CN110069036B - Safe remote control function design method in comprehensive monitoring system - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a safe remote control function design method in an integrated monitoring system, wherein a basic unit of a platform data organization of the SCADA monitoring system is an object, all data in the system and the relation among the data are distributed in various object types in the form of object or object attribute, and each object type is numbered by a unique ObjectId, and the method is characterized in that: designing a corresponding remote control dialog box HMI for each remote control device based on the object-oriented remote control device modeling step, and operating with a dispatcher; the illegal operation without permission is avoided, all operation buttons in the dialog box are subjected to permission judgment, and the operation buttons in the dialog box opened by the user without the operation permission are all in a Disabled inoperable state; and step two, a remote control safety design step, wherein errors caused by operation command disorder due to abnormalities such as CPU, random errors of the memory, transmission errors of the communication link and the like are avoided in the remote control operation process.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to various professional technical fields applied to a comprehensive monitoring ISCS and SCADA distributed platform, and covers the automatic industrial control industries of comprehensive monitoring, electric power monitoring, environment and equipment monitoring systems, water conservancy monitoring, oil and gas chemical industry, rail transit, coal mines and the like.
The rail transit integrated monitoring (ISCS) system is a large computer integrated system based on modern computer technology, network technology, automation technology and information technology. The system integrates a plurality of automatic professional subsystems, and uniformly monitors each professional under the support of an integrated platform, so that the information sharing of each professional system and the linkage control function among the systems are realized, the operation efficiency is improved, and an informatization basis is provided for the realization of the modern operation management of urban rail transit.
Background
The main functions of the integrated monitoring system comprise a real-time centralized monitoring function of the electromechanical equipment and a coordination linkage function among all the systems. On one hand, the comprehensive monitoring system can realize the basic functions of real-time centralized monitoring and control of broadcasting information, clock information and the like of power equipment, fire alarm information and equipment thereof, station environmental control equipment, interval environmental control equipment, environmental parameters, shielded door equipment, flood gate prevention equipment, escalator equipment, lighting equipment, access control equipment, automatic ticket selling and checking equipment, broadcasting and closed-circuit television equipment, a passenger information display system and the like; on the other hand, through the comprehensive monitoring system, high-level functions such as coordination and interaction among related system equipment under the night non-operation condition, the day normal operation condition, the emergency condition and the important equipment failure condition can be realized.
Once the urban rail transit is damaged, public benefits can be seriously harmed, and the urban rail transit belongs to the range of key information infrastructure. The urban rail transit comprehensive monitoring system is used as a core main body of urban rail transit such as large and medium-sized urban subways, light rails, trams and the like, and the safety problem is not ignored. In the technical standard of the integrated monitoring system engineering for urban rail transit of GB-T50636 & 2018 formally implemented in 2018, 9, 1, it is explicitly pointed out that "the information security of the integrated monitoring system should meet the part 1 of the existing national standard" industrial control information system security: assessment Specification GB/T30976.1 and section 2 Industrial control information System Security: the acceptance criteria is specified in GB/T30976.2, and the design, implementation and acceptance are preferably carried out according to the third level of the information system safety level protection standard. However, in the actual situation at present, manufacturers of various domestic integrated monitoring systems design and modify the integrated monitoring systems with higher requirements, so that the integrated monitoring systems can meet more professional security certification, typically SIL (Safety Integrity Level) 2-Level security certification.
SIL certification is a third party assessment, verification and certification for evaluating and confirming the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) or Performance Level (PL) of a safety device based on the standards of IEC 61508 (GB/T20438), IEC 61511 (GB/T21109), IEC 61513, IEC 13849-1, IEC 62061, IEC 61800-5-2, and the like.
The most common and critical functions in the urban rail transit monitoring automation system and one of the functions with the highest requirement on safety is remote control operation of equipment, remote control errors caused by remote control misoperation, permission misjudgment, system remote control data processing errors, communication line faults, data transmission errors and the like may exist in the whole remote control operation process, and if an effective safety guarantee mechanism is lacked, wrong remote control is probably caused, so that certain harm is caused to operation of urban rail transit lines.
The comprehensive monitoring system of the applicant carries out special training on a development method of safety software in the SIL2 grade certification process, learns part of domestic design ideas of signal interlocking systems meeting SIL4 grades, and designs a scheme of safety remote control equipment by combining the characteristics of the comprehensive monitoring system, wherein the scheme can effectively avoid the safety problem caused by the occurrence of abnormalities such as CPU, random errors of a memory, transmission errors of a communication link and the like in the comprehensive monitoring system.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the safety remote control function design method in the comprehensive monitoring system can effectively avoid the safety problem caused by the abnormity of the comprehensive monitoring system, such as CPU, random error of a memory, transmission error of a communication link and the like.
In order to achieve the purpose of the invention, the invention adopts the technical scheme that: a design method of safe remote control function in an integrated monitoring system, the basic unit of platform data organization of the SCADA monitoring system is an object, all data in the system and the relationship among the data are distributed in various object types in the form of object or object attribute, each object type is numbered by a unique ObjectId, characterized in that:
step one, modeling based on object-oriented remote control equipment, and designing a corresponding remote control dialog box HMI for each type of remote control equipment for operating with a dispatcher;
the illegal operation without permission is avoided, all operation buttons in the dialog box are subjected to permission judgment, and the operation buttons in the dialog box opened by the user without the operation permission are all in a Disabled inoperable state;
each device only allows one operator to open for operation, and only allows one operator to open the remote control dialog box of one device at any time by judging the Lock attribute in the breaker data model, namely after one operator opens, the other operator can not open the remote control dialog box of the device;
and interface safety operation logic judgment, namely judging whether certain operation is allowed according to all remote signaling states of the current equipment.
Step two, a remote control safety design step, wherein errors caused by operation command disorder due to abnormalities such as CPU, random errors of a memory, transmission errors of a communication link and the like are avoided in the remote control operation process;
special attributes for security verification are added to the remote object point data model of table 2:
splitting a Command remote control selection Command which is originally 0,1, representing by using two combined commands, and writing two attributes of Command SafetyVal1 and Command SafetyVal2 while writing a Command attribute; the Command0 write-corresponding Command SafeTyVal1 is 0x5aa5, and Command SafeTyVal2 is 0xa55 a; the Command1 corresponding write Command SafetyVal1 is 0xa55a, and Command SafetyVal2 is 0x5aa 5;
the writing of the Command remote control option time is not determined when the Command attribute is written, but the three attributes of the current device are read again by the dialog box after the Command, Command safe val1, and Command safe val2 attributes of the platform data model are written, and the Command remote control option time is written when it is judged that (Command & & Command safe val1 &0x 5aa5 &command & Command safe val2 &0xa 55a) or (Command & & Command safe val1 &0xa 55a & & Command safe val2 &0x 5aa5) is true, and the encrypted string of the remote control option time string 5 is written to the Command attribute comdtid 5. The ExecuteTime attribute is written when an 'execution' button is clicked, and meanwhile, the MD5 encrypted character string of the remote control execution time character string is written into the attribute ExecuteTimeMD5, so that all exceptions of data writing from an HMI interface to a system platform equipment model can be effectively avoided;
the remote control selection data content and the remote control execution data content are transmitted to the PSCADA device apparatus using an extended ASDU of a standard protocol over a data transmission protocol.
The invention has the advantages of
Urban rail transit is a great problem related to the livelihood, and the operation safety of equipment in an urban rail transit system is closely connected with the travel safety of the public. The safe remote control function designed by the application can avoid errors caused by remote control misoperation, permission misjudgment, system processing data errors, communication line faults, data transmission errors and other reasons in the remote control operation process of equipment, and ensures the remote control safety and effectiveness, thereby ensuring the correct and stable and effective operation of the comprehensive monitoring system and reducing accidents.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to specific examples.
Because the types of devices that need to be remotely operated in the integrated monitoring system are various, for convenience of data modeling and description in the introduction, the circuit breaker devices in the power monitoring subsystem in the integrated monitoring system are used for example.
In the method for designing the safe remote control function in the comprehensive monitoring system, the basic unit of the data organization of the SCADA monitoring system UNICON1.0 platform is an object, all data in the system and the relationship among the data are distributed in the examples of various object types in the form of objects or object attributes, and each object example is numbered by a unique ObjectId. The platform system is assisted by a graphical tool, and data is displayed to a user in a form conforming to an actual topological structure, so that the data management capability of the large SCADA system is greatly improved.
Object-oriented modeling of remote control devices
The well designed data modeling mode can provide better support for remote control of an HMI interface and remote control operation. The basic unit of the platform data organization of the integrated monitoring system is an object, and the remote control equipment is subjected to object-oriented modeling, so that the data organization of the remote control equipment is more reasonable and is beneficial to the safety design of the whole remote control function. The data model of the circuit breaker apparatus is shown in the following table.
TABLE 1 Circuit breaker data model
TABLE 2 remote object Point data model
Safety remote control dialog box HMI design
Based on the object-oriented remote control device modeling mode, a corresponding remote control dialog box HMI can be designed for each remote control device for operation with a dispatcher.
Safety design 1: and illegal operation without permission is avoided. All the operation buttons in the dialog box are subjected to authority judgment, and the operation buttons in the dialog box opened by a user without operation authority are in a Disabled inoperable state (gray display).
Safety design 2: each device allows only one operator to be turned on for operation. By judging the Lock attribute in the breaker data model, only one operator is allowed to open the remote control dialog box of one device at any time, namely after one operator opens, another operator can not open the remote control dialog box of the device.
Safety design 3: and interface safety operation logic judgment. Whether certain operation (operation type: switching-off, switching-on, execution and cancellation) is allowed or not is judged according to all remote signaling states of the current equipment, and the specific judgment is as follows.
TABLE 3 device operating logic decisions
(III) remote Security design to meet SIL2
In order to meet the safety design requirement in SIL2, the safety design in the above section is not sufficient to avoid errors caused by operation command disorder due to abnormalities such as CPU, random error in memory, transmission error in communication link, etc. during remote control operation, typically, when an operator clicks the "open" button after all conditions are met, an "open selection" command with a command value of 0 should be sent, and the command should be 0 all the time from the HMI interface to the device data model of the system platform and then transmitted to the circuit breaker device. It is obvious that the following errors may occur in this process, resulting in an operation error.
1. The data written from the HMI interface into the system platform data model is shifted from 0 to 1;
processing errors by the CPU, and processing 0 into other data;
3. a memory error (or due to writing of illegal data in the memory) occurs in the memory storing the command0, and the value is changed to a value other than 0;
4. 0 becomes a non-0 value during link transmission.
Obviously, the above reasons lack the verification of the command data. In order to solve such problems, special safety design is also required.
Safety design 4: the following four special attributes for security verification are added to the "remote object point data model of table 2".
Safety design 4.1: the Command remote control selection Command which is originally 0,1 is split (the Command attribute is reserved at the same time), two combined commands are used for representing, and the Command attribute is written and simultaneously the two attributes of the Command safe Val1 and the Command safe Val2 are written. The Command0 write-corresponding Command SafeTyVal1 is 0x5aa5, and Command SafeTyVal2 is 0xa55 a; command1 corresponds to a write Command SafeTyVal1 of 0xa55a and Command SafeTyVal2 of 0x5aa 5.
The use of a pair of special magic numbers 0x5aa5 and 0xa55a is mainly to avoid possible common mode faults due to anomalies. Binary numbers for 0x5aa5 and 0xa55a are 0101101010100101 and 1010010101011010, respectively. Note that the distances of the inside of the 0x5aa5 number on 1bits, 4bits, 8bits are all maximized (data per 1bit, per 4bits, per 8bits are exactly the opposite); the distances within the 0x5aa5 or 0xa55a numbers at 1bit, 4bit, 8bit are all maximized (data per 1bit, per 4bits, per 8bits are diametrically opposite); and the bitwise exclusive or of 0x5aa5 and 0xa55a has a value of 0xFFFF, i.e., the distance between them is also maximum. The design of the group of data can effectively avoid the disorder of data bits caused by potential abnormality and the like when the data is stored in a CPU, a memory and a hard disk.
TABLE 4 remote object Point (Add Security Attribute) data model
Safety design 4.2: the writing of the Command remote control option time is not determined when the Command attribute is written, but the three attributes of the current device are read again by the dialog box after the Command, Command safe val1, and Command safe val2 attributes of the platform data model are written, and the Command remote control option time is written when it is judged that (Command & & Command safe val1 &0x 5aa5 &command & Command safe val2 &0xa 55a) or (Command & & Command safe val1 &0xa 55a & & Command safe val2 &0x 5aa5) is true, and the encrypted string of the remote control option time string 5 is written to the Command attribute comdtid 5. The ExecuteTime attribute is written when an 'execute' button is clicked, and meanwhile, the MD5 encrypted character string of the remote control execution time character string is written into the attribute ExecuteTimeMD5, so that all exceptions of data writing from an HMI interface to a system platform equipment model can be effectively avoided.
Safety design 4.3: remote control selection, execution data are transmitted to the PSCADA device equipment using an extended ASDU of standard protocol over data transmission protocol. This mechanism can effectively avoid all data transfer anomalies from the system platform equipment model to the PSCADA device equipment.
Remote control selection of data content: the select Command, the select time CommandTime, the security selection attribute data CommandSafetyVal1, CommandSafetyVal2, CommandTimeMD 5. The PSCADA device equipment checks after receiving the remote control selection data: the opening selection Command is valid when (Command ═ 0& & Command safe val1 ═ 0x5aa5& & Command safe val2 ═ 0xa55a) & (Command time MD5 ═ MD5(Command time)) expression is true; the closing selection Command is valid when (Command & & Command safe val1 ═ 0xa55a & & Command safe val2 ═ 0x5aa5) & & (Command time MD5 ═ MD5(Command time)) expression is true.
Remote control execution data content: select Command, select time CommandTime, execute data ExecuteTrigger, execute time ExecuteTime, security select attribute data CommandSafetyVal1, CommandSafetyVal2, CommandTimeMD5, security execute attribute data executetiemmd 5. The PSCADA device equipment performs verification after receiving the remote control execution data: when (Command ═ 0& & Command safe val1 ═ 0x5aa5& & Command safe val2 ═ 0xa55a) & & (Command time MD5 ═ MD5(Command time)) & (execotetime MD5 ═ MD5 (execotetime)) expression is true, the opening execution Command is valid, the device performs the opening operation; when (Command ═ 1& & Command safe val1 ═ 0xa55a & & Command safe val2 ═ 0x5aa5) & & (Command time MD5 ═ MD5(Command time)) & & (execttimemd 5 ═ MD5 (exectetime)) expression is true, the closing Command is valid, the device performs a closing operation.
As can be seen from the above, the design of the remote control function can almost avoid data failure in all links, thereby ensuring the safety of the remote control process, but also brings the following disadvantages:
1) the strengthened safety verification brings more time overhead and delays the real-time performance of remote control;
2) the security verification is strengthened, so that more space overhead is brought, and the memory and hard disk storage are increased;
3) the supported PSCADA device side must make corresponding changes;
the above is directed to the safety design of the downlink data of the remote control selection and execution command, and similar and same safety processing can be performed on the feedback uplink data of the selection and execution command in necessary situations, and the process is not described in detail in the present application.
Typical applications
The safety function designed by the application is mainly used in the urban rail transit comprehensive monitoring system which needs to meet the SIL2 grade, although most of the urban rail transit comprehensive monitoring systems in China at present have no SIL2 grade requirement, from the newly-recruited projects, the requirements are basically provided, so the safety function can be certainly and widely applied to practical projects in the coming years.
Claims (4)
1. A design method of safe remote control function in an integrated monitoring system, the basic unit of platform data organization of the SCADA monitoring system is an object, all data in the system and the relationship among the data are distributed in various object types in the form of object or object attribute, each object type is numbered by a unique ObjectId, characterized in that:
step one, modeling based on object-oriented remote control equipment, and designing a corresponding remote control dialog box HMI for each type of remote control equipment for operating with a dispatcher;
step two, a remote control safety design step, wherein errors caused by operation command disorder due to abnormalities such as CPU, random errors of a memory, transmission errors of a communication link and the like are avoided in the remote control operation process;
in the second step:
add special attributes for security verification on the remote object point data model:
splitting a Command remote control selection Command which is originally 0,1, representing by using two combined commands, and writing two attributes of Command SafetyVal1 and Command SafetyVal2 while writing a Command attribute; the Command0 corresponds to a write Command SafeTyVal1 of 0x5aa5, and Command SafeTyVal2 of 0xa55 a; the Command1 corresponds to a write Command SafeTyVal1 of 0xa55a, and Command SafeTyVal2 of 0x5aa 5;
the writing of the Command remote control option time is not determined at the time of the Command attribute writing, but the three attributes of the current device are read again by the dialog box after the Command, Command safe val1, Command safe val2 attributes of the platform data model are written, and the Command remote control option time is written when it is judged that (Command ═ 0& & Command safe val1 &0x 5aa5 &commandsafe val2 &0xa 55a) or (Command & & Command safe val1 &0xa 55a & & Command safe val2 &0x 5aa5) is true, and the encrypted string of the remote control option time string 5 is written into the Command attribute comdtim 5; the ExecuteTime attribute is written when an 'execution' button is clicked, and meanwhile, the MD5 encrypted character string of the remote control execution time character string is written into the attribute ExecuteTimeMD5, so that all exceptions of data writing from an HMI interface to a system platform equipment model can be effectively avoided;
the remote control selection data content and the remote control execution data content are transmitted to the PSCADA device apparatus using an extended ASDU of a standard protocol over a data transmission protocol.
2. The method for designing a safe remote control function in an integrated monitoring system according to claim 1, wherein in the first step:
the illegal operation without permission is avoided, all operation buttons in the dialog box are subjected to permission judgment, and the operation buttons in the dialog box opened by the user without the operation permission are all in a Disabled inoperable state;
each device only allows one operator to open for operation, and only allows one operator to open the remote control dialog box of one device at any time by judging the Lock attribute in the breaker data model, namely after one operator opens, the other operator can not open the remote control dialog box of the device;
and interface safety operation logic judgment, namely judging whether certain operation is allowed according to all remote signaling states of the current equipment.
3. The method for designing a safe remote control function in an integrated monitoring system according to claim 1, wherein:
the use of 0x5aa5 and 0xa55a avoids common mode faults that may be caused by anomalies, the binary numbers of 0x5aa5 and 0xa55a being 0101101010100101 and 1010010101011010, respectively; the distances of the inside of the 0x5aa5 or 0xa55a numbers on 1bit, 4bit and 8bit are all the maximum; and the bitwise exclusive or value of 0x5aa5 and 0xa55a is 0xFFFF, i.e., the distance between them is also maximum; the design of the group of data can effectively avoid the disorder of data bits caused by potential abnormality and the like when the data is stored in a CPU, a memory and a hard disk.
4. The method for designing a safe remote control function in an integrated monitoring system according to claim 1, wherein:
remote control selection of data content: a select Command, select time Command, security select attribute data CommandSafetyVal1, CommandSafetyVal2, CommandTimeMD 5; the PSCADA device equipment checks after receiving the remote control selection data: the opening selection Command is valid when (Command ═ 0& & Command safe val1 ═ 0x5aa5& & Command safe val2 ═ 0xa55a) & (Command time MD5 ═ MD5(Command time)) expression is true; the closing selection Command is valid when (Command ═ 1& & Command safe val1 ═ 0xa55a & & Command safe val2 ═ 0x5aa5) & (Command time MD5 ═ MD5(Command time)) expression is true;
remote control execution data content: selecting a Command, selecting a time CommandTime, executing data ExecuteTrigger, executing time ExecuteTime, security selection attribute data CommandSafetyVal1, CommandSafetyVal2, CommandTimeMD5, security execution attribute data ExecuteTimeMD 5; the PSCADA device equipment performs verification after receiving the remote control execution data: when (Command ═ 0& & Command safe val1 ═ 0x5aa5& & Command safe val2 ═ 0xa55a) & & (Command time MD5 ═ MD5(Command time)) & (execotetime MD5 ═ MD5 (execotetime)) expression is true, the opening execution Command is valid, the device performs the opening operation; when (Command ═ 1& & Command safe val1 ═ 0xa55a & & Command safe val2 ═ 0x5aa5) & & (Command time MD5 ═ MD5(Command time)) & & (execttimemd 5 ═ MD5 (exectetime)) expression is true, the closing Command is valid, the device performs a closing operation.
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