communication system). Some of the functions in the base station of the present disclosure may also be implemented as entities having a control function for communications in D2D, M M and V2V communication scenarios, or as entities playing a role in spectrum coordination in cognitive radio communication scenarios.

First example

Fig. 10 is a block diagram showing a first example of a schematic configuration of a base station (to which the technique of the present disclosure is exemplified by a gNB in this figure) to which the technique can be applied. The gNB 1200 includes a plurality of antennas 1210 and a base station device 1220. The base station apparatus 1220 and each antenna 1210 may be connected to each other via an RF cable. In one implementation, the gNB 1200 (or base station device 1220) herein may correspond to the operator devices (or more specifically, the electronic device 600) described above.

Each of the antennas 1210 includes a single or multiple antenna elements, such as multiple antenna elements included in a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antenna, and is used for the base station apparatus 1220 to transmit and receive wireless signals. As shown in fig. 10, the gNB 1200 may include a plurality of antennas 1210. For example, the multiple antennas 1210 may be compatible with multiple frequency bands used by the gNB 1200.

The base station device 1220 includes a controller 1221, a memory 1222, a network interface 1223, and a wireless communication interface 1225.

The controller 1221 may be, for example, a CPU or DSP, and operates various functions of higher layers of the base station apparatus 1220. For example, the controller 1221 generates a data packet from data in a signal processed by the wireless communication interface 1225, and transfers the generated packet via the network interface 1223. The controller 1221 may bundle data from the plurality of baseband processors to generate a bundle packet, and transfer the generated bundle packet. The controller 1221 may have a logic function to perform such controls as radio resource control, radio bearer control, mobility management, admission control, and scheduling. The control may be performed in conjunction with a nearby gNB or core network node. The memory 1222 includes a RAM and a ROM, and stores programs executed by the controller 1221 and various types of control data (such as a terminal list, transmission power data, and scheduling data).

The network interface 1223 is a communication interface for connecting the base station apparatus 1220 to the core network 1224. The controller 1221 may communicate with the core network nodes or additional gnbs via a network interface 1223. In this case, the gNB 1200 and the core network node or other gnbs may be connected to each other through logical interfaces (such as an S1 interface and an X2 interface). The network interface 1223 may also be a wired communication interface or a wireless communication interface for a wireless backhaul. If the network interface 1223 is a wireless communication interface, the network interface 1223 may use a higher frequency band for wireless communication than the frequency band used by the wireless communication interface 1225.

Wireless communication interface 1225 supports any cellular communication schemes, such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) and LTE-advanced, and provides wireless connectivity to terminals located in cells of the gNB 1200 via antenna 1210. The wireless communication interface 1225 may generally include, for example, a baseband (BB) processor 1226 and RF circuitry 1227. The BB processor 1226 may perform, for example, encoding/decoding, modulation/demodulation, and multiplexing/demultiplexing, and performs various types of signal processing of layers such as L1, medium Access Control (MAC), radio Link Control (RLC), and Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP). Instead of the controller 1221, the bb processor 1226 may have some or all of the above-described logic functions. The BB processor 1226 may be a memory storing a communication control program, or a module including a processor configured to execute a program and related circuits. The update program may cause the function of the BB processor 1226 to change. The module may be a card or blade inserted into a slot of the base station apparatus 1220. Alternatively, the module may be a chip mounted on a card or blade. Meanwhile, the RF circuit 1227 may include, for example, a mixer, a filter, and an amplifier, and transmit and receive wireless signals via the antenna 1210. Although fig. 10 shows an example in which one RF circuit 1227 is connected to one antenna 1210, the present disclosure is not limited to this illustration, but one RF circuit 1227 may be connected to a plurality of antennas 1210 at the same time.

As shown in fig. 10, wireless communication interface 1225 may include a plurality of BB processors 1226. For example, the plurality of BB processors 1226 may be compatible with the plurality of frequency bands used by the gNB 1200. As shown in fig. 10, wireless communication interface 1225 may include a plurality of RF circuits 1227. For example, the plurality of RF circuits 1227 may be compatible with a plurality of antenna elements. Although fig. 10 shows an example in which the wireless communication interface 1225 includes a plurality of BB processors 1226 and a plurality of RF circuits 1227, the wireless communication interface 1225 may also include a single BB processor 1226 or a single RF circuit 1227.

Second example

Fig. 11 is a block diagram showing a second example of the schematic configuration of a base station (to which the technique of the present disclosure is exemplified by a gNB in this figure) to which the technique can be applied. The gNB 1330 includes multiple antennas 1340, a base station device 1350, and an RRH 1360. The RRH 1360 and each antenna 1340 can be connected to each other via RF cables. Base station device 1350 and RRH 1360 may be connected to each other via high-speed lines, such as fiber optic cables. In one implementation, the gNB 1330 (or base station device 1350) herein may correspond to the operator devices (or more specifically, the electronic device 600) described above.

Each of the antennas 1340 includes a single or multiple antenna elements (such as multiple antenna elements included in a MIMO antenna) and is used for the RRH 1360 to transmit and receive wireless signals. As shown in fig. 11, the gNB 1330 may include a plurality of antennas 1340. For example, multiple antennas 1340 may be compatible with multiple frequency bands used by gNB 1330.

The base station device 1350 includes a controller 1351, a memory 1352, a network interface 1353, a wireless communication interface 1355, and a connection interface 1357. The controller 1351, the memory 1352, and the network interface 1353 are the same as the controller 1221, the memory 1222, and the network interface 1223 described with reference to fig. 10.

Wireless communication interface 1355 supports any cellular communication schemes (such as LTE and LTE-advanced) and provides wireless communication via RRH 1360 and antenna 1340 to terminals located in a sector corresponding to RRH 1360. The wireless communication interface 1355 may generally include, for example, a BB processor 1356. The BB processor 1356 is identical to the BB processor 1226 described with reference to fig. 10, except that the BB processor 1356 is connected to the RF circuitry 1364 of the RRH 1360 via a connection interface 1357. As shown in fig. 11, the wireless communication interface 1355 may include a plurality of BB processors 1356. For example, multiple BB processors 1356 may be compatible with multiple frequency bands used by the gNB 1330. Although fig. 11 shows an example in which the wireless communication interface 1355 includes a plurality of BB processors 1356, the wireless communication interface 1355 may also include a single BB processor 1356.

The connection interface 1357 is an interface for connecting the base station device 1350 (wireless communication interface 1355) to the RRH 1360. The connection interface 1357 may also be a communication module for connecting the base station device 1350 (wireless communication interface 1355) to communication in the above-described high-speed line of the RRH 1360.

The RRH 1360 includes a connection interface 1361 and a wireless communication interface 1363.

The connection interface 1361 is an interface for connecting the RRH 1360 (wireless communication interface 1363) to the base station apparatus 1350. The connection interface 1361 may also be a communication module for communication in the high-speed line described above.

The wireless communication interface 1363 transmits and receives wireless signals via the antenna 1340. The wireless communication interface 1363 may generally include, for example, RF circuitry 1364.RF circuitry 1364 may include, for example, mixers, filters, and amplifiers and transmits and receives wireless signals via antenna 1340. Although fig. 11 shows an example in which one RF circuit 1364 is connected to one antenna 1340, the present disclosure is not limited to this illustration, but one RF circuit 1364 may be connected to a plurality of antennas 1340 at the same time.

As shown in fig. 11, the wireless communication interface 1363 may include a plurality of RF circuits 1364. For example, multiple RF circuits 1364 may support multiple antenna elements. Although fig. 11 shows an example in which the wireless communication interface 1363 includes a plurality of RF circuits 1364, the wireless communication interface 1363 may include a single RF circuit 1364.

Exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure are described above with reference to the drawings, but the present disclosure is of course not limited to the above examples. Various changes and modifications may be made by those skilled in the art within the scope of the appended claims, and it is understood that such changes and modifications will naturally fall within the technical scope of the present disclosure.

For example, a plurality of functions included in one unit in the above embodiments may be implemented by separate devices. Alternatively, the functions realized by the plurality of units in the above embodiments may be realized by separate devices, respectively. In addition, one of the above functions may be implemented by a plurality of units. Needless to say, such a configuration is included in the technical scope of the present disclosure.

In this specification, the steps described in the flowcharts include not only processes performed in time series in the order described, but also processes performed in parallel or individually, not necessarily in time series. Further, even in the steps of time-series processing, needless to say, the order may be appropriately changed.

Although the present disclosure and its advantages have been described in detail, it should be understood that various changes, substitutions and alterations can be made herein without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosure as defined by the appended claims. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one does not exclude the presence of other like elements in a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises an element.

Claims

1. An electronic device for a first operator device in a consortium chain system, wherein the first operator device is subject to frequency interference from one or more operator devices in the consortium chain system that are different from the first operator device, wherein the electronic device comprises a processing circuit, wherein the processing circuit is configured to cause the first operator device to perform the following operations:

In response to the detected frequency interference value being higher than the interference threshold, sending a monitoring data request to a monitoring control device in the alliance chain system;

In response to a confirmation message for the monitoring data request returned by the monitoring control device, acquiring monitoring data from the monitoring control device, wherein the monitoring data is previously captured by one or more monitoring devices managed by the monitoring control device and stored at the monitoring control device;

Performing summary mapping processing on the acquired monitoring data, and comparing the result of the summary mapping processing with the summary information of the original monitoring data previously stored on the blockchain to determine whether the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete; and

In response to determining that the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete, the monitoring data is analyzed to determine the source and type of interference to the first operator's equipment.

2. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the monitoring data request comprises one or more of the following:

a device identifier of the first carrier's device;

The interference time of the first operator's equipment;

The interfered location of the first operator's equipment; and

The interfered frequency band of the first operator's equipment.

3. The electronic device of claim 2, wherein the monitoring data request is stored on a blockchain.

4. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein determining whether the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete comprises:

In response to determining that a result of the summary mapping processing of the acquired monitoring data is consistent with a result of the summary mapping processing of the original monitoring data included in the summary information of the original monitoring data stored on the blockchain, determining that the acquired monitoring data is accurate and complete; or

In response to determining that a result of summary mapping processing of the acquired monitoring data is inconsistent with a result of summary mapping processing of the original monitoring data included in summary information of the original monitoring data stored on the blockchain, it is determined that the acquired monitoring data is inaccurate and incomplete.

5. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein:

Before the first operator device detects frequency interference, the first operator device and each of the one or more operator devices store their device information on the blockchain, and the monitoring control device stores the device information of the one or more monitoring devices it manages on the blockchain.

6. The electronic device according to claim 5, wherein determining the type of interference to which the first operator device is subjected comprises:

Based on the acquired monitoring data, draw an interference graph, wherein the interference graph at least includes a time domain interference graph or a frequency domain interference graph; and

Based on the curve characteristics of the interference graph, the type of interference is determined, wherein the type of interference at least includes spurious interference, blocking interference or intermodulation interference.

7. The electronic device according to claim 6, wherein determining the source of interference to the first operator device comprises:

Query the device information of the operator’s device stored on the blockchain; and

Based on the device information and interference graph of the operator device, determine which operator device or devices among the one or more operator devices in the alliance chain system each type of interference comes from.

8. An electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the one or more monitoring devices are trusted monitoring devices selected from the multiple monitoring devices by a smart contract based at least on the reputation values of the multiple monitoring devices in the alliance chain system and cross-verification of data, and wherein the smart contract is deployed by the monitoring control device.

9 . The electronic device according to claim 8 , wherein the reputation values of the one or more monitoring devices are all higher than a reputation threshold, and the one or more monitoring devices have passed cross-validation of data.

10. An electronic device according to claim 8, wherein the smart contract uploads summary information of the original monitoring data captured by each of the one or more monitoring devices to the blockchain based on the original monitoring data captured by the one or more monitoring devices that are trusted.