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CN112039658A - Quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum coding - Google Patents

Quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum coding Download PDF

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CN112039658A
CN112039658A CN202010771909.2A CN202010771909A CN112039658A CN 112039658 A CN112039658 A CN 112039658A CN 202010771909 A CN202010771909 A CN 202010771909A CN 112039658 A CN112039658 A CN 112039658A
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alice
fibonacci
oam
key
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尚涛
孙海正
张源境
唐瑶
刘然
刘建伟
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Beihang University
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852Quantum cryptography
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04BTRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/11Arrangements specific to free-space transmission, i.e. transmission through air or vacuum
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04BTRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/70Photonic quantum communication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852Quantum cryptography
    • H04L9/0858Details about key distillation or coding, e.g. reconciliation, error correction, privacy amplification, polarisation coding or phase coding

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Abstract

The invention discloses a quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum encoding, which comprises the following steps: step 1, constructing a QKD protocol model which is irrelevant to a general measuring device, wherein Alice and Bob are both parties of legal communication needing to establish secure key sharing, and Charlie is an untrusted third-party measuring device; step 2, the third party completes Bell state measurement of the auxiliary photons and sends the measurement result to Alice and Bob through a classical public channel; step 3, the two communication parties obtain a key seed according to the measurement result; step 4, repeating the steps 1-3 to obtain a key seed with enough length; step 5, generating a Fibonacci key matrix with the same rank; and 6, verifying whether the key matrix is correct or not. The invention has the advantages that: (1) no adjustment of the system reference frame is required. (2) No flipping of the qubits is required. (3) And a high-capacity coding mode is used, so that the entangled photon coding capacity is improved. (4) With a high data transmission rate.

Description

一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法A Quantum Key Distribution Method Using Orbital Angular Momentum Coding

技术领域technical field

本发明涉及一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法,属于通信网络技术领域。The invention relates to a quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum coding, and belongs to the technical field of communication networks.

背景技术Background technique

量子密钥分发(Quantum Key Distribution,QKD)技术是量子通信中发展比较成熟的一个分支,而且用于设计实验了一些节点数量有限的小型化QKD网络,尤其是基于量子卫星的QKD网络可以极大地增加通信距离。虽然量子卫星克服了远距离光子损耗的问题,但是通信的实时全方位覆盖和多节点建设问题仍待解决,限制了其实际应用范围。此外,在太空建立完整的量子卫星通信网络需要耗费大量的人力物力以及时间。近年,研究人员开始对低空机载QKD平台进行研究,这种网络部署方式具有结构简单、操作方便、成本低等显著特点,在未来的量子通信网络中将有广泛的应用前景。Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology is a relatively mature branch of quantum communication, and it is used to design and experiment some miniaturized QKD networks with a limited number of nodes, especially QKD networks based on quantum satellites Increase the communication distance. Although quantum satellites have overcome the problem of long-distance photon loss, the real-time omni-directional coverage and multi-node construction of communication remain to be solved, limiting their practical application range. In addition, establishing a complete quantum satellite communication network in space requires a lot of manpower, material resources and time. In recent years, researchers have begun to study the low-altitude airborne QKD platform. This network deployment method has the remarkable characteristics of simple structure, convenient operation and low cost, and will have broad application prospects in the future quantum communication network.

在基于光纤信道的QKD系统中,光纤中存在的双折射现象和衰减效应会限制密钥分发的安全距离,该距离一般只能达到百公里左右。实现更远距离的量子密钥分发需要使用其它的方法。在自由空间信道中,携带信息的光信号基本上可以忽略双折射现象,并且退相干效应较小。此外,实验中应用的光信号波段在自由空间中传输性质好、损耗低,相关的探测器技术也逐渐成熟。但是,近地面的自由空间QKD仍会受到大气湍流、天气情况以及地形的影响,同样无法实现更远的安全传输距离。随着对飞行器技术和量子卫星的研究,研究人员计划利用地球卫星或其他空间平台作为中继节点从而实现更远距离乃至全球范围的QKD网络,特别是在真空环境中,光信号几乎可以无损的传输。使用轨道角动量(OrbitalAngular Momentum,OAM)编码量子信息具有两个优势:一是OAM态在传输方向上具有旋转不变性,因此发送方和接收方不必实时调整参考系统。二是OAM理论上具有无限维本征态,利用高维编码能大大提高系统的编码效率。In a fiber channel-based QKD system, the birefringence phenomenon and attenuation effect in the fiber will limit the safe distance of key distribution, which generally can only reach about 100 kilometers. Achieving quantum key distribution over longer distances requires the use of other methods. In a free-space channel, the information-carrying optical signal can essentially ignore birefringence, and the decoherence effect is small. In addition, the optical signal band used in the experiment has good transmission properties and low loss in free space, and the related detector technology is gradually mature. However, the free space QKD near the ground is still affected by atmospheric turbulence, weather conditions, and terrain, and it is also impossible to achieve a longer safe transmission distance. With the research on aircraft technology and quantum satellites, researchers plan to use earth satellites or other space platforms as relay nodes to achieve longer-distance and even global QKD networks, especially in a vacuum environment, where optical signals can be almost lossless. transmission. Using Orbital Angular Momentum (OAM) to encode quantum information has two advantages: First, the OAM state is rotationally invariant in the transmission direction, so the sender and receiver do not have to adjust the reference system in real time. Second, OAM theoretically has infinite-dimensional eigenstates, and the use of high-dimensional coding can greatly improve the coding efficiency of the system.

近年,轨道角动量技术得到了迅速发展,如产生、控制以及与其他系统接口等关键技术。此外,Yu等人提出了使用平面等离子体界面来产生单OAM状态的光束。研究还表明,纳米等离子体螺旋阵列中独特的散射共振可以支持光子带隙,其带边模式具有多个分布在斐波那契数之间的OAM值。因此人们开始对高容量量子密钥分发方案进行研究,并取得了一定进展。通过发展高维希尔伯特空间来研究高容量量子密钥分发方案的研究有两个主要优势:一方面一个共享密钥的多个比特可以编码在一个量子上。另一方面高维系统对某些类型的噪声具有更强的鲁棒性。2013年,Simon等人提出了一种高容量、高效率形式的量子密钥分发方案。他们利用专门设计的光的OAM纠缠态和斐波那契数列来实现量子密钥分发,该方案单次量子信息的传输容量进一步增大,但是其方案的高容量特性仍然受到实现困难,编码不够灵活的限制。该方案存在的问题主要是因为增加信息容量依赖于具有更大带宽的OAM和用于编码的方法,因此由于实际带宽的限制,它不可能同时满足较长的传输距离和较低的误码率。其次,虽然Simon等人的OAM-QKD协议的理论分析已经提出,但由于实际应用系统的硬件设备存在缺陷,仍可能会遭受光子数分离攻击、致盲攻击等。在2012年时,Lo等人就提出了使用测量设备独立性的方法来解决测量端漏洞的问题。在测量设备无关QKD协议(Measurement-device-independent QKD,MDI-QKD)中,合法通信双方(Alice和Bob)将量子密钥信息发送给第三方(Charlie)完成Bell测量,即使Charlie是不可信的,也可以完成一个安全的QKD过程。而且在该系统中,Alice或Bob信息的传输距离只是Alice或Bob信息到检测器的距离,因此,Alice和Bob之间的通信距离是QKD中实际传输距离的两倍。In recent years, orbital angular momentum technology has developed rapidly, such as key technologies such as generation, control and interface with other systems. Furthermore, Yu et al. proposed the use of a planar plasmonic interface to generate beams in a single OAM state. The study also shows that unique scattering resonances in nanoplasmonic helical arrays can support photonic band gaps with band-edge modes with multiple OAM values distributed between Fibonacci numbers. Therefore, people began to study the high-capacity quantum key distribution scheme, and made some progress. Research on high-capacity quantum key distribution schemes by developing high-dimensional Hilbert spaces has two main advantages: On the one hand, multiple bits of a shared key can be encoded on a quantum. On the other hand, high-dimensional systems are more robust to certain types of noise. In 2013, Simon et al. proposed a high-capacity, high-efficiency form of quantum key distribution scheme. They used the specially designed OAM entanglement state of light and Fibonacci sequence to realize quantum key distribution. The transmission capacity of single quantum information of this scheme is further increased, but the high-capacity characteristics of its scheme are still difficult to realize, and the encoding is not enough. Flexible restrictions. The problem with this scheme is mainly because increasing the information capacity depends on OAM with larger bandwidth and the method used for encoding, so it is impossible to satisfy both longer transmission distance and lower bit error rate due to the limitation of practical bandwidth . Secondly, although the theoretical analysis of the OAM-QKD protocol by Simon et al. has been proposed, due to the defects in the hardware equipment of the practical application system, it may still suffer from photon number separation attacks and blinding attacks. In 2012, Lo et al. proposed the use of measurement device independence to solve the problem of measurement-side vulnerabilities. In the Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) protocol, both legitimate communication parties (Alice and Bob) send quantum key information to a third party (Charlie) to complete the Bell measurement, even if Charlie is not trusted , can also complete a secure QKD process. And in this system, the transmission distance of Alice or Bob's information is only the distance from Alice or Bob's information to the detector, so the communication distance between Alice and Bob is twice the actual transmission distance in QKD.

量子的OAM通过纳米等离子体螺旋阵列可以产生具有多个分布在斐波那契数之间的OAM值。本发明基于OAM的上述特点给出了一种利用斐波那契数列与卢卡斯数列关系编码的OAM-MDI-QKD的方案,在确保安全密钥传输距离尽量长的前提下,提升单次量子密钥分发的信息传输容量。Quantum OAM can generate OAM values with multiple distributions between Fibonacci numbers through nanoplasmonic helical arrays. Based on the above characteristics of OAM, the present invention provides an OAM-MDI-QKD scheme encoded by the relationship between Fibonacci sequence and Lucas sequence. Information transfer capacity for quantum key distribution.

发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

本发明的技术解决问题:在使用光纤信道的QKD系统中,光纤中存在的双折射现象和衰减效应会限制密钥分发的安全距离,而在自由空间信道中,携带信息的光信号基本上可以忽略双折射现象,并且退相干效应较小。此外,光信号波段在自由空间中传输性质好、损耗低,相关的探测器技术也逐渐成熟。但是,近地面的自由空间QKD会受到大气湍流、天气情况以及地形的影响,同样无法实现更远的安全传输距离。如何在不增加额外带宽的情况下提升单次量子信息的传输容量是实现QKD技术实用性必须解决的关键问题。The technology of the present invention solves the problem: in the QKD system using the optical fiber channel, the birefringence phenomenon and the attenuation effect existing in the optical fiber will limit the safe distance of key distribution, while in the free space channel, the optical signal carrying the information can basically Birefringence is ignored and decoherence effects are small. In addition, the optical signal band has good transmission properties and low loss in free space, and the related detector technology is gradually mature. However, the free space QKD near the ground will be affected by atmospheric turbulence, weather conditions and terrain, and it is also impossible to achieve a longer safe transmission distance. How to improve the transmission capacity of single-shot quantum information without increasing additional bandwidth is a key problem that must be solved to realize the practicality of QKD technology.

本发明采取的技术方案是:一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法,它包含以下步骤:The technical scheme adopted by the present invention is: a quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum encoding, which comprises the following steps:

步骤1.构建一般测量设备无关QKD协议模型,其中Alice和Bob是需要建立安全密钥共享的合法通信双方,负责制备光子信息。而Charlie是一个不可信的第三方测量设备,负责检测由Alice和Bob传输的纠缠光子。Alice使用斐波那契(Fibonacci)值编码OAM纠缠光子对,记为

Figure BDA0002616955270000031
Bob使用卢卡斯(lucas)值编码OAM纠缠光子对,记为|φ>。OAM纠缠态中存在的两种光子态分别命名为Fibonacci值的信号(signal)光子态和辅助(idler)光子态,其中信号光子态记为|Fk>s,辅助光子态记为|Fk>i,其中k为正整数。Alice和Bob分别将纠缠对中信号光子留给自己。与此同时,Alice和Bob分别将调制好的辅助光子通过自由空间信道发送给第三方测量设备Charlie。Step 1. Build a general measurement device-independent QKD protocol model, in which Alice and Bob are legitimate communication parties who need to establish secure key sharing, and are responsible for preparing photonic information. And Charlie is an untrusted third-party measurement device that detects the entangled photons transmitted by Alice and Bob. Alice uses Fibonacci values to encode OAM entangled photon pairs, denoted as
Figure BDA0002616955270000031
Bob uses the Lucas value to encode the OAM entangled photon pair, denoted by |φ>. The two photon states existing in the OAM entangled state are named as the signal photon state and the auxiliary (idler) photon state of the Fibonacci value, respectively, where the signal photon state is denoted as |F k > s , and the auxiliary photon state is denoted as |F k > i , where k is a positive integer. Alice and Bob each keep the signal photons in the entangled pair to themselves. At the same time, Alice and Bob respectively send the modulated auxiliary photons to Charlie, a third-party measurement device, through the free space channel.

步骤2.在Charlie的测量设备中,首先使用两个静态光学OAM分选机(Sorter)以及一个透镜过滤出叠加态

Figure BDA0002616955270000032
Figure BDA0002616955270000033
并阻止任何非Fibonacci值的OAM态通过。LC1、DC1、LC2和DC2是四个单光子探测器,用于检测Fibonacci值的OAM态,其中LC1用于检测OAM态|Fk-2>/|Fk-1>;LC2用于检测OAM态|Fk-1>/|Fk+1>;DC1用于检测OAM叠加态
Figure BDA0002616955270000034
DC2用于检测OAM叠加态
Figure BDA0002616955270000041
然后,当且仅当LC1和LC2、LC1和DC2、DC1和LC2、DC1和DC2四种情况中任一种情况下的两个探测器同时触发时,本次测量成功。最后,Charlie完成了对辅助光子的Bell态测量,并将测量结果通过经典公开信道发送给Alice和Bob。Step 2. In Charlie's measurement device, first use two static optical OAM sorters (Sorter) and a lens to filter out the superposition state
Figure BDA0002616955270000032
and
Figure BDA0002616955270000033
and prevents any OAM states of non-Fibonacci values from passing through. L C1 , D C1 , L C2 and D C2 are four single-photon detectors for detecting OAM states of Fibonacci values, where L C1 is used to detect OAM states |F k-2 >/|F k-1 >; L C2 is used to detect the OAM state |F k-1 >/|F k+1 >; D C1 is used to detect the OAM superposition state
Figure BDA0002616955270000034
D C2 is used to detect OAM superposition states
Figure BDA0002616955270000041
Then, if and only if the two detectors in any of the four cases L C1 and L C2 , L C1 and D C2 , D C1 and L C2 , D C1 and D C2 fire at the same time, this measurement success. Finally, Charlie completes the Bell state measurement of the auxiliary photon and sends the measurement result to Alice and Bob through the classical open channel.

步骤3.根据测量结果,Alice和Bob保留所有结果中对应Charlie成功测量的情况。然后,Alice将本地保留的信号光子调制后传输到本方的LA探测器中,同时Bob也将本地保留的信号光子调制后传输到本方的LB探测器中。Alice和Bob分别使用OAM分选器LA或LB对信号光子态进行检测。如果Alice或Bob发现Charlie发布的结果与他们检测到的结果不匹配,通信双方将终止通信。否则,他们将执行下述操作。合法通信双方Alice和Bob,当一方检测到确定的Fibonacci值时,另一方检测到的Fibonacci值仍然还不能确定。当Alice检测到一个确定的Fibonacci值时,它可以根据Fibonacci编码的OAM纠缠态公式

Figure BDA0002616955270000042
和Charlie的测量结果,使用公式Fk=Fk-1+Fk-2,k≥2,k为整数,得到用于生成密钥信息的Fibonacci值,记为Fk。同时,Bob检测到一个确定的Fibonacci值时,可以根据lucas编码的OAM纠缠态公式|φ>和Charlie的测量结果,使用公式Lk=Fk+1+Fk-1,k≥2,k为整数,得到用于生成密钥信息的lucas值,记为Lk。然后,Alice和Bob根据Fibonacci序列和Lucas序列可以同时得到Fk和Lk,进一步得到密钥种子F2k=Fk×Lk。上述过程不需要交换经典信息,也不需要进行比特位翻转。Step 3. According to the measurement results, Alice and Bob keep all the results corresponding to Charlie's successful measurement. Then, Alice modulates the locally reserved signal photons and transmits them to the local LA detector, and Bob also modulates and transmits the locally reserved signal photons to the local LB detector . Alice and Bob use the OAM sorter LA or LB , respectively, to detect the signal photon state. If Alice or Bob find that the results published by Charlie do not match what they detected, both parties will terminate the communication. Otherwise, they will perform the actions described below. Alice and Bob, two legitimate communication parties, when one party detects the definite Fibonacci value, the Fibonacci value detected by the other party is still uncertain. When Alice detects a definite Fibonacci value, it can entangle according to the Fibonacci-encoded OAM formula
Figure BDA0002616955270000042
and Charlie's measurement result, using the formula F k =F k-1 +F k-2 , k≥2, k is an integer, to obtain the Fibonacci value for generating key information, denoted as F k . At the same time, when Bob detects a certain Fibonacci value, he can use the formula L k =F k+1 +F k-1 , k≥2, k is an integer, and the lucas value used to generate the key information is obtained, denoted as L k . Then, Alice and Bob can obtain F k and L k at the same time according to the Fibonacci sequence and the Lucas sequence, and further obtain the key seed F 2k =F k ×L k . The above process does not require the exchange of classical information, nor does it require bit flipping.

步骤4.Alice和Bob重复步骤1—3,直到获得足够长的密钥种子。Step 4. Alice and Bob repeat steps 1-3 until a long enough key seed is obtained.

步骤5.根据Charlie的探测器的结果,Alice和Bob得到Fibonacci密钥矩阵的密钥种子F2k。然后,他们使用随机数生成器生成具有相同秩的Fibonacci密钥矩阵。Step 5. According to the results of Charlie's detector, Alice and Bob obtain the key seed F 2k of the Fibonacci key matrix. Then, they used a random number generator to generate a Fibonacci key matrix with the same rank.

步骤6.Alice和Bob可以通过Fibonacci密钥矩阵对应的行列式det(D2k)=1,验证密钥矩阵是否正确。如果行列式的秩不等于1,则中止通信。否则,他们可以使用Fibonacci对角线密钥矩阵通过矩阵乘法对数字消息进行加密。Step 6. Alice and Bob can verify whether the key matrix is correct through the determinant det(D 2k )=1 corresponding to the Fibonacci key matrix. If the rank of the determinant is not equal to 1, the communication is terminated. Otherwise, they can encrypt digital messages by matrix multiplication using the Fibonacci diagonal key matrix.

本发明充分发挥量子轨道角动量高维度的特性,设计了一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法,采用斐波那契数和卢卡斯数编码量子信息,并通过斐波那契数列与卢卡斯数列之间存在的关系解码密钥信息,提升了单次量子密钥分发的信息容量。The invention takes full advantage of the high-dimensional characteristics of quantum orbital angular momentum, designs a quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum encoding, uses Fibonacci numbers and Lucas numbers to encode quantum information, and uses Fibonacci numbers to encode quantum information. The relationship between the sequence and the Lucas sequence decodes the key information, increasing the information capacity of a single quantum key distribution.

本发明与现有技术相比的优点在于:The advantages of the present invention compared with the prior art are:

(1)本发明不需要调整系统参考系。在基于OAM编码的QKD系统中,因为OAM态在传输方向上具有旋转不变性,所以系统不需要对参考系进行实时监控和调整。(1) The present invention does not need to adjust the system reference frame. In the QKD system based on OAM coding, because the OAM state is rotationally invariant in the transmission direction, the system does not need to monitor and adjust the reference frame in real time.

(2)本发明不需要对量子比特进行翻转。通信双方Alice和Bob可以依据本方的分选机LA和LB获得密钥种子,并从Charlie得知测量的结果,而不是原始MDI-QKD协议中使用的比特翻转方法。(2) The present invention does not need to flip the qubit. Alice and Bob, both communicating parties, can obtain the key seed according to their own sorting machines LA and LB , and get the measurement result from Charlie, instead of the bit flip method used in the original MDI - QKD protocol.

(3)本发明使用了高容量编码方式。使用获得的Fibonacci值作为Fibonacci块对角矩阵的种子,然后可以使用矩阵乘法对数字消息序列进行加密。在Simon等人的协议中,每个Fibonacci数值都用来表示一个三位二进制字符串。而在本发明中,相同的Fibonacci数被用来构建Fibonacci对角矩阵,并与来自Bob的Lucas数进一步构建Fibonacci块对角矩阵,生成的密钥明显比编码为三位二进制字符串长,本发明提高了纠缠光子的编码能力。(3) The present invention uses a high-capacity encoding method. Using the obtained Fibonacci values as seeds for the Fibonacci block diagonal matrix, the sequence of digital messages can then be encrypted using matrix multiplication. In the Simon et al. protocol, each Fibonacci value is used to represent a three-digit binary string. In the present invention, the same Fibonacci number is used to construct the Fibonacci diagonal matrix, and the Fibonacci block diagonal matrix is further constructed with the Lucas number from Bob, and the generated key is obviously longer than that encoded as a three-digit binary string. The invention improves the encoding ability of entangled photons.

(4)本发明具有高数据传输速率。将分选器LA和LB分别放置在Alice端和Bob端,并在Charlie的测量设备中放置两对检测器,即LC1和DC1、LC2和DC2。与Lo等人的提出的原始MDI-QKD协议不同,每种探测结果都会产生密钥信息,不会丢弃任何一种情况。也即,在Charlie的测量设备中,当LC1和LC2、LC1和DC2、DC1和LC2、DC1和DC2中任一对探测器响应时,Alice和Bob都可以获得密钥信息。(4) The present invention has a high data transmission rate. Sorters LA and LB were placed at Alice's end and Bob's end, respectively, and two pairs of detectors, L C1 and D C1 , L C2 and D C2 , were placed in Charlie's measurement device. Unlike the original MDI-QKD protocol proposed by Lo et al., key information is generated for each probe result and neither case is discarded. That is, in Charlie's measurement device, when any of L C1 and L C2 , L C1 and D C2 , D C1 and L C2 , and D C1 and D C2 respond to the detectors, both Alice and Bob can obtain the secret key information.

附图说明Description of drawings

图1为本发明的基于Fibonacci编码的OAM-MDI-QKD方案的实验原理图;Fig. 1 is the experimental schematic diagram of the OAM-MDI-QKD scheme based on Fibonacci coding of the present invention;

图中符号说明如下:The symbols in the figure are explained as follows:

Alice与Bob为合法通信双方;Alice and Bob are legitimate communication parties;

Charlie为不可信的第三方测量设备;Charlie is an untrusted third-party measurement device;

LC1、DC1、LC2和DC2为四个单光子探测器;L C1 , D C1 , L C2 and D C2 are four single-photon detectors;

Sorter为光子OAM态分选机;Sorter is a photonic OAM state sorter;

BS为分束器;BS is a beam splitter;

LA和LB分别为Alice端和Bob端OAM态分选器;L A and L B are the OAM state sorters at the Alice end and the Bob end, respectively;

Decoy-IM为诱骗态强度调制器;Decoy-IM is a decoy state intensity modulator;

SLM为空间光调制器;SLM is a spatial light modulator;

l为光子OAM生成的具有Fibonacci数列特征和lucas数列特征的量子叠加态;l is a quantum superposition state with Fibonacci sequence characteristics and Lucas sequence characteristics generated by photonic OAM;

|Fk-1>A、|Fk-2>A和|Fk+1>B、|Fk-1>B为信号光子态,留在本地(Alice或Bob);|F k-1 > A , |F k-2 > A and |F k+1 > B , |F k-1 > B are the signal photon states and stay in the local (Alice or Bob);

|Fk-2>B、|Fk-1>B和|Fk-1>A、|Fk+1>A为辅助光子态,发送给第三方(Charlie)进行测量。|F k-2 > B , |F k-1 > B and |F k-1 > A , |F k+1 > A are auxiliary photon states, which are sent to a third party (Charlie) for measurement.

具体实施方式Detailed ways

本发明所提出的一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法,需解决以下两个问题:(1)在经典的量子密钥分发协议中,单次量子信息的传输容量多为1比特的经典信息,在偏振编码下选择水平竖直基矢编码量子信息并不能有效的提升信息容量,如何改变量子信息的编码方式从而提升密钥分发中单次量子信息传输的容量是必须解决的首要问题;(2)量子密钥分发方案无法快速进入实用阶段,一个主要的原因是量子测量过程的不确定性,导致整体方案的效率较低,在纠缠类协议(Ekert91协议)中,效率因子q=1/2。如何提升量子密钥分发方案的效率问题是其实用化的一个关键技术。A quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum coding proposed by the present invention needs to solve the following two problems: (1) In the classical quantum key distribution protocol, the transmission capacity of a single quantum information is mostly 1 bit The choice of horizontal and vertical basis vectors to encode quantum information under polarization coding cannot effectively increase the information capacity. How to change the encoding method of quantum information to increase the capacity of single quantum information transmission in key distribution is the first and foremost problem that must be solved. Problems; (2) The quantum key distribution scheme cannot quickly enter the practical stage. One of the main reasons is the uncertainty of the quantum measurement process, which leads to the low efficiency of the overall scheme. In the entanglement protocol (Ekert91 protocol), the efficiency factor q = 1/2. How to improve the efficiency of quantum key distribution scheme is a key technology for its practical application.

本发明的主要实现思想是:充分发挥量子OAM的高维度特性,利用斐波那契数列编码量子信息,设计一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法。The main realization idea of the present invention is to fully utilize the high-dimensional characteristics of quantum OAM, use Fibonacci sequence to encode quantum information, and design a quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum encoding.

斐波那契数列与卢卡斯数列Fibonacci and Lucas numbers

Fibonacci数列:Fk=Fk-1+Fk-2,k≥2,k为整数;Lucas数列:Lk=Lk-1+Lk-2,k≥2,k为整数。Fibonacci sequence: F k =F k-1 +F k-2 , k≥2, k is an integer; Lucas sequence: L k =L k-1 +L k-2 , k≥2, k is an integer.

它们之间存在的关系:The relationship that exists between them:

Lk=Fk+1+Fk-1,F2k=Fk×LkL k =F k+1 +F k-1 , F 2k =F k ×L k .

构造Fibonacci矩阵:Construct a Fibonacci matrix:

Figure BDA0002616955270000071
Figure BDA0002616955270000071

Figure BDA0002616955270000072
Figure BDA0002616955270000072

构造Fibonacci对角线密钥矩阵:Construct the Fibonacci diagonal key matrix:

Figure BDA0002616955270000073
Figure BDA0002616955270000073

det(D2k)=(-1)k(k+1)det(D 2k )=(-1) k(k+1) .

本发明是一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法,该方法具体实施步骤如下:The present invention is a quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum encoding, and the specific implementation steps of the method are as follows:

步骤1.构建一般测量设备无关QKD协议模型,其中Alice和Bob是需要建立安全密钥共享的合法通信双方,负责制备光子信息。而Charlie是一个不可信的第三方测量设备,负责检测由Alice和Bob传输的纠缠光子。Alice使用斐波那契(Fibonacci)值编码OAM纠缠光子对,记为

Figure BDA0002616955270000076
Bob使用卢卡斯(lucas)值编码OAM纠缠光子对,记为|φ>。OAM纠缠态中存在的两种光子态分别命名为Fibonacci值的信号(signal)光子态和辅助(idler)光子态,其中信号光子态记为|Fk>s,辅助光子态记为|Fk>i,其中k为正整数。Fibonacci值和lucas值的OAM纠缠态如下所示:Step 1. Build a general measurement device-independent QKD protocol model, in which Alice and Bob are legitimate communication parties who need to establish secure key sharing, and are responsible for preparing photonic information. And Charlie is an untrusted third-party measurement device that detects the entangled photons transmitted by Alice and Bob. Alice uses Fibonacci values to encode OAM entangled photon pairs, denoted as
Figure BDA0002616955270000076
Bob uses the Lucas value to encode the OAM entangled photon pair, denoted by |φ>. The two photon states existing in the OAM entangled state are named as the signal photon state and the auxiliary (idler) photon state of the Fibonacci value, respectively, where the signal photon state is denoted as |F k > s , and the auxiliary photon state is denoted as |F k > i , where k is a positive integer. The OAM entangled states of Fibonacci and lucas values are as follows:

Figure BDA0002616955270000074
Figure BDA0002616955270000074

Figure BDA0002616955270000075
Figure BDA0002616955270000075

Alice和Bob分别将纠缠对中信号光子留给自己。与此同时,Alice和Bob分别将调制好的辅助光子通过自由空间信道发送给第三方测量设备Charlie。Alice and Bob each keep the signal photons in the entangled pair to themselves. At the same time, Alice and Bob respectively send the modulated auxiliary photons to Charlie, a third-party measurement device, through the free space channel.

步骤2.在Charlie的测量设备中,首先使用两个静态光学OAM分选机(Sorter)以及一个透镜分别过滤出叠加态

Figure BDA0002616955270000081
Figure BDA0002616955270000082
并阻止任何非Fibonacci值的OAM态通过。LC1、DC1、LC2和DC2是四个单光子探测器,用于检测Fibonacci值的OAM态,其中LC1用于检测OAM态|Fk-2>/|Fk-1>;LC2用于检测OAM态|Fk-1>/|Fk+1>;DC1用于检测OAM叠加态
Figure BDA0002616955270000083
DC2用于检测OAM叠加态
Figure BDA0002616955270000084
然后,当且仅当LC1和LC2、LC1和DC2、DC1和LC2、DC1和DC2四种情况中任一种情况下的两个探测器同时触发时,本次测量成功。最后,Charlie完成了对辅助光子的Bell态测量,并将测量结果通过经典公开信道发送Alice和Bob。Step 2. In Charlie's measurement equipment, first use two static optical OAM sorters (Sorter) and a lens to filter out the superposition state respectively
Figure BDA0002616955270000081
and
Figure BDA0002616955270000082
and prevents any OAM states of non-Fibonacci values from passing through. L C1 , D C1 , L C2 and D C2 are four single-photon detectors for detecting OAM states of Fibonacci values, where L C1 is used to detect OAM states |F k-2 >/|F k-1 >; L C2 is used to detect the OAM state |F k-1 >/|F k+1 >; D C1 is used to detect the OAM superposition state
Figure BDA0002616955270000083
D C2 is used to detect OAM superposition states
Figure BDA0002616955270000084
Then, if and only if the two detectors in any of the four cases L C1 and L C2 , L C1 and D C2 , D C1 and L C2 , D C1 and D C2 fire at the same time, this measurement success. Finally, Charlie completed the Bell state measurement of the auxiliary photon, and sent the measurement result to Alice and Bob through the classical open channel.

表1 OAM-MDI-QKD方案中密钥信息的可能测量结果Table 1 Possible measurement results of key information in OAM-MDI-QKD scheme

Figure BDA0002616955270000085
Figure BDA0002616955270000085

在表1中,Charlie进行Bell态测量时,T表示探测器LC1和LC2同时响应;U表示探测器LC1和DC2同时响应;V表示探测器DC1和LC2同时响应;W表示探测器DC1和DC2同时响应。In Table 1, when Charlie performs the Bell state measurement, T means that the detectors L C1 and L C2 respond simultaneously; U means that the detectors L C1 and D C2 respond simultaneously; V means that the detectors D C1 and L C2 respond simultaneously; W means that the detectors D C1 and L C2 respond simultaneously; Detectors D C1 and D C2 respond simultaneously.

步骤3.根据表1给出的可能测量结果,Alice和Bob保留所有结果中对应于Charlie成功测量的情况(T、U、V和W)。然后,Alice将本地保留的信号光子调制后传输到本方的LA探测器中,同时Bob也将本地保留的信号光子调制后传输到本方的LB探测器中。Alice和Bob分别使用OAM分选器LA或LB对信号光子态进行检测。如果Alice(或Bob)发现Charlie发布的结果与他们检测到的结果不匹配,通信双方将终止通信。否则,他们继续执行以下操作。Step 3. According to the possible measurement results given in Table 1, Alice and Bob keep all the results (T, U, V and W) corresponding to Charlie's successful measurement. Then, Alice modulates the locally reserved signal photons and transmits them to the local LA detector, and Bob also modulates and transmits the locally reserved signal photons to the local LB detector . Alice and Bob use the OAM sorter LA or LB , respectively, to detect the signal photon state. If Alice (or Bob) finds that the results published by Charlie do not match what they detected, both parties will terminate the communication. Otherwise, they proceed to do the following.

表2本方案的可能输出结果Table 2 Possible output results of this scheme

Figure BDA0002616955270000091
Figure BDA0002616955270000091

通信双方中,当一方检测到确定的Fibonacci值时,另一方检测到的Fibonacci值还仍然无法确定。通过分析图1、通信双方的OAM纠缠态和Charlie的测量结果(如表2所示),双方可以得到确定的Fibonacci数值。例如,如果Alice和Bob检测到的结果分别是|Fk-1>和|Fk-1>,而Charlie中产生响应的探测器为LC1和LC2,测量结果为|Fk-2>和|Fk+1>,对应表2中第一种可能情况。Alice方拥有的Fibonacci数值为Fk-1,根据OAM纠缠态

Figure BDA0002616955270000101
可知发送的辅助光子的值为Fk-2,对比Charlie公布的测量结果和响应的探测器,此次通信正常。Alice根据公式Fk=Fk-1+Fk-2,k≥2可以求出Fibonacci数值Fk。同理,Bob方拥有的Fibonacci数值为Fk-1,根据OAM纠缠态
Figure BDA0002616955270000102
可知发送的辅助光子的值为Fk+1,对比Charlie公布的测量结果和响应的探测器,此次通信正常。Bob根据公式Lk=Fk+1+Fk-1,k≥2可以求出Lucas数值Lk。然后,Alice和Bob根据Fibonacci序列和Lucas序列可以同时得到Fk和Lk,进一步得到密钥种子F2k=Fk×Lk。上述过程不需要交换经典信息,也不需要进行比特位翻转。当Alice和Bob检测到的结果为其他情况时,如表2中所示,通信双方也可以使用上述相同的方法得到密钥种子F2k。Among the two communicating parties, when one party detects the definite Fibonacci value, the Fibonacci value detected by the other party still cannot be determined. By analyzing Figure 1, the OAM entanglement state of both communication parties and Charlie's measurement results (as shown in Table 2), both parties can obtain the determined Fibonacci value. For example, if Alice and Bob detect |F k-1 > and |F k-1 >, respectively, and the responding detectors in Charlie are L C1 and L C2 , the measurement is |F k-2 > and |F k+1 >, corresponding to the first possible case in Table 2. The Fibonacci value owned by Alice's side is F k-1 , according to the OAM entangled state
Figure BDA0002616955270000101
It can be seen that the value of the auxiliary photon sent is F k-2 . Comparing the measurement results published by Charlie and the responding detector, the communication is normal. Alice can obtain the Fibonacci value F k according to the formula F k =F k-1 +F k-2 , k≥2. Similarly, the Fibonacci value owned by Bob's side is F k-1 , according to the OAM entangled state
Figure BDA0002616955270000102
It can be seen that the value of the auxiliary photon sent is F k+1 . Comparing the measurement results published by Charlie and the responding detector, the communication is normal. Bob can calculate the Lucas value L k according to the formula L k =F k+1 +F k-1 , k≥2. Then, Alice and Bob can obtain F k and L k at the same time according to the Fibonacci sequence and the Lucas sequence, and further obtain the key seed F 2k =F k ×L k . The above process does not require the exchange of classical information, nor does it require bit flipping. When the results detected by Alice and Bob are other cases, as shown in Table 2, the two communicating parties can also obtain the key seed F 2k using the same method as above.

步骤4.Alice和Bob重复步骤1-3,直到获得足够长的密钥种子(例如:根据Shannon的一次一密加密理论,要做到无条件安全,量子密钥分发产生的密钥应与明文等长,并且保证每次对明文加密使用不同的密钥)。Step 4. Alice and Bob repeat steps 1-3 until a long enough key seed is obtained (for example: according to Shannon's one-time pad encryption theory, to achieve unconditional security, the key generated by quantum key distribution should be the same as the plaintext, etc. long, and guarantees that a different key is used for plaintext encryption each time).

步骤5.根据Charlie的探测器的结果,Alice和Bob得到Fibonacci密钥矩阵的密钥种子F2k。然后,他们使用随机数生成器生成具有相同秩的Fibonacci密钥矩阵。Step 5. According to the results of Charlie's detector, Alice and Bob obtain the key seed F 2k of the Fibonacci key matrix. Then, they used a random number generator to generate a Fibonacci key matrix with the same rank.

步骤6.Alice和Bob可以通过Fibonacci密钥矩阵对应的行列式det(D2k)=1,验证密钥矩阵是否正确。如果行列式的秩不等于1,则中止通信。否则,他们可以使用Fibonacci对角线密钥矩阵通过矩阵乘法对数字消息进行加密。Step 6. Alice and Bob can verify whether the key matrix is correct through the determinant det(D 2k )=1 corresponding to the Fibonacci key matrix. If the rank of the determinant is not equal to 1, the communication is terminated. Otherwise, they can encrypt digital messages by matrix multiplication using the Fibonacci diagonal key matrix.

本发明是基于OAM编码的MDI-QKD改进方案,它是在原始MDI-QKD协议的基础上进行的,改进方案和原方案有两点不同:1)在改进方案中用的是具有不同l值的光子态来编码量子信息,这种方法并不会削弱协议的安全性,OAM应用在量子通信中的安全性证明在Simon等人的文献中有详细说明。此外采用OAM态编码还可以避免基的依赖性问题,改善光子制备阶段的性能,使密钥速率不再受到此缺陷的影响。2)第二点不同是在检测器端,由于基的设置不同,对应的测量装置和方法也不尽相同。原始MDI-QKD协议之所以能够排除检测器端的窃听,主要就是因为它不依赖于测量设备,测量装置只是把测量结果公布出来,安全密钥的产生还需要比特翻转等操作。本发明的测量装置在功能上与Lo等人的原始MDI-QKD协议相同,由上述的分析可知MDI-QKD协议安全性的核心在于后选择(post-select)和比特翻转(bit-flip),在改进方案中并没有改变后选择,所以从协议原理上来讲改进方案并没有削弱原始MDI-QKD协议的安全性能。The present invention is an improved MDI-QKD scheme based on OAM coding, which is carried out on the basis of the original MDI-QKD protocol. The improved scheme is different from the original scheme in two points: 1) In the improved scheme, different l values are used. This method does not weaken the security of the protocol. The security proof of OAM application in quantum communication is detailed in the literature of Simon et al. In addition, the use of OAM state coding can avoid the problem of base dependence, improve the performance of the photon preparation stage, and make the key rate no longer affected by this defect. 2) The second difference is that at the detector side, due to the different settings of the base, the corresponding measurement devices and methods are also different. The main reason why the original MDI-QKD protocol can eliminate eavesdropping on the detector side is that it does not depend on the measurement equipment. The measurement device only publishes the measurement results, and the generation of the security key also requires operations such as bit flipping. The measuring device of the present invention is functionally the same as the original MDI-QKD protocol of Lo et al. It can be seen from the above analysis that the core of the security of the MDI-QKD protocol lies in post-select and bit-flip, There is no change in post selection in the improved scheme, so from the principle of the protocol, the improved scheme does not weaken the security performance of the original MDI-QKD protocol.

在QKD系统的实际应用时,由于理想单光子源难以实现,一般采用其他光源进行代替,应用非理想光源时可能会被光子分裂攻击等手段窃听,所以一般还需要引入诱骗态技术。Lo等人提出的MDI-QKD极化编码方案在实际实现中应用了弱相干光源和诱骗态,从该方案中可以找到一些安全性的依据,比如GLLP、Shor-Preskill、相互无偏基等。同样在基于OAM编码的MDI-QKD协议方案中如果采用非理想光源和诱骗态技术,它的安全性同样可由GLLP、Shor-Preskill等来保证,其安全性和原方案是等价的。In the practical application of the QKD system, because the ideal single-photon source is difficult to achieve, other light sources are generally used instead. When non-ideal light sources are used, they may be eavesdropped by means of photon splitting attacks, so it is generally necessary to introduce decoy state technology. The MDI-QKD polarization coding scheme proposed by Lo et al. applies weakly coherent light sources and decoy states in practical implementation, and some security evidences can be found from this scheme, such as GLLP, Shor-Preskill, and mutual unbiased basis. Similarly, in the MDI-QKD protocol scheme based on OAM coding, if non-ideal light source and decoy state technology are used, its security can also be guaranteed by GLLP, Shor-Preskill, etc., and its security is equivalent to the original scheme.

本发明说明书中未作详细描述的内容属于本领域专业技术人员公知的现有技术。Contents that are not described in detail in the specification of the present invention belong to the prior art known to those skilled in the art.

以上所述仅是本发明一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法的优选实施方式,应当指出,对于本技术领域的普通技术人员来说,在不脱离本发明一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法原理的前提下,还可以作出若干改进和润饰,这些改进和润饰也应视为本发明一种使用轨道角动量编码的量子密钥分发方法的保护范围。The above is only a preferred embodiment of a quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum encoding according to the present invention. Under the premise of the principle of the encoded quantum key distribution method, several improvements and modifications can also be made, and these improvements and modifications should also be regarded as the protection scope of a quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum encoding of the present invention.

Claims (1)

1. A quantum key distribution method using orbital angular momentum encoding, characterized by: the method comprises the following steps:
step 1, constructing a QKD protocol model which is irrelevant to general measuring equipment, wherein Alice and Bob are both legal communication parties needing to establish secure key sharing and are responsible for preparing photon information; charlie is an untrusted third party measurement device responsible for detecting entangled photons transmitted by Alice and Bob; alice encodes OAM entangled photon pairs using Fibonacci values, noted
Figure FDA0002616955260000011
Bob encodes OAM entangled photon pairs using Lucas values, denoted as φ>(ii) a Two photon states existing in the OAM entangled state are respectively named as a signal photon state and an auxiliary photon state of Fibonacci value, wherein the signal photon state is marked as | Fk>sThe auxiliary photon state is denoted as | Fk>iWherein k is a positive integer; respectively reserving the entanglement centering signal photons for Alice and Bob; meanwhile, Alice and Bob respectively send the modulated auxiliary photons to third-party measuring equipment Charlie through a free space channel;
step 2. in the Charlie measurement equipment, two static optical OAM sorters and a lens are used to filter out the superimposed state
Figure FDA0002616955260000012
And
Figure FDA0002616955260000013
and preventing any OAM state of non-Fibonacci values from passing; l isC1、DC1、LC2And DC2Is four single photon detectors for detecting OAM states of Fibonacci values, wherein LC1For detecting OAM state | Fk-2>/|Fk-1>;LC2For detecting OAM state | Fk-1>/|Fk+1>;DC1For detecting OAM stack states
Figure FDA0002616955260000014
DC2For detecting OAM superimposed state
Figure FDA0002616955260000015
Then, if and only if LC1And LC2、LC1And DC2、DC1And LC2、DC1And DC2When two detectors under any one of the four conditions are triggered simultaneously, the measurement is successful; finally, Charlie completes Bell state measurement of the auxiliary photons and sends the measurement result to Alice and Bob through a classical public channel;
step 3, according to the measurement result, Alice and Bob reserve the successful measurement condition of corresponding Charlie in all the results; then, Alice transmits the locally reserved signal photon after modulating the signal photon to the local LAIn the detector, Bob also modulates and transmits locally reserved signal photons to L of the local sideBIn the detector; alice and Bob use OAM sorter L, respectivelyAOr LBDetecting the signal photon state; if Alice or Bob finds that the result issued by Charlie does not match the result detected by the Charlie, the two communication parties terminate the communication; otherwise, they will perform the following operations; when one party detects the determined Fibonacci value, the other party still cannot determine the detected Fibonacci value; when Alice detects a certain Fibonacci value, it can be based on the Fibonacci encoded OAM entanglement status formula
Figure FDA0002616955260000021
And Charlie measurements, using formula Fk=Fk-1+Fk-2K is more than or equal to 2, k is an integer, and a Fibonacci value for generating key information is obtained and is recorded as Fk(ii) a Meanwhile, when Bob detects a certain Fibonacci value, the value can be according to the Lucas coded OAM entanglement state formula | phi>And Charlie measurements, using formula Lk=Fk+1+Fk-1K is not less than 2, k is an integer, and a lucas value for generating key information is obtained and recorded as Lk(ii) a Then, Alice and Bob can simultaneously obtain F according to the Fibonacci sequence and the Lucas sequencekAnd LkGo forward toStep (b) to obtain a key seed F2k=Fk×Lk(ii) a The process does not need to exchange classical information and does not need to carry out bit flipping;
step 4, Alice and Bob repeat steps 1-3 until a sufficiently long key seed is obtained;
step 5, according to the result of the Charlie detector, Alice and Bob obtain a key seed F of the Fibonacci key matrix2k(ii) a Then, they generate Fibonacci key matrices with the same rank using a random number generator;
and 6, enabling Alice and Bob to pass through a determinant det (D) corresponding to the Fibonacci key matrix2k) Verifying whether the key matrix is correct or not as 1; if the rank of the determinant is not equal to 1, communication is aborted; otherwise, they can encrypt the digital message by matrix multiplication using the Fibonacci diagonal key matrix.
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