CN120435664A - Positioning reference signal integrity detection and quantification in side link positioning - Google Patents
Positioning reference signal integrity detection and quantification in side link positioningInfo
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- CN120435664A CN120435664A CN202380089792.1A CN202380089792A CN120435664A CN 120435664 A CN120435664 A CN 120435664A CN 202380089792 A CN202380089792 A CN 202380089792A CN 120435664 A CN120435664 A CN 120435664A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S5/00—Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
- G01S5/02—Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves
- G01S5/0205—Details
- G01S5/0244—Accuracy or reliability of position solution or of measurements contributing thereto
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S5/00—Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations
- G01S5/02—Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more direction or position line determinations; Position-fixing by co-ordinating two or more distance determinations using radio waves
- G01S5/0205—Details
- G01S5/0215—Interference
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Abstract
Various techniques are provided for a method that includes receiving, by a first terminal device, configuration information from a location management device for positioning reference signal, PRS, integrity checking related to one or more second terminal devices configured to support positioning of a target terminal device, collecting measurements of one or more PRS transmissions based on the configuration information, and performing integrity checking on the one or more PRS transmissions based on respective received energy profiles from the measurements of the collected PRS transmissions.
Description
Cross Reference to Related Applications
The present application claims priority and benefit from U.S. provisional application No. 63/483093, filed 2/3 at 2022, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
Technical Field
The present description relates to wireless communications.
Background
A communication system may be a facility that enables communication between two or more nodes or devices, such as fixed communication devices or mobile communication devices. The signals may be carried on a wired carrier or a wireless carrier.
An example of a cellular communication system is an architecture standardized by the third generation partnership project (3 GPP). Recent developments in this field are commonly referred to as Long Term Evolution (LTE) of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) radio access technology. E-UTRA (evolved UMTS terrestrial radio Access) is the air interface for the Long Term Evolution (LTE) upgrade path of 3GPP for mobile networks. In LTE, a base station or Access Point (AP), referred to as an enhanced node access point (eNB), provides wireless access within a coverage area or cell. In LTE, a mobile device or mobile station is referred to as a User Equipment (UE) or terminal device. LTE has included many improvements or developments. Various aspects of LTE continue to improve.
The 5G New Radio (NR) development is part of a continuous mobile broadband evolution process to meet the 5G requirements, similar to the early evolution of 3G and 4G wireless networks. In addition to mobile broadband, 5G is also directed to emerging use cases. The goal of 5G is to provide significant improvements in wireless performance, which may include new levels of data rate, latency, reliability, and security. The 5G NR can also be extended to efficiently connect to the large-scale internet of things (IoT), and can provide a new type of mission critical services. For example, ultra-reliable and low latency communication (URLLC) devices may require high reliability and very low latency.
Disclosure of Invention
According to an example embodiment, a method may include receiving, by a first terminal device, configuration information from a location management device for positioning reference signal, PRS, integrity checking related to one or more second terminal devices configured to support positioning of a target terminal device, collecting measurements of one or more PRS transmissions based on the configuration information, and performing integrity checking on the one or more PRS transmissions based on respective received energy profiles from the measurements of the collected PRS transmissions.
According to another example embodiment, a method may include transmitting, by a location management device, a location integrity configuration to a second terminal device, receiving, by the location management device, an integrity report from the second terminal device, the integrity report including measurements associated with a first location reference signal, PRS, and a second PRS, and determining, by the location management device, whether the second PRS is a valid PRS based on the integrity report.
The details of one or more examples of the embodiments are set forth in the accompanying drawings and the description below. Other features will be apparent from the description and drawings, and from the claims.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a wireless network according to an example embodiment.
Fig. 2 is a diagram illustrating a network using side chain positioning according to an example embodiment.
Fig. 3A, 3B and 3C are graphs illustrating measured positioning reference signals according to example embodiments.
Fig. 4A and 4B are graphs illustrating measured positioning reference signals according to example embodiments.
Fig. 5A and 5B show signal flow diagrams according to example embodiments.
Fig. 6 is a block diagram illustrating a method of verifying a positioning reference signal according to an example embodiment.
Fig. 7 is a block diagram illustrating another method of verifying a positioning reference signal according to an example embodiment.
Figure 8 is a wireless station or wireless node according to an example embodiment (e.g., AP, BS, gNB, RAN node, relay node, UE or user equipment, terminal device, network node, network entity, DU, CU-CP, a.
Detailed Description
Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a wireless network 130 according to an example embodiment. In the wireless network 130 of fig. 1, user equipment 131, 132, 133, and 135 (which may also be referred to as a Mobile Station (MS), a User Equipment (UE), or a terminal device) may be connected to (and communicate with) a Base Station (BS) 134, which may also be referred to as an Access Point (AP), an enhanced node B (eNB), a BS, a next generation node B (gNB), a next generation enhanced node B (ng-eNB), or a network node. The terms user equipment (device) and User Equipment (UE) may be used interchangeably. A BS may also include, or may be referred to as, a RAN (radio access network) node, and may include a portion of the BS or a portion of the RAN node, such as (e.g., in the case of a split BS, such as a Centralized Unit (CU) and/or a Distributed Unit (DU)). At least a portion of the functionality of a BS (e.g., access Point (AP), base Station (BS), or (e) node B (eNB), BS, RAN node) may also be performed by any node, server, or host that may be operably coupled to a transceiver, such as a remote radio head. BS (or AP) 134 provides wireless coverage within cell 136, including to user equipment (or UE) 131, 132, 133, and 135. Although only four user equipments (or UEs) are shown connected or attached to BS134, any number of user equipments may be provided. BS134 is also connected to core network 150 via an S1 interface or NG interface 151. This is just one simple example of a wireless network, and other examples may be used.
A base station, such as BS134, for example, is an example of a Radio Access Network (RAN) node within a wireless network. The BS (or RAN node) may be or may include (or may alternatively be referred to as) for example an Access Point (AP), a gNB, an eNB or a part thereof, such as a Centralized Unit (CU) and/or a Distributed Unit (DU) in case of splitting the BS or splitting the gNB, or other network node. For example, a BS (or gNB) may include a Distributed Unit (DU) network entity, such as a gNB-distributed unit (gNB-DU), and a Centralized Unit (CU) that may control a plurality of DUs. In some cases, for example, a Centralized Unit (CU) may be split or separated into control plane entities, such as gNB centralized (or central) unit-control plane (gNB-CU-CP), and user plane entities, such as gNB centralized (or central) unit-user plane (gNB-CU-UP). For example, CU sub-entities (gNB-CU-CP, gNB-CU-UP) may be provided as different logical entities or different software entities (e.g., separate or different software entities as a communication), which may be running or provided on the same hardware or server, in the cloud, etc., or may be provided on different hardware, systems, or servers, e.g., physically separate or running on different systems, hardware, or servers.
As described above, in the split configuration of the gNB/BS, the gNB function can be split into DUs and CUs. A Distributed Unit (DU) may provide or establish wireless communication with one or more UEs. Thus, a DU may provide one or more cells and may allow a UE to communicate with and/or establish a connection to the DU in order to receive wireless services, such as allowing a terminal device (e.g., UE) to transmit or receive data. A centralized (or Central) Unit (CU) may provide control functions and/or data plane functions for one or more connected DUs, e.g. including control functions such as gNB control of transmission of user data, mobility control, radio access network sharing, positioning, session management, etc., in addition to those specifically assigned to DUs. A CU may control operation of DUs (e.g., a CU communicates with one or more DUs) through a forward (Fs) interface.
According to an illustrative example, in general, a BS node (e.g., BS, eNB, gNB, CU/DU..) or a Radio Access Network (RAN) may be part of a mobile telecommunications system. The RAN (radio access network) may comprise one or more BSs or RAN nodes implementing radio access technologies, e.g. to allow one or more UEs to access the network or core network. Thus, for example, a RAN (RAN node, such as a BS or a gNB) may reside between one or more user equipments or UEs and a core network. According to example embodiments, each RAN node (e.g., BS, eNB, gNB, CU/DU..) or BS may provide one or more wireless communication services to one or more UEs or user equipment, e.g., to allow the UEs to wirelessly access the network via the RAN node. Each RAN node or BS may perform or provide wireless communication services, such as, for example, allowing a UE or user equipment to establish a wireless connection to the RAN node and to send data to and/or receive data from one or more UEs. For example, after establishing a connection to a UE, the RAN node (e.g., BS, eNB, gNB, CU/d.u.) may forward data received from the network or core network to a terminal device (e.g., UE) and/or forward data received from the terminal device (e.g., UE) to the network or core network. The RAN node (e.g., BS, eNB, gNB, CU/DU..) may perform various other wireless functions or services, such as, for example, broadcasting control information (e.g., such as system information) to UEs, paging UEs when there is data to deliver to the UEs, assisting terminal devices (e.g., UEs) in handover between cells, scheduling resources for uplink data transmissions from and downlink data transmissions to the UE(s), sending control information to configure one or more UEs, etc. These are several examples of one or more functions that the RAN node or BS may perform. The base station may also be a DU (distributed unit) part of an IAB (integrated access and backhaul) node (also called relay node). The DU supports access link connection(s) for the IAB node.
User equipment (user terminal, user Equipment (UE), mobile terminal, terminal device, handheld wireless device, etc.) may refer to portable computing devices including wireless mobile communications devices that operate with or without a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), which may be referred to as a universal SIM, including by way of example and not limitation, mobile Stations (MSs), mobile telephones, cellular telephones, smart phones, personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), handsets, devices using wireless modems (alarm or measurement devices, etc.), laptop and/or touch screen computers, tablet phones, game consoles, notebook computers, vehicles, sensors and multimedia devices, or any other wireless device. It should be understood that the user device may also be (or may include) a nearly dedicated uplink-only device, examples of which are cameras or video cameras that load images or video clips into the network. The user equipment may also be an MT (mobile terminal) part of an IAB (integrated access and backhaul) node (also referred to as a relay node). The MT supports backhaul connections for the IAB node.
In LTE (as an illustrative example), core network 150 may be referred to as an Evolved Packet Core (EPC), which may include a Mobility Management Entity (MME) that may handle or assist mobility/handover of user equipment between BSs, one or more gateways that may forward data and control signals between BSs and a packet data network or the internet, and other control functions or blocks. Other types of wireless networks, such as 5G (which may be referred to as New Radio (NR)), advanced 5G, 6G, etc. may also include core networks (e.g., which may be referred to as 5GC in 5G/NR).
Further, as an illustrative example, the various example embodiments or techniques described herein may be applied to various types of user devices or data service types, or to user devices that may have multiple applications running thereon, which may be different data service types. New radio (5G) and 6G developments may support a variety of different applications or a variety of different data service types, such as, for example, machine Type Communication (MTC), enhanced machine type communication (eMTC), large-scale MTC (eMTC), internet of things (IoT) and/or narrowband IoT user equipment, enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), and ultra-reliable and low-latency communications (URLLC). Many of these new 5G (NR) and 6G related applications may typically require higher performance than previous wireless networks.
IoT may refer to an ever-growing set of objects that may have internet or network connectivity such that the objects may send and receive information to and from other network devices. For example, many sensor-type applications or devices may monitor physical conditions or states and may send reports to a server or other network device, for example, when an event occurs. For example, machine type communication (MTC or machine-to-machine communication) may be characterized by fully automatic data generation, exchange, processing, and actuation between intelligent machines with or without human intervention. The enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) may support much higher data rates than are currently available in LTE.
Ultra-reliable and low latency communications (URLLC) are new data service types or new usage scenarios that can be supported for new radio (5G) and 6G systems. This enables new applications and services to emerge, such as industrial automation, autonomous driving, vehicle safety, electronic health services, etc. As an illustrative example, the goal of 3GPP is to provide a connection with a block error rate (BLER) corresponding to 10 -5 and reliability up to a1 millisecond (ms) U-plane (user/data plane) delay. Thus, for example, URLLC user equipment/UEs may require significantly lower block error rates and low latency (with or without the need for high reliability) than other types of user equipment/UEs. Thus, for example, URLLCUE (or URLLC application on a UE) may require a much shorter latency than eMBB UE (or eMBB application running on the UE).
Various example embodiments may be applied to various wireless technologies or wireless networks, such as LTE, LTE-a, 5G (new radio (NR)), 6G, cmWave band networks and/or mmWave band networks, ioT, MTC, eMTC, mMTC, eMBB, URLLC, etc., or any other wireless network or wireless technology. These example networks, technologies, or data service types are provided as illustrative examples only.
In 5G NR positioning, it is a known problem how to identify that legitimate PRS transmissions are being emulated or imitated by a so-called spoofer. Spoofed PRS transmissions may be due to failure or have malicious intent. A problem with PRS spoofing is that it may result in significant errors in the positioning of the target terminal device (e.g., UE). Additionally, PRS spoofing may be entirely a positioning process. Unlike traditional Uu positioning, where PRSs are broadcast by the network gNB via their TRPs, signal transmitting devices (e.g., unidentified devices transmitting malicious PRSs) or failed side link terminal devices (e.g., UEs) may become spoofed devices in SL positioning. Example implementations may relate to a 5G NR side link positioning scenario in which any side link terminal device (e.g., UE) may become a positioning anchor for broadcasting SL PRS.
Example implementations may solve the foregoing problems due to a rogue device in SL positioning, where the rogue device is sending PRSs to a target device. Example implementations may include using an anchor terminal device (e.g., a sidelink UE) to measure PRSs identified as suspected rogue PRSs. A device (e.g., network entity, BS, DU, cu, UE, etc.) that includes a Location Management Function (LMF) may use PRS measurements made by a target terminal device (e.g., UE) and PRS measurements made by an anchor UE to perform a validation decision associated with PRSs that are identified as suspected rogue PRSs. Devices that include an LMF may be referred to as location management devices. Thus, in example implementations described herein, the network entity, BS, DU, cu, UE, etc. may be a location management device.
Fig. 2 is a diagram illustrating a network using side chain positioning according to an example embodiment. As shown in fig. 2, the network includes BS134, UE 205, UE 210, UE 215, UE 220, and signaling device 225 (sometimes referred to as device 225). BS134 may be a combination of devices. For example, BS134 may represent BS and core network devices (or entities), BS134 may represent BS and control devices (or entities), BS134 may represent base stations on satellites, satellites as repeaters and terrestrial base stations, and any other similar combination of network devices. Individual devices and/or combinations of devices may sometimes be referred to as devices, systems, etc. UE 205, UE 210, UE 215, and UE 220 may be user devices, terminal devices, user terminals, mobile devices, fixed devices, internet of things (IoT) devices, any wireless (or cellular) connected devices, and the like.
In the example implementation shown in fig. 2, the UE 205 may be a target UE (e.g., UE and/or terminal device) for which a location is to be determined. In the example implementation illustrated by fig. 2, UEs 210, 215, and 220 may be anchor UEs (e.g., UEs that transmit PRSs for determining (or helping to determine) a location of a target UE). In an example implementation, the network entity may include an LMF. In this implementation, UE 205, UE 210, UE 215, and UE220 may communicate with network entities including LMFs via base station 134. In an example implementation, a terminal device (e.g., UE) may include an LMF. In this implementation, UE 205, UE 210, UE 215, and UE220 may communicate location information directly to a terminal device (e.g., UE) that includes an LMF. For example, the UE220 may include an LMF. Thus, UE 205, UE 210, and UE 215 may communicate location information directly to UE 220.
In the example of fig. 2, UE 210 transmits PRS230, UE 215 transmits PRS235, and UE 220 transmits PRS240. In addition, the UE 205 (as the target UE) may measure PRS230, PRS235, and PRS240.PRS measurements may be used to determine the location of the UE 205.
Also shown in fig. 2 is a signal transmitting device 225 or device 225 that transmits spoofed PRS 245. The spoofed PRS245 may be configured by the device 225 to spoof, for example, the PRS235. In other words, the spoofed PRS245 may be spoofing a legitimate PRS235, which may adversely affect the positioning process of the UE 205 (as a target UE). In an example embodiment, the UE 210 may also measure the spoofed PRS245, and the LMF may verify the spoofed PRS245 using the spoofed PRS245 measured by the UE 205 and the spoofed PRS245 measured by the UE 210 (in this example, the spoofed PRS245 should be determined to be invalid).
Example implementations may determine whether PRS is valid based on one (or both) of two techniques. In a first technique, a device that transmits spoofed PRSs (e.g., spoofing of legitimate PRSs) cannot generate spoofed PRSs that are time aligned with legitimate PRS transmissions at both a target terminal device (e.g., UE) and an anchor terminal device (e.g., UE) because the anchor terminal device (e.g., UE and/or anchor UE) are in different locations. In a second technique, the distance between the PRS source anchor terminal device (e.g., UE) and the other reference anchor UE(s) allows for accurate estimation of PRS time of arrival (ToA) and verification of PRS measurements.
In a first technique, if a device (e.g., device 225) sending a spoofed PRS (e.g., spoofed PRS 245) synchronizes a spoofed PRS transmission with a legitimate PRS transmission at a target terminal device (e.g., UE 205), at least one of the anchor terminal device(s) (e.g., UE 210, UE 215, and UE 220) will observe two different PRS copies because the device (e.g., device 225) sending the spoofed PRS (e.g., spoofed PRS 245) will also not be able to synchronize with the anchor UE due to the disjoint location of the anchor UE with respect to the target terminal device (e.g., UE 205). A device (e.g., device 225) sending a spoofed PRS (e.g., spoofed PRS 245) may synchronize the spoofed PRS transmissions with legitimate PRS transmissions at a target terminal device (e.g., UE 205) to, for example, reduce positioning accuracy while minimizing detection risks.
In a first technique, if a device (e.g., device 225) sending a spoofed PRS (e.g., spoofed PRS 245) does not synchronize the spoofed PRS transmission with a legitimate PRS transmission at a target terminal device (e.g., UE 205), the target terminal device (e.g., UE 205) may be able to observe two different copies of the same PRS. The device transmitting spoofed PRSs and not synchronizing spoofed PRS transmissions is sometimes referred to as blind PRS interference.
In a second technique, the location of the anchor UE(s) is known to the LMF and the server UE. Thus, the expected time of arrival (ToA) for a given PRS can be calculated (as anchor distance/speed of light) when propagating from the source anchor of the PRS to (any) other anchor. The expected ToA of the PRS can be compared to the actual measured ToA. Furthermore, if the expected ToA is not within a predefined tolerance range, an integrity alarm may be triggered for PRS.
Further, with either or both of the first and second techniques, signal power or signal energy associated with the measured PRS may help identify spoofed PRS transmissions. For example, a legitimate PRS transmission may have an expected signal power or signal energy. Thus, if the measured PRS transmit signal power or signal energy (e.g., within a predefined threshold) is above or below the expected signal power or signal energy, an integrity alarm may be triggered for the PRS. However, if the measured PRS transmission signal power or signal energy is below a predefined threshold signal power or signal energy, the PRS transmission may be identified as noise (e.g., reflection of some other PRS transmission).
Fig. 3A, 3B and 3C are graphs illustrating measured positioning reference signals according to example embodiments. In the examples of fig. 3A, 3B and 3C, the measurements are shown as pulses for clarity. However, the measured positioning reference signal may have a waveform more like that shown in fig. 4A and 4B below. Fig. 3A, 3B, and 3C illustrate a measured PRS 305 and a measured PRS 310. The measured PRS 305 may be associated with legitimate PRS transmissions (e.g., PRS230, PRS235, and PRS 240) and the measured PRS 310 may be associated with spoofed PRS (e.g., spoofed PRS 245).
Fig. 3A may represent PRSs 305 and 310 measured at a target terminal device (e.g., UE 205). In fig. 3A, PRS 305 and PRS 310 are measured with a time difference Δt 1. The time difference Δt 1 is less than the separation tolerance 315. Thus, fig. 3A may illustrate spoofed PRS transmissions that overlap with legitimate PRS transmissions. Overlapping PRS transmissions may not be detected by a target terminal device (e.g., UE 205). In other words, the target terminal device (e.g., UE 205) may not be able to measure ToA, for example. However, the target terminal device (e.g., UE 205) may determine that there is more than one peak. PRS transmissions with more than one peak may trigger an integrity alert for PRS.
Fig. 3B may represent PRS 305 and PRS 310 measured at an anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 210). In the example of fig. 3B, an anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 210) may be farther from the source of PRS 310 than a target UE. In fig. 3, PRS 305 and PRS 310 are measured with a time difference Δt 2. The time difference Δt 2 is greater than the separation tolerance 315. Additionally, fig. 3B may illustrate spoofed PRS transmissions relative to legitimate PRS transmission delays. The delayed PRS transmissions may be detected by an anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 210) because, for example, the time difference Δt 2 is greater than the separation tolerance 315. In other words, the anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 210) may be capable of measuring ToA, for example. Thus, an anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 210) can make measurements that can be used to verify PRS.
Fig. 3C may represent PRS 305 and PRS 310 measured at an anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 215). In the example of fig. 3C, the anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 215) may be closer to the source of PRS 310 than the target UE. In fig. 3, PRS 305 and PRS 310 are measured with a time difference Δt 3. The time difference Δt 3 is greater than the separation tolerance 315. Additionally, fig. 3C may illustrate spoofed PRS transmissions that are earlier relative to legitimate PRS transmissions. The early PRS transmission may be detected by an anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 215) because, for example, time difference Δt 3 is greater than separation tolerance 315. In other words, the anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 215) may be capable of measuring ToA, for example. Thus, the anchor terminal device (e.g., UE 215) can make measurements that can be used to verify PRS.
Fig. 4A and 4B are graphs illustrating measured positioning reference signals according to example embodiments. Fig. 4A and 4B illustrate more typical measured PRS waveforms. Fig. 4A illustrates a spoofed PRS transmission overlapping a legitimate PRS transmission as described above with respect to fig. 3A. Fig. 4B illustrates legitimate PRS transmission delays and early spoofed PRS transmissions as described above with respect to fig. 3B and 3C, respectively.
Example implementations may use the first and second techniques described above to detect PRS spoofing and trigger integrity alarms for PRSs. For example, a network entity including an LMF and/or a terminal device (e.g., UE) including an LMF (referred to as a server UE) may trigger a PRS verification check in response to an integrity alarm. In an example implementation, a target terminal device (e.g., UE) uses PRS without a single spike as a trigger (e.g., as in fig. 3A and 4A). In another example implementation, a network entity including the LMF and/or the server UE may detect measurement mismatch(s) and/or excessive error.
PRS to be verified may be identified and an appropriate verification node may be selected. In an example implementation, the authentication node may be an anchor UE. An anchor terminal device (e.g., UE) may select randomly or based on RSRP (e.g., weaker RSRP may be used to identify the non-co-located anchor). In another example implementation, the authentication node may be a Transmission Reception Point (TRP). In another example implementation, the verifying node may have a common synchronization reference with a source anchor of a PRS to be verified (e.g., a PRS selected for verification).
The network entity including the LMF and/or the server UE may configure the integrity verification measurements by sending configuration data. In an example implementation, the configuration data may identify a PRS to be verified. The selected PRS may be marked in the configuration data using a binary flag indicating the selection for verification checking. In another example implementation (or additional), the configuration data may also include information about the distance (e.g., absolute position or distance) between the PRS source anchor and the selected authentication node. In another example implementation (or in addition), the configuration may also include an offset (e.g., timing advance) relative to the common synchronization reference.
In another example implementation (or in addition), the configuration may also include an indication of the integrity assessment criteria. The anchor terminal device (e.g., UE) selected in the authentication process may be configured to collect measurements of the selected PRS and may evaluate PRS integrity based on criteria. In an example implementation, the criteria may be based on an evaluation of individual PRS energy or power peaks. In another example implementation (or additional), the criteria may be based on a comparison of PRS arrival time (ToA) with an expected ToA. The expected ToA may be calculated as the distance between the source anchor and the verification anchor. ToA may be calculated by considering an offset (e.g., timing advance) relative to a reference clock of a common synchronization source.
The verification anchor terminal device (e.g., UE) may report the results of the integrity verification in report data to a network entity including the LMF and/or server UE. In an example implementation, the reporting data may include a binary flag indicating success or failure of the integrity check for a given PRS. The measurement report associated with the selected PRS may be marked by a binary flag. In another example implementation, a network entity including the LMF and/or the server UE may be configured to determine success or failure of an integrity check for a given PRS, and the measurement report may include measurement data. The network entity including the LMF and/or the server UE may be configured to update the positioning procedure based on the integrity verification (e.g., reconfigure the affected PRS and/or source anchor UE in the event of a failure).
Fig. 5A and 5B show signal flow diagrams according to example embodiments. Fig. 5A is a signal flow diagram according to an example embodiment. As shown in fig. 5A, the network may include network entities 505 (e.g., location management devices, LMFs, location servers, and/or sensing servers), BS134, UE 205, UE 210, UE 220, and signaling device 225 (sometimes referred to as device 225). In an example implementation, network entity 505 may communicate with UE 205, UE 210, and UE 220 via BS 134. BS134 may be a combination of devices. For example, BS134 may represent BS and core network devices (or entities), BS134 may represent BS and control devices (or entities), BS134 may represent base stations on satellites, satellite and terrestrial base stations as repeaters, and any other similar combination of network devices. Individual devices and/or combinations of devices may sometimes be referred to as devices, systems, etc. UE 205, UE 210, and UE 220 may be user devices, terminal devices, user terminals, mobile devices, fixed devices, internet of things (IoT) devices, any wireless (or cellular) connected devices, and so forth.
In block 510, assistance data may be transmitted over a network. Assistance data may be generated and transmitted by the network entity 505 and/or the UE205, UE210, UE215, and/or UE220 as server UE. In block 520, PRSs are generated and transmitted by UE 220. Then, the UE205 (as a target terminal device) receives and measures PRSs transmitted by the UE 220. In block 522, the device 225, which is a signaling device, generates spoofed PRSs. Spoofed PRSs generated by the device 225 may be configured to spoof PRSs transmitted by the UE 220. The UE205 (as the target terminal device) then receives and measures the spoofed PRS transmitted by the device 225.
In block 515, the network node triggers a positioning integrity check. The positioning integrity check may be triggered by the target terminal device (e.g., UE) observing an unclear curve of received PRSs without any (single) distinct peaks, or by a network entity including the LMF and/or the server UE in case of excessive error of one PRS relative to other measurements. In other words, in block 515, the positioning integrity check may be triggered by any of the UE 205 (as a target terminal device), the network entity 505 (as a location management device), and/or the UE 205, UE 210, UE 215, and/or UE 220 as a server UE.
In block 524, the network entity 505 (as a location management device) determines that PRS is to be verified and the UE 210 is selected as a terminal device (e.g., UE) to make PRS verification measurements. The network entity 505 may generate configuration data associated with PRS verification. Network entity 505 may transmit (e.g., wirelessly transmit) the message received by BS134 (block 526A). BS134 may transmit (e.g., wirelessly transmit) the message received by UE 210 (block 526B). In this implementation, the message is generated by network entity 505 and transmitted to UE 210 via BS 134. The message may include configuration data generated by the network entity 505. The configuration data may identify PRSs selected for integrity verification. For example, the selected PRS may be marked (e.g., retransmitted, updated, etc.) in the assistance data by an added binary flag. The configuration data may also include information regarding a distance (e.g., absolute position or distance) between the PRS source anchor and the selected authentication node. This information may be available via the initial assistance data distribution. The configuration data may also include information about an offset (e.g., timing advance in the case where TRP is selected as the verification anchor) relative to the common synchronization reference. Further, the configuration data may include an indication of an integrity assessment criteria.
In block 528, PRS is generated and transmitted by UE 220. Then, the UE 210 (as an authentication anchor terminal device) receives and measures PRSs transmitted by the UE 220. In block 530, the device 225, which is a signaling device, generates spoofed PRSs. Spoofed PRSs generated by the device 225 may be configured to spoof PRSs transmitted by the UE 220. Then 210 (as an authentication anchor terminal device) receives and measures the spoofed PRS transmitted by device 225.
In block 532, the UE 210 (as an authentication anchor UE) may be configured to collect measurements of the selected PRS and evaluate PRS integrity based on criteria. The criteria may be based on a single clear PRS peak detected in the received energy curve. Alternatively, the criteria may compare the measured PRS arrival time to an expected arrival time. The expected arrival time may be calculated from the distance between the source anchor and the verification anchor (distance/speed of light-hardware propagation delay if known). The expected time of arrival may be calculated by considering an offset (e.g., timing advance) relative to a reference clock of a common synchronization source at UE 220 and UE 210 (as an authentication anchor terminal device). The difference may be added to a value corresponding to the distance/optical speed-hardware propagation delay.
UE 210 may transmit (e.g., wirelessly transmit) the message received by BS134 (block 534A). BS134 may transmit (e.g., wirelessly transmit) the message received by network entity 505 (block 534B). In this implementation, the message is generated by UE 210 and transmitted to network entity 505 via BS 134. The message may include the result of the integrity verification of the selected PRS. For example, the message may include reporting data. The reporting data may include a binary flag indicating success or failure of the integrity verification performed for the selected PRS. For example, the measurement report associated with the selected PRS may be marked by a binary flag. In block 536, the network entity 505 may perform a positioning procedure update based on the result of the integrity verification of the selected PRS.
Fig. 5B is a signal flow diagram according to an example embodiment. In the example of fig. 5B, the terminal device (e.g., UE) is a location management device (e.g., server UE), while in the example of fig. 5A, the network entity 505 is a location management device. In fig. 5B, many of the blocks are the same as in fig. 5A and will not be discussed for brevity.
In block 538, the UE 220 (as a location management device) determines that PRS is to be verified and the UE 210 is selected as a terminal device (e.g., UE) to make PRS verification measurements. The UE 220 may generate configuration data associated with PRS verification. The UE 220 may transmit (e.g., wirelessly transmit) a message received by the UE 210 (block 540). The message may include configuration data generated by the UE 220. The configuration data may identify PRSs selected for integrity verification. For example, the selected PRS may be marked (e.g., retransmitted, updated, etc.) in the assistance data by a raised binary flag. The configuration data may also include information regarding a distance (e.g., absolute position or distance) between the PRS source anchor and the selected authentication node. This information may be available via the initial assistance data distribution. The configuration data may also include information about an offset (e.g., timing advance in the case where TRP is selected as the verification anchor) relative to the common synchronization reference. Further, the configuration data may include an indication of an integrity assessment criteria.
The UE 210 may transmit (e.g., wirelessly transmit) a message received by the UE 220 (block 542). The message may include the result of the integrity verification of the selected PRS. For example, the message may include reporting data. The reporting data may include a binary flag indicating success or failure of the integrity verification performed for the selected PRS. For example, the measurement report associated with the selected PRS may be marked by a binary flag. In block 544, the UE 220 may perform a positioning procedure update based on the result of the integrity verification of the selected PRS.
Example 1. Fig. 6 is a block diagram of a method of verifying PRS in accordance with an example embodiment. As shown in fig. 6, in step S605, configuration information is received by a first terminal device from a location management device for Positioning Reference Signal (PRS) integrity checking associated with one or more second terminal devices configured to support positioning of a target terminal device. In step S610, measurements of one or more PRS transmissions are collected based on configuration information. In step S615, an integrity check is performed on one or more PRS transmissions based on the respective received energy profiles from the measurements of the collected PRS transmissions.
Example 2 the method of example 1 may further comprise determining, by the first terminal device, whether the one or more PRS transmissions are from the one or more second terminal devices by evaluating a corresponding received power energy profile based on the measurements of the collected PRS transmissions.
Example 3 the method of example 1 or example 2, wherein the first terminal device and the one or more second terminal devices may be anchor terminal devices configured to support positioning of the target terminal device.
Example 4 the method of example 3 may further comprise generating, by the first terminal device, an integrity report comprising a result of the integrity check, and transmitting the integrity report to the location management device.
Example 5. The method of example 1, wherein collecting measurements of the one or more PRS transmissions may include measuring, by the first terminal device, a first PRS associated with one of the one or more second terminal devices identified in the configuration information and measuring, by the first terminal device, a second PRS associated with one of the one or more second devices, the method may further include generating, by the first terminal device, an integrity report associated with the target terminal device based on the first PRS and the second PRS.
Example 6. The method of example 5, wherein the second PRS may be a copy of the first PRS.
Example 7 the method of any one of examples 1-6, wherein the location management device may be located in a network device, the method further comprising transmitting, by the first terminal device, an integrity report to the network device, and receiving, by the first terminal device, a validation report associated with the target terminal device from the location management device, wherein the validation report indicates whether the second PRS is a valid PRS.
Example 8 the method of any one of examples 1-6, wherein the location management device may be located in a network device, the method further comprising transmitting, by the first terminal device, an integrity report to the network device, and receiving, by the first terminal device, at least one of updated auxiliary configuration, reconfiguration data, and location instructions associated with the target terminal device from the location management device.
Example 9 the method of any of examples 1-6, wherein the location management device may be located in a location server terminal device, the method may further include transmitting, by the first terminal device, an integrity report to the location server terminal device, and receiving, by the first terminal device, a validation report associated with the target terminal device from the location management device, wherein the validation report indicates whether the second PRS is a valid PRS.
Example 10 the method of any of examples 1-6, wherein the location management device may be located in the first terminal device, the method may further include determining, by the first terminal device, whether the second PRS is a valid PRS based on at least one of a time distance between a power curve associated with the first PRS and a power curve associated with the second PRS, a time distance between a local power maximum associated with the first PRS and a local power maximum associated with the second PRS, a time distance between a global power maximum associated with the first PRS and a global power maximum associated with the second PRS, a time distance between a predefined power value associated with the first PRS and a predefined power value associated with the second PRS, a time of arrival associated with at least one of the first PRS and the second PRS, a peak power associated with at least one of the first PRS and the second PRS, and an expected time of arrival associated with the first PRS.
Example 11. The method of any of examples 1-10, wherein the location integrity configuration may include at least one of a PRS to be checked, a distance between a target terminal device and an anchor terminal device, an offset relative to a common synchronization reference, and an integrity assessment criterion, the PRS to be checked may be a first PRS, the target terminal device may be a target terminal device, and the anchor terminal device may be a first terminal device.
Example 12 the method of any one of examples 1-11, wherein the integrity assessment criteria may include at least one of PRS peak power, PRS peak power range, PRS peak power delta, PRS arrival time window, PRS arrival time mask, and PRS arrival time delta.
Example 13 fig. 7 is a block diagram of another method of verifying PRS in accordance with an example embodiment. As shown in fig. 7, in step S705, the location integrity configuration is transmitted by the location management device to the second terminal device. In step S710, an integrity report including measurements associated with a first Position Reference Signal (PRS) and a second PRS is received by a position management device from a second terminal device. In step S715, it is determined by the location management device whether the second PRS is a valid PRS based on the integrity report.
Example 14. The method of example 13, wherein determining whether the second PRS is a valid PRS may include at least one of a time of arrival associated with at least one of the first PRS and the second PRS, a peak power associated with at least one of the first PRS and the second PRS, and an expected time of arrival associated with the first PRS.
Example 15 the method of example 13 or example 14 may further comprise triggering, by the location management device, a location integrity check associated with the first terminal device.
Example 16. The method of example 15, wherein triggering the position integrity check may be based on at least one of detecting a PRS without a single peak power, at least two PRS peak powers within a time window, and at least two PRS peak powers greater than a threshold power and within the time window.
Example 17 the method of any one of examples 13-16, wherein the location integrity configuration may include at least one of a PRS to be checked, a distance between a target terminal device and an anchor terminal device, an offset relative to a common synchronization reference, and an integrity assessment criterion, the PRS to be checked may be a first PRS, the target terminal device may be a target terminal device, and the anchor terminal device may be a first terminal device.
Example 18 the method of example 17, wherein the integrity assessment criteria may include at least one of PRS peak power, PRS peak power range, PRS peak power delta, PRS arrival time window, PRS arrival time mask, and PRS arrival time delta.
Example 19 the method of any one of examples 13 to 18, wherein the location management device may be located in one of a network device, a base station, a distributed unit, a central unit, a transmission reception point, or a location server terminal device.
Example 20 the method of example 19, wherein the location management device may switch from the network device, the base station, or the transmission reception point to one of the location server terminal devices based on network unavailability or switch from the location server terminal device to the network device, the base station, or the transmission reception point based on network availability.
Example 21. A method may include any combination of one or more of examples 1-20.
Example 22. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions stored thereon that, when executed by at least one processor, are configured to cause a computing system to perform the method of any of examples 1 to 21.
Example 23, an apparatus comprising means for performing the method of any of examples 1 to 21.
Example 24. An apparatus comprising at least one processor and at least one memory including computer program code, the at least one memory and the computer program code configured to, with the at least one processor, cause the apparatus at least to perform the method of any one of examples 1 to 21.
Example 25. An apparatus comprising at least one processor and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to perform at least the method of any one of examples 1 to 21.
Fig. 8 is a block diagram of a wireless station 800 or wireless node or network node 800 according to an example embodiment. According to example embodiments, the wireless node or wireless station or network node 800 may include, for example, one or more of AP, BS, gNB, RAN nodes, relay nodes, UEs, terminal devices or user devices, network nodes, network entities, DUs, CU-CPs, CU-UP..
The wireless station 800 may include, for example, one or more (e.g., two as shown in fig. 8) Radio Frequency (RF) or wireless transceivers 802A, 802B, each of which includes a transmitter for transmitting signals and a receiver for receiving signals. The wireless station also includes a processor or control unit/entity (controller) 804 to execute instructions or software and control transmission and reception of signals, and memory 806 for storing data and/or instructions.
Processor 804 may also make decisions or determinations, generate frames, packets, or messages for transmission, decode received frames or messages for further processing, and other tasks or functions described herein. For example, the processor 804, which may be a baseband processor, may generate messages, packets, frames, or other signals for transmission via the wireless transceiver 802 (802A or 802B). The processor 804 may control transmission of signals or messages over the wireless network and may control reception of signals or messages, etc., via the wireless network (e.g., after being down-converted by the wireless transceiver 802). The processor 804 may be programmable and capable of executing software or other instructions stored in memory or on other computer media to perform the various tasks and functions described above, such as one or more of the tasks or methods described above. The processor 804 may be (or may include) a programmable processor such as hardware, programmable logic, executing software or firmware, and/or any combination of these. For example, using other terminology, the processor 804 and transceiver 802 together may be considered a wireless transmitter/receiver system.
In addition, referring to fig. 8, a controller (or processor) 808 may execute software and instructions and may provide overall control for the station 800, and may provide control for other systems not shown in fig. 8, such as controlling input/output devices (e.g., displays, keyboards), and/or may execute software for one or more applications that may be provided on the wireless station 800, such as, for example, email programs, audio/video applications, word processors, voice over IP applications, or other applications or software.
Additionally, a storage medium may be provided that includes stored instructions that, when executed by a controller or processor, may cause the processor 804 or other controller or processor to perform one or more of the functions or tasks described above.
According to another example embodiment, the RF or wireless transceiver(s) 802A/802B may receive signals or data and/or transmit or send signals or data. The processor 804 (and possibly the transceiver 802A/802B) may control the RF or wireless transceiver 802A or 802B to receive, transmit, broadcast, or transmit signals or data.
However, the example embodiments are not limited to the system given as an example, but a person skilled in the art may apply the solution to other communication systems. Another example of a suitable communication system is a 5G system. It is assumed that the network architecture in 5G will be very similar to that of LTE-advanced. The 5G may use multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antennas, many more base stations or nodes than LTE (so-called small cell concept), including macro sites operating in cooperation with smaller stations, and may also employ various radio technologies to obtain better coverage and enhanced data rates. Another example of a suitable communication system is a 6G system. It is assumed that the network architecture in 6G will be similar to that of 5G.
It should be appreciated that future networks will most likely utilize Network Function Virtualization (NFV), a network architecture concept that proposes virtualizing network node functions as "building blocks" or entities that can be operatively connected or linked together to provide services. A Virtualized Network Function (VNF) may comprise one or more virtual machines that run computer program code using standard or generic type servers instead of custom hardware. Cloud computing or data storage may also be utilized. In radio communications, this may mean that node operations may be performed at least in part in a server, host, or node operatively coupled to a remote radio head. Node operations may also be distributed among multiple servers, nodes, or hosts. It should also be appreciated that the labor allocation between core network operation and base station operation may be different from or even absent from that of LTE.
Example embodiments of the various techniques described herein may be implemented in digital electronic circuitry, or in computer hardware, firmware, software, or in combinations of them. Example embodiments may be implemented as a computer program product, i.e., a computer program tangibly embodied in an information carrier (e.g., in a machine-readable storage device or in a propagated signal), for execution by, or to control the operation of, data processing apparatus (e.g., a programmable processor, a computer, or multiple computers). Embodiments may also be provided on a computer-readable medium or computer-readable storage medium, which may be a non-transitory medium. Embodiments of the various techniques may also include embodiments provided via transitory signals or media, and/or program and/or software embodiments that are downloadable via the internet or other network(s) (wired and/or wireless network). Additionally, embodiments may be provided via Machine Type Communication (MTC) and also via internet of things (IOT).
A computer program may be in source code form, object code form, or in some intermediate form and it may be stored in some carrier, distribution medium, or computer readable medium, which may be any entity or device capable of carrying the program. Such carriers include, for example, recording media, computer memory, read-only memory, electro-optical and/or electronic carrier signals, telecommunications signals, and software distribution packages. Depending on the processing power required, the computer program may be executed in a single electronic digital computer or may be distributed among multiple computers.
Furthermore, example embodiments of the various techniques described herein may use a network physical system (CPS) (a system of cooperating computing elements that control physical entities). The CPS may enable embodiments and utilization of a multitude of interconnected ICT devices (sensors, actuators, processor microcontrollers.) embedded in physical objects at different locations. Mobile network physical systems are sub-classes of network physical systems, wherein the physical system in question has inherent mobility. Examples of mobile physical systems include mobile robots and electronic devices transported by humans or animals. The increasing popularity of smartphones has increased interest in the field of mobile network physical systems. Accordingly, various embodiments of the techniques described herein may be provided via one or more of these techniques.
A computer program, such as the computer program(s) described above, can be written in any form of programming language, including compiled or interpreted languages, and it can be deployed in any form, including as a stand-alone program or as a module, component, subroutine, or other unit or portion thereof suitable for use in a computing environment. A computer program can be deployed to be executed on one computer or on multiple computers at one site or distributed across multiple sites and interconnected by a communication network.
The method steps may be performed by one or more programmable processors executing a computer program or portion of a computer program to perform functions by operating on input data and generating output. Method steps may also be performed by, and apparatus may be implemented as, special purpose logic circuitry, e.g., an FPGA (field programmable gate array) or an ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit).
Processors suitable for the execution of a computer program include, by way of example, both general and special purpose microprocessors, and any one or more processors of any kind of digital computer, chip or chipset. Generally, a processor will receive instructions and data from a read-only memory or a random access memory or both. Elements of a computer may include at least one processor for executing instructions and one or more memory devices for storing instructions and data. Generally, a computer will also include, or be operatively coupled to receive data from or transfer data to, or both, one or more mass storage devices for storing data (e.g., magnetic, magneto-optical disks, or optical disks). Information carriers suitable for embodying computer program instructions and data include all forms of non-volatile memory, including by way of example semiconductor memory devices, e.g., EPROM, EEPROM, and flash memory devices, magnetic disks, e.g., internal hard disks or removable disks, magneto-optical disks, and CD-ROM and DVD-ROM disks. The processor and the memory can be supplemented by, or incorporated in, special purpose logic circuitry.
To provide for interaction with a user, embodiments can be implemented on a computer having a display device, e.g., a Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) or Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) monitor, for displaying information to the user and a user interface, e.g., a keyboard and a pointing device, e.g., a mouse or a trackball, by which the user can provide input to the computer. Other types of devices may also be used to provide interaction with the user, for example, feedback provided to the user may be any form of sensory feedback, such as visual feedback, auditory feedback, or tactile feedback, and may receive input from the user in any form, including acoustic, speech, or tactile input.
Example embodiments may be implemented in a computing system that includes a back-end component (e.g., as a data server), or that includes a middleware component (e.g., an application server), or that includes a front-end component (e.g., a client computer having a graphical user interface or a Web browser through which a user can interact with an embodiment), or any combination of such back-end, middleware, or front-end components. The components may be interconnected by any form or medium of digital data communication (e.g., a communication network). Examples of communication networks include a Local Area Network (LAN) and a Wide Area Network (WAN), such as the internet.
While certain features of the described embodiments have been illustrated as described herein, many modifications, substitutions, changes, and equivalents will now occur to those skilled in the art. It is, therefore, to be understood that the appended claims are intended to cover all such modifications and changes as fall within the true spirit of the various embodiments.
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