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WO1998004996A1 - Systeme biometrique et sans objet intermediaire d'autorisation de transaction - Google Patents

Systeme biometrique et sans objet intermediaire d'autorisation de transaction Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1998004996A1
WO1998004996A1 PCT/US1997/013032 US9713032W WO9804996A1 WO 1998004996 A1 WO1998004996 A1 WO 1998004996A1 US 9713032 W US9713032 W US 9713032W WO 9804996 A1 WO9804996 A1 WO 9804996A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
bia
buyer
dpc
code
individual
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US1997/013032
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
David Pare
Ned Hoffman
Jonathan A. Lee
Original Assignee
Smarttouch, Llc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US08/687,225 external-priority patent/US5685250A/en
Application filed by Smarttouch, Llc filed Critical Smarttouch, Llc
Priority to AU39636/97A priority Critical patent/AU3963697A/en
Publication of WO1998004996A1 publication Critical patent/WO1998004996A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/30—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/32—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check
    • G07C9/37—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition

Definitions

  • tokens and credit cards in today's financial world is pervasive.
  • a token would be any inanimate object which confers a capability to the individual presenting the object.
  • Remote access of every financial account is through the use of tokens or plastic cards.
  • a token which acts to identify an individual and the financial account he is accessing.
  • the reason for the migration from metal coins to plastic cards is simple and straightforward: access to money in this money transfer system is vastly safer and more convenient for both merchants and consumers than handling large quantities of coins and notes.
  • Fraud losses in the credit card industry stem from many different areas due to the highly vulnerable nature of the system, but they are mainly due to either lost, stolen, or counterfeit cards.
  • Credit cards operate without the use of a personal identification code (PIC), therefore a lost credit card can be turned into cash if the card falls into the wrong hands.
  • PICC personal identification code
  • Counterfeit credit cards arc manufactured by a more technically sophisticated criminal by acquiring a cardholder's valid account number and then producing a counterfeit card using that valid number. The counterfeiter encodes the magnetic strip, and embosses the counterfeit plastic card with the account number. The card is then presented to merchants and charged up to the rightful cardholder's account.
  • PICC personal identification code
  • Card blanks are manufactured under very tight security. Then they are individualized with the account number, expiration date, and are then mailed to the cardholder. Manufacturing and distributing the card alone costs the industry approximately one billion dollars annually. The standard card costs the financial industry $2 for each, but only $0.30 of this $2 is associated with actual manufacturing cost.
  • Smart cards contain as much computing power as did some of the first home computers.
  • Current cost projections for a first-generation smart card is estimated at approximately $3.50, not including distribution costs, which is significantly higher than the $0.30 plastic card blank.
  • smart cards may also store phone numbers, frequent flyer miles, coupons obtained from stores, a transaction history, electronic cash usable at tollbooths and on public transit systems, as well as the customer's name, vital statistics, and perhaps even medical records.
  • the financial industry trend is to further establish use of tokens.
  • the side effect of increasing the capabilities of the smart card is centralization of functions.
  • the flip side of increased functionality is increased vulnerability. Given the number of functions that the smart card will be performing, the loss or damage of this monster card will be excruciatingly inconvenient for the cardholder. Being without such a card will financially incapacitate the cardholder until it is replaced. Additionally, losing a card full of electronic cash will also result in a real financial loss as well. Furthermore, ability of counterfeiters to one day copy a smartcard is not addressed.
  • biometrics are recorded from a user of known identity and stored for future reference on a token.
  • the user is required to enter physically the requested biometrics, which are then compared to the authenticated biometrics on the token to determine if the two match in order to verify user identity.
  • biometrics are uniquely personal to the user and because the act of physically entering the biometrics are virtually irreproducible, a match is putative of actual identity, thereby decreasing the risk of fraud.
  • biometrics have been suggested, such as finger prints, hand prints, voice prints, retinal images, handwriting samples and the like.
  • token-based security system which relies on a biometrics of a user can be found in United States Patent 5,280,527 to Gullman et al.
  • a biometrics security apparatus containing a microchip in which is recorded characteristics of the authorized user's voice.
  • the user In order to initiate the access procedure, the user must insert the token into a terminal such as an ATM, and then speak into the terminal to provide a biometrics input for comparison with an authenticated input stored in the microchip of the presented token.
  • the process of identity verification is generally not isolated from potential tampering by one attempting unauthorized access.
  • the remote terminal may then signal the host computer that access should be permitted, or may prompt the user for an additional code, such as a PIN (also stored on the token), before sending the necessary verification signal to the host computer.
  • an additional code such as a PIN (also stored on the token)
  • Gullman's reliance of comparison of stored and input biometrics potentially reduces the risk of unauthorized access as compared to numeric codes
  • Gullman's use of the token as the repository for the authenticating data combined with Gullman's failure to isolate the identity verification process from the possibility of tampering greatly diminishes any improvement to fraud resistance resulting from the replacement of a numeric code with a biometrics.
  • the system remains somewhat cumbersome and inconvenient to use because it too requires the presentation of a token in order to initiate an access request.
  • the computer system must be affordable and flexible enough to be operatively compatible with existing networks having a variety of electronic transaction and transmission devices and system configurations.
  • the present invention satisfies these needs by providing an improved commercial transaction authorization method between a buyer and a seller using a computer system that comprises the following steps.
  • Each financial account has an associated abbreviated account index code that is assigned by the buyer during registration.
  • the samples, the PIN, the financial accounts and the index codes are stored in the computer system
  • the seller is registered in a seller registration step.
  • the seller registers at least one financial account with the computer system, and is given a seller identification code. Once both buyer and seller are registered, transactions can take place.
  • a seller proposes a commercial transaction to a buyer in a proposal step, describing the product or service being sold, the price, and the seller's identification code.
  • the buyer accepts the transaction in an acceptance step by adding the buyer's personal authentication information including the buyer's biometric, PIN, and an abbreviated account index code that specifies which of the buyer's financial accounts to debit.
  • This accepted transaction is called a transaction agreement, which is forwarded to the computer system in a transmission step.
  • the computer system After receiving the transaction agreement, the computer system attempts to identify the buyer.
  • the computer system compares the biometric samples and the PIN added by the buyer to the transaction agreement with previously registered biometric samples and PINs in a buyer identification step. If a match is found, the buyer is identified successfully, otherwise the buyer is not identified and the transaction fails.
  • the computer system in a payment step determines the financial account of the buyer using the account index code as well as the financial account of the seller using the seller identification code, both of which are found in the transaction agreement. Once both accounts are determined, the computer system debits the account of the buyer and credits the account of the seller. If the debit fails, if for instance there arc insufficient resources in the buyer's financial account, the transaction fails.
  • the computer system constructs a transaction given the two financial accounts, the amount, and the associated transaction information, and forwards the transaction to another computer system, such as one operated by VISA International, where the transaction is actually executed and a status of success or failure is returned by the other computer system.
  • another computer system such as one operated by VISA International
  • a presentation step provides the results of the operation to the buyer and/or the seller.
  • the identification step occurs in less than two seconds, which is a commercially acceptable timeframe.
  • an embodiment of the invention provides a mechanism for an buyer to signal that the transaction is being performed under duress.
  • Multiple emergency methods are provided.
  • One method is an emergency account index code which, when employed by the buyer during the acceptance step, allows the transaction to proceed, but in addition sends a silent alarm.
  • the computer system notes the use of the emergency account index code and sends the silent alarm.
  • the other method allows the individual to select an alternate PIN which, when entered during the acceptance step and detected by the computer system during the buyer identification step, results in a successful transaction while at the same time sending a silent alarm.
  • the buyer can specify the steps that the computer system will take or cause to be taken when a silent alarm occurs, including placing artificial financial resource limits on the buyer's accounts, the presentation of a different private code at the end of the transaction, the rejection of the transaction, the notification of the alarm to the authorities, or the notification of the alarm to the seller.
  • another embodiment of the invention provides a system authentication method.
  • the buyer submits a secret private code in addition to biometric, PIN, accounts, and index codes.
  • This embodiment displays the buyer's secret private code to the buyer after each transaction. Only the computer system knows the private code, which is never entered by the buyer during the transaction. Thus, no fake stations can generate the code, thus making any attempt to steal biometric and PIN information immediately obvious to the buyer.
  • the computer system causes a credit draft to be constructed up to the limit supplied in the transaction agreement, instead of performing an immediate debit/credit.
  • the computer system communicates with one or more external computer systems in order to perform various functions, including the buyer's resource determination, the debiting of a buyer's financial account, the crediting of the seller's financial account, or the construction of a credit draft.
  • the buyer is remote from the seller, and transaction proposals and other information is transmitted from seller to buyer and vice versa using a computer network such as the Internet.
  • the seller identification code is identical to the seller's financial account.
  • All electronic communications to and from the computer system are encrypted using industry standard encryption technology, preferably the DES (Data Encryption Standard) with 1 12-bit encryption keys.
  • DES Data Encryption Standard
  • Each identification station has its own set of encryption keys that are known only to that particular station and the computer system.
  • the individual being identified and the computer system are remote and physically separate from each other. It is preferred that the method of the invention include a method for examining the biometrics samples during registration and comparing such biometrics with a collection of biometrics samples from individuals who have been designated as having previously attempted to perpetrate or who have actually perpetrated fraud upon the system.
  • Yet another method of the invention is to be able to rapidly identify an individual from an examination of his biometrics sample and personal identification code by storing several dissimilar biometrics samples from different individuals in an electronic basket that is identified by one personal identification code.
  • the computer system allows individuals to select their own PIN from a group of PINs selected by the remote data processing center. This is performed in a method whereby once the individual's biometric is gathered, the data processing center selects several PINs at random which may be conducive to being memorized. The data processing center then conducts a comparison of the biometric gathered with those already in those PIN baskets or groups. In the event the new registrant's biometric is to similar to any previously registered biometric which has been allotted to any one of those randomly selected PIN groups, then that PIN is rejected by the database for use by the new individual and an alternative PIN is selected for another such biometric comparison.
  • the present invention is clearly advantageous over the prior art in a number of ways. First, it is extremely easy and efficient for the user, particularly where the buyer is accessing financial accounts, because it eliminates the need to carry and present any tokens in order to access one's accounts. The present invention eliminates all the inconveniences associated with carrying, safeguarding and locating any desired tokens.
  • this invention eliminates all such tokens and thereby significantly reduces the amount of memorization and diligence increasingly required of consumers by providing access to all assets using only one personal identification code.
  • the consumer is now uniquely empowered, by means of this invention, to conveniently conduct his personal and/or professional electronic transactions at any time without dependance upon tokens which may be stolen, lost or damaged.
  • the invention is clearly advantageous from a convenience standpoint to retailers and financial institutions by making purchases and other financial transactions less cumbersome and more spontaneous.
  • the paper work of financial transactions is significantly reduced as compared to current systems, such as credit card purchase wherein separate receipts are generated for use by the credit card company, the merchant and the consumer.
  • Such electronic transactions also save merchants and banks considerable time and expense by greatly reducing operational costs.
  • the system of the invention is designed to provide a consumer with simultaneous direct access to all of his financial accounts, the need for transactions involving money, checks, commercial paper and the like will be greatly reduced, thereby reducing the cost of equipment and staff required to collect and account for such transactions.
  • the invention is markedly advantageous and superior to existing systems in being highly fraud resistant.
  • present computer systems are inherently unreliable because they base determination of a user's identity on the physical presentation of a unique manufactured object along with, in some cases, information that the user knows.
  • both the token and information can be transferred to another, through loss, theft or by voluntary action of the authorized user.
  • anyone possessing such items will be recognized by existing security systems as the authorized user to whom that token and information is assigned.
  • the present invention virtually eliminates the risk of granting access to non- authorized users by determining user identity from an analysis of one or more of a user's unique, biometrics characteristics.
  • the system anticipates an emergency account index, whereby the authorized user can alert authorities of the transgression without the knowledge of the coercing party.
  • the invention further enhances fraud resistance by maintaining authenticating data and carrying out the identity verification operations at a point in the system that is operationally isolated from the user requesting access, thereby preventing the user from acquiring copies of the authenticating data or from tampering with the verification process.
  • authenticating information such as personal codes
  • Yet another object of the invention is to provide a system of secured access that is practical, convenient, and easy to use, since individuals no longer need to write down their PINs in order to remember them.
  • Still another object of the invention is to provide a system of secured access to a computer system that is highly resistant to fraudulent access attempts by non-authorized users.
  • Yet another object of the invention is to provide a computer access identification system that enables a user to notify authorities that a particular access request is being coerced by a third party without giving notice to said third party of the notification.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram of the system of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram of the Data Processing Center (DPC) and its internal data bases and execution modules
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram of the retail point of sale terminal, the biometrics input apparatus and its components, and the interconnections between them
  • FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the operation of the biometrics input apparatus and the terminal for generating a request packet
  • FIG. 5 is a representational diagram of the request packet and the mandatory and optional data it contains
  • FIG. 6 is a representational diagram of the response packet and the mandatory and optional data it contains
  • FIG. 7 is a flow chart depicting the data encryption and sealing process at the biometrics input device
  • FIG. 8 is a flow chart depicting the data decryption and counter party identification process at the DPC
  • FIG. 9 is a flow chart depicting the data encryption and sealing process at the DPC;
  • FIG. 10 is a flow chart representing the registration of an individual during the registration process;
  • FIG. 11 is a flow chart representing the process of identification of the individual and returning a private code to the individual;
  • FIG. 12 is a flow chart of the skeleton of the processes that occur at the DPC and an execution step;
  • FIG. 13 is a flow chart of the emergency request and response process at the DPC;
  • FIG. 14 is a flow chart of the overall operation of retail transaction authorization execution at the DPC;
  • FIG. 15 is a flow chart of the overall operation of remote transaction authorization execution step at the DPC;
  • FIG. 16 is a flow chart of the overall operation of ATM account access execution at the DPC;
  • FIG. 17 is a flow chart of the overall operation of issuer batch modification execution at the
  • FIG. 18 is a flow chart of the overall operation of secure fax submit and electronic document submit execution at the DPC
  • FIG. 19 is a flow chart of the overall operation of secure fax data and electronic document data execution at the DPC;
  • FIG. 20A is a representational diagram of the electronic signature request packet
  • FIG. 20B is a representational diagram of the electronic signature response packet
  • FIG. 20C is a representational diagram of the electronic signature verification request packet
  • FIG. 20D is a representational diagram of the electronic signature verification request packet
  • FIG. 21 is a flow chart of the overall operation of electronic signature execution at the DPC
  • FIG. 22 is a flow chart of the overall operation of electronic signature verification execution at the DPC.
  • the main objective of this invention is to provide a tokenless, secure, reliable, safe, and consistent, apparatus and method, for identifying individuals for the purpose of performing financial transactions and non-financial transmissions, which can accommodate large numbers of users. It is the essence of this invention that consumers have the ability to conduct these transactions without the use of any tokens, credit cards, badges or identification cards including drivers licenses. In order to be functional it is important that the system operate at speeds required for completing financial transactions such as credit card purchases and ATM services, from multiple banks and credit accounts. The system must be secure, such that individuals records and their biometrics information remain confidential and safe, both within the computer system that identifies the individual and authorizes transactions, or during transfer of data between the computer system and remote sites with which the computer system communicates.
  • the system must be reliable in that errors in identification and authorization must not hamper or make use of the system cumbersome. Since only the use of biometrics are contemplated for identification of individuals, the system must also have security measures to either reduce access, even to the authorized user, or notify authorities in emergency cases. It is appreciated that the system must be able to handle a large number of users, and accommodate storage and transfer of large amounts of data, such as bio-characteristic information, commensurate with speeds at which financial transactions are carried on today.
  • FIG. 1 Essentially a Data Processing Center (DPC) 1 is connected to various terminals 2 through various type of communication means 3 which can be one of several types.
  • the DPC is also connected and communicates with independent computer networks 4.
  • the DPC contains several data bases and software execution modules as shown in FIG. 2.
  • the data bases are backed up or "mirrored" for safety reasons.
  • the Firewall Machine 5 is responsible for prevention of electronic intrusion of the system while the Gateway Machine 6 is responsible for carrying out all requests from the user, including adding , deleting and otherwise modifying all data bases.
  • the Gateway Machine is also responsible for decryption and dc-packaging of data that has arrived from the terminals using the MACM module 7, MDM module 8, and the SNM module 9.
  • the PGL module 10, and the IML module 11 are used to locate the proper personal identification code and biometrics sample basket.
  • FIG. 3 depicts an example of a terminal and the biometrics input device 12, which has a biometrics scanner 13, data entry means such as a key pad or PIN pad 14, and a display panel 15.
  • the biometrics scanner can be any one of finger print scanner, voice recognition, palm print scanner, retinal scanner or the like, although the fingerprint scanner will be used as an example.
  • the biometrics input device is further equipped with computing modules 16, device drivers, and erasable and non-erasable memory modules.
  • the biometrics input device communicates with the terminal through preferably a serial port 17.
  • the terminal 2 communicates through a conventional modem 18 with the DPC 1 through request packets 19 and response packets 20 using one of the interconnecting means in FIG. 1 such as cable network, cellular telephone networks, telephone networks, Internet, ATM network, or X.25.
  • FIG. 4 shows a representational diagram of the request packet 19 and its method of generation by the biometrics input device software.
  • FIG. 5 and FIG. 6 show a representational diagram of the request packet and response packet with optional and mandatory data segments. Furthermore, it is shown which parts of the packets are encrypted and which ones are sealed.
  • FIG. 4 shows a representational diagram of the request packet 19 and its method of generation by the biometrics input device software.
  • FIG. 5 and FIG. 6 show a representational diagram of the request packet and response packet with optional and mandatory data segments. Furthermore, it is shown which parts of the packets are encrypted and which ones are sealed.
  • FIG. 7 is a block diagram of the overall process for data encryption and sealing showing the use of DUKPT key data 20 for encryption of data before appending additional data before sealing the request packet with a Message Authentication Code Key (MAC) 21.
  • FIG. 8 and FIG. 9 show the decryption and encryption process at the DPC.
  • FIG. 12 through 19 and 21 through 22 are block diagrams of selected examples of execution steps carried on at the DPC.
  • the BIA is a combination of hardware and software whose job is to gather, encode, and encrypt biometric input for use in individual identification. All actions of the BIA are directed by an outside controlling entity called a terminal, which issues commands and receives results over the BIA's serial line.
  • BIA hardware comes in four basic versions: standard, wireless, integrated phone/cable television (or "CATV”)/fax, and ATM. Each BIA hardware variant addresses a particular need in the marketplace, and because of the differences in construction, each variant has a different level of security.
  • BIA software comes in seven basic versions: personal computer (or "PC"), retail, ATM, registration, internal, issuer, and integrated remote. Each software load provides a different, use-specific command set.
  • the registration software load does not accept requests to form retail transaction messages.
  • the retail software command set cannot send individual registration messages.
  • the DPC knows what software package is loaded into each BIA; any attempts by an BIA to send a message that it is normally not able to send is rejected, and treated as a major security violation.
  • the ability of the invention to detect and combat merchant-based fraud relies on the fact that the BIA's external interface is strictly limited, that the construction of the BIA makes it extremely difficult to tamper with the contents, that each BIA has its unique encryption codes that are known only to the DPC, and that each BIA is only allowed to perform operations limited to its designated function.
  • Each biometric input means has a hardware identification code previously registered with the DPC, which makes the biometric input means uniquely identifiable to the DPC in each subsequent transmission from that biometric input device.
  • the BIA is constructed with the assumption that the controlling terminal is a source for fraud and deception. Terminals range from software applications running on personal computers to dedicated hardware/software systems developed for a particular use such as a retail point of sale. Regardless of the particular model, no BIA reveals unencrypted biometric information. BIA models without display means (such as LCD, LED, or quartz screens) must reveal selected information (such as individual private codes) to the terminal for display, and as a result those particular terminal-BIA combinations are considered to be less secure.
  • BIA models are either partially or fully integrated with the terminal.
  • Partially integrated devices are physically separate from the terminal, and they include wireless and standard retail point of sale BIAs.
  • Fully integrated devices are contained within the physical enclosure of the terminal itself, for instance, an ATM, or a telephone. No BIA ever discloses any secret encryption codes to any external source.
  • BIA Standard model has computing module (i.e., multichip modules), biometric scanner (i.e., single fingerprint scanner), display means (i.e., LCD screen), communications port (i.e., serial port) , data entry means (i.e., a manual data entry key board or PIC pad) encased in tamper-resistant case, and electronic detection means (i.e., RF shielding).
  • computing module i.e., multichip modules
  • biometric scanner i.e., single fingerprint scanner
  • display means i.e., LCD screen
  • communications port i.e., serial port
  • data entry means i.e., a manual data entry key board or PIC pad
  • electronic detection means i.e., RF shielding
  • BIA Command Set Messages Each BIA software command set provides a different set of operations. They are introduced briefly here:
  • the Standard BIA hardware is a multichip module combined with a single-print scanner, an LCD screen, a serial port, and a PIC pad encased in a hard tamper-resistant case that makes attempts to penetrate obvious while also providing RF shielding for the contents.
  • the following components are amalgamated into a multichip module, called the BIA Multichip Module (a process for encapsulating several processors in one physical shell, well known in the industry), constructed to protect the communications pathways between the devices from easy wiretapping.
  • Mask ROM is cheaper than other types of read only memory, but it is easily reverse engineered, and is not electronically erasable. As such we only place the noncritical commonly available code here. (Mask ROM is well known in the industry).
  • Flash ROM is more expensive, but it is much more difficult to reverse engineer, and most importantly, it is electronically erasable. All of the more critical information is stored here. Flash ROM is used in an attempt to increase the difficulty of duplicating an BIA. (Flash ROM is well known in the industry).
  • EEPROM Electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
  • RAM is temporary in nature, and is lost whenever power is lost.
  • Each multichip module contains a "write-once" memory location that is irreversibly set following the initialization of the flash ROM. Whenever an attempt is made to download software to the flash ROM, this memory location is checked; if it is already been set, then the BIA refuses to load. This way, critical software and data keys may only be downloaded once into the device, at the time of manufacture.
  • registers and keys are explicitly zeroed when a transaction is canceled. Once a transaction is completed, registers are cleared as well. Once a "form message" command is executed, biometric, PIC, and account index code registers are also cleared, along with any encryption keys that aren't required for subsequent use.
  • BIA Multichip module CCD single-print scanner capacitance detector plate (known in the industry) lighted PIC keypad
  • RF shielding tamper-resistant case serial connection up to 57.6kb
  • breech detection hardware known in the industry
  • optional thermite charge attached to Multichip module known in the industry
  • the multichip module and the components are, where practical, physically connected to each other without exposed wiring being present.
  • the enclosure protecting the electronic components of the BIA is welded shut during manufacture; it cannot be opened under any circumstances without significant damage to the case.
  • the BIA Upon detecting any opening (or damage) of the enclosure, the BIA performs an emergency electronic zero of any and all keys residing in flash ROM, followed by all of the software libraries. Specific breech detection methods are kept confidential and proprietary.
  • the Wireless version of BIA hardware is identical to the Standard model in construction, except that it exports a spread-spectrum wireless communications module using an external antenna instead of an external serial port.
  • This version is designed to be used in restaurants, where transactions are authorized at the customer's convenience.
  • BIA Hardware ATM Model
  • the ATM version of BIA hardware is a multichip module combined with a heavy-duty single- print scanner and a serial port. The components are encased in a tamper-resistant case that makes attempts to penetrate obvious while also providing RF shielding for the contents.
  • This version is designed to be retrofitted into ATM locations.
  • the scanner pad is a heavy-duty sensor pad, and the entire construction makes use of the existing screens and keypads present in the ATM itself.
  • the ATM since the ATM has no LCD screen or PIC keypad, it really has no need of those device drivers in the mask ROM.
  • BIA Hardware Phone/CATV Model
  • the Phone/CATV version of BIA hardware is a multichip module combined with a single-print scanner and a serial port. The module is physically attached to the scanner, and the whole is encased in plastic in order to make tampering more difficult. Some amount of RF shielding is provided for the components.
  • This version is designed to be integrated with telephones, television remote controls, and fax machines. As a result, it makes use of the existing keypads and LCD or television screens to enter or display values. It also uses the communication facilities of the host terminal. For example, the fax machine uses the built-in fax modem and the television remote uses the CATV cable network.
  • This hardware model is (in comparison with other models) relatively insecure, as it is intended that these devices cost as little as possible, be lightweight, and integrate easily with existing low-cost devices.
  • Multichip Module
  • the external interface to the BIA is much like a standard modem; commands are sent to it from a controlling terminal using the external serial line. When a command completes, a response code is sent from the BIA to the terminal.
  • Each BIA software load supports a different set of operations. For instance, a retail load supports only transaction authorizations, while a registration load supports individual identification and biometric registration.
  • All BIA data fields are in printable ASCII, with fields separated by fs control characters, and records separated by newlines. Encrypted fields are binary converted to 64-bit ASCII using the base-64 conversion library (all known in the industry).
  • Some commands are not available in some configurations. For instance, the ATM BIA cannot "Get PIC", since there is no attached PIC pad. Instead, the ATM BIA supports a "Set PIC” command.
  • BIA acts as if the cancel button was pushed.
  • the "cancel” button has been pushed, and the entire operation has been canceled. This has the side effect of clearing all information which was gathered. A message to that effect will bedisplayed on the LCD screen, if available.
  • Each command may have specific other response codes which are valid only for it. These response codes will generally have text accompanying the code, which will be displayed on the LCD screen if it is available.
  • This command selects from one of a number of different languages encoded within the BIA for prompting for user input.
  • This command requests the BIA to activate its scanner to get biometric input from the individual, storing it into the Encoded Biometric Register.
  • the message "Please place finger on lighted panel” is displayed on the LCD panel and returned to the terminal.
  • the scanner pad is illuminated, prompting the individual to enter his biometric.
  • a ⁇ time> value of zero means that there is no limit to the time for biometric scan input.
  • a fingerprint scan is taken and given a preliminary analysis by the print quality algorithm. If the scan is not good enough, the BIA continues to take new scans until ⁇ time> seconds pass. As time passes and snapshots of the print are taken and analyzed, messages are posted to the LCD screen and sent to the terminal based on the problems detected by the print quality software. If no print of appropriate quality is forthcoming, the BIA returns an error code of time expired, displaying a message to that effect on the LCD.
  • the print's minutiae are then extracted by the print encoding algorithm. Only a subset of the minutiae are selected at random, with care taken to retain enough sufficient for identification. These minutiae are then ordered randomly, and are placed in the Encoded Biometric Register. Then the BIA responds with the success result code.
  • biometric input yields different encodings, so as to complicate the task of anyone attempting to discover the encryption codes of a captured BIA. This is accomplished by the selection of a random subset and random ordering of the encoded biometric.
  • This command requests the BIA to fill the PIC Register by reading from the keypad.
  • the message "Please enter your PIC, then press ⁇ enter>” is displayed on the LCD display and sent to the terminal, the appropriate keypad lights are turned on, and then keypad scanning begins. Scanning terminates when either ⁇ time> number of seconds runs out, or when the individual hits the "enter" key.
  • Get Account Index Code ⁇ time> First, the message "Now enter your account index code, then press ⁇ enter>” is displayed on the LCD and sent to the terminal. This prompts the individual to enter his account index code. When each key is pressed, that value appears on the LCD panel. The correction button can be pressed to erase one of the values. When the "enter” button is pressed, the Account index code register is set. During input, the appropriate keypad keys are lit, and when input is concluded, the keypad lights are turned off.
  • the message "Please enter your title index code, then press ⁇ enter>" is displayed on the LCD and sent to the terminal. This prompts the individual to enter his title index code.
  • the appropriate keypad keys are lit, and when input is concluded, the keypad lights are turned off.
  • the Validate Amount command sends the message "Amount ⁇ amount> OK?" to the terminal, and displays it on the LCD screen. If the individual confirms the amount by hitting the "yes" (or enter) button, the Amount Register is set to ⁇ amount>.
  • the ⁇ amount> value must be a valid number, with no control characters or spaces, etc. During prompting, the yes, no, and cancel buttons are lit. Once prompting is complete, all the lights are turned off.
  • Enter Amount ⁇ time>
  • the Enter Amount command sends the message "Enter amount” to the terminal, and also displays it on the LCD screen as well. The individual must then enter the dollar amount himself. Each character entered is displayed on the LCD screen. All appropriate buttons are lit. If the enter button is hit, the Amount Register is set to be the value entered on the keyboard. Once entry is complete, all the lights are turned off.
  • the Validate Document command sends the message "Document ⁇ name> OK?" to the terminal, and displays it on the LCD screen as well. If the individual confirms the document by hitting the "yes" (or enter) button, the Document Name Register is set to ⁇ name>.
  • the ⁇ name> must be printable ASCII, with no control characters, and no leading or trailing spaces. During prompting, the yes, no, and cancel buttons are lit. Once prompting is complete, all the lights are turned off.
  • ⁇ text> This is used to set information such as the merchant code, the product information, and so on.
  • the Get Message Key command causes the BIA to generate a 56-bit random key to be used by the controlling hardware to encrypt any message body that the controlling device wishes to add to the message. That generated key is returned by the BIA in hexadecimal format (known in the industry). The message key are then added to the biometric-PIC block.
  • the form message command instructs the BIA to output a message containing all the information it has gathered. It also checks to make sure that all the registers appropriate to that specific message ⁇ type> have been set. If all required registers are not set, the BIA returns with an error. The specific command set software will determine which messages can be formed by that BIA model; all others will be rejected.
  • Each message includes a transmission Code consisting of the BIA's unique hardware identification code and an incrementing sequence number.
  • the transmission code allows the
  • the BIA uses the DUKPT key management system to select the biometric-PIC block encryption 56-bit DES key from the Future Key Table. This key is then used to encrypt the Biometric-PIC Block using cipher block chaining (CBC). In addition, a response DES key is also generated randomly, and is used by the DPC to encrypt the portions of the response that need to be encrypted.
  • CBC cipher block chaining
  • the message key is only present if the controlling terminal has requested a message key for this message. It is up to the controlling terminal to encrypt any message body attached to the transaction authorization request using the message key.
  • the BIA outputs the body of the appropriate request message (such as a Transaction Authorization Request message), terminated by and protected with the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
  • MAC Message Authentication Code
  • the MAC field is calculated using the BIA's secret 1 12- bit DES MAC key, and covers all message fields from first to last.
  • the MAC assures the DPC that nothing in the message has changed effectively scaling the message, while still allowing the plaintext fields to be inspected by the controlling terminal.
  • the BIA When the Form Message command is done, the BIA sends the message "I'm talking to DPC Central" to the terminal as well as displaying it on the LCD screen, indicating that work is proceeding on the request.
  • the command returns OK in addition to returning the entire formed message upon completion of the command.
  • the Show Response command instructs the BIA to use its current Response Key to decrypt the private code from the system.
  • This command is used by a terminal during a secure network communications session to ask the individual to validate a message from an outside source.
  • the message comes encrypted and in two parts: the challenge, and the response.
  • the BIA Upon receipt of a Validate Private command, the BIA displays the text of the challenge message as in "OK ⁇ challenge>? " on the LCD screen, but does not send this to the terminal.
  • the response is encrypted by the BIA using the Private Session Key, and then returned to the terminal along with the OK response code. If the individual does not validate the challenge, then the BIA returns with a "failed” response code, along with the text "transaction canceled at your request," which is also displayed on the LCD screen.
  • the Reset command instructs the BIA to clear all temporary registers, the LCD screen, all temporary Key registers, and to turn off all keypad lights that may be on.
  • This command assigns the BIA's PIC Register to be ⁇ value>. Note that allowing a non-secured device to provide the PIC is a potential security problem, because non-secured devices are much more vulnerable to wiretapping or replacement.
  • This command assigns the BIA's Account index code Register to be ⁇ value>. Note that allowing a non-secured device to provide the account index code is a potential security problem, because non-secured devices are much more vulnerable to wiretapping or replacement.
  • This command assigns the BIA's Title Index Code Register to be ⁇ value>. Note that allowing a non-secured device to provide the Title Index Code is a potential security problem, because non-secured devices are much more vulnerable to wiretapping or replacement.
  • This command assigns the BIA's Amount Register to be ⁇ value>.
  • the Decrypt Response command instructs the BIA to use it's current Response Key to decrypt the encrypted portion of the response message. Once decrypted, the response is returned to the controlling device, presumably for display on the ATM terminal's LED screen. Note that providing this decryption ability is a security problem, as once the plaintext leaves the BIA, the terminal has the ability to do with it what it will.
  • the BIA software is supported by several different software libraries. Some of them are standard, generally available libraries, but some have special requirements in the context of the BIA.
  • the BIA is constantly selecting random DES keys for use in the message body and message response encryption, it is important that the keys selected be unpredictable keys. If the random number generator is based on time of day, or on some other externally-predictable mechanism, then the encryption keys will be much more easily guessed by an adversary that happens to know the algorithm. In order to assure the security of the encryption techniques used in the BIA, it is assumed that both the random number generator algorithm as well as the encryption algorithms are both publicly known.
  • a standard random number algorithm for generating DES keys is defined in ANSI X9.17, appendix C (known in the industry).
  • the biometric encoding algorithm is a proprietary algorithm for locating the minutiae that are formed by ridge endings and bifurcations on human fingertips. A complete list of minutiae is stored in the DPC as a reference, while only a partial list is required by the algorithm when performing a comparison between an identification candidate and a registered individual. During both biometric registration as well as identification, the encoding algorithm ensures that enough minutiae are found before ending the biometric input step.
  • the BIA is a realtime computing environment, and as such requires a realtime embedded operating system to run it.
  • the operating system is responsible for taking interrupts from devices and scheduling tasks.
  • Each device driver is responsible for the interface between the operating system and the specific hardware, such as the PIC pad device driver, or the CCD Scanner device driver.
  • Hardware is the source for events such as "PIC pad key pressed", or "CCD Scanner scan complete”.
  • the device driver handles such interrupts, interprets the events, and then takes action on the events.
  • DES implementations publicly available. DES implementations provide a secret key-based encryption from plaintext to ciphertext, and decryption from ciphertext to plaintext, using 56-bit secret keys.
  • Public Key encryption support libraries are available from Public Key Partners, holders of the RSA public key patent (known in the industry).
  • Public Key cryptosystems are asymmetric encryption systems that allow communication to take place without requiring a costly exchange of secret keys.
  • a public key is used to encrypt a DES key, and then the DES key is used to encrypt a message.
  • the BIA uses public key cryptosystems to provide for the secure exchange of secret keys.
  • the invention uses public key cryptography for communications security and short-lived credential exchange, and not long-term storage of secrets.
  • Both the end-user individual and the bank are identified by the DPC to create the network credential.
  • the network credential includes the end- user individual's identification as well as the context of the connection (i.e., the TCP/IP source and destination ports).
  • the derived unique key per transaction key (DUKPT) management library is used to create future DES keys given an initial key and a message sequence number. Future keys are stored in a Future Key Table. Once used, a given key is cleared from the table. Initial keys are only used to generate the initial future key table. Therefore the initial key is not stored by the BIA.
  • DUKPT is designed to create a key management mechanism that provided a different DES key for each transaction, without leaving behind the trace of the initial key. The implications of this are that even successful capture and dissection of a given future key table does not reveal messages that were previously sent, a veiy important goal when the effective lifetime of the information transmitted is decades. DUKPT is fully specified in ANSI X9.24 (known in the industry).
  • DUKPT was originally developed to support PIC encryption mechanisms for debit card transactions. In this environment, it was critical to protect all transactions. An assumption is made that a criminal records encrypted transactions for a six month period, and then captures and successfully extracts the encryption code from the PIC pad. The criminal could then manufacture one new counterfeit debit card for each message that had been transmitted over that six month period. Under DUKPT, however, the criminal's theft and dissection would not allow him to decrypt previous messages (although new messages would still be decryptable if the criminal were to replace the PIC pad subsequent to dissection).
  • the BIA/Retail software interface exports an interface that allows specific retail point of sale terminals to interact with the system.
  • the BIA/Retail interface is designed to allow the terminal to perform the following operation:
  • the BIA/Retail provides the following command set:
  • the BIA CATV software interface exports a command set that allows terminals integrated with a Phone/CATV BIAs to interact with the system. The following operation is supported:
  • the BIA/CATV provides the following command set:
  • the B I A/Fax software interface exports a command set that allows terminals integrated with a fax BIA to interact with the system.
  • the following operations are supported:
  • the BIA/Fax provides the following command set:
  • the BIA/Reg software interface exports an interface that allows general purpose computers to interact with the system to identify and register individuals. The following operations are supported:
  • the BIA/Reg provides the following command set:
  • the BIA/PC software interface exports a command set that allows general purpose computers to send, receive, and sign electronic documents, conduct transactions across the network, and provide biometric-derived credentials to sites on the network.
  • the following operations are supported: • Electronic Document Submit
  • the BIA/PC provides the following command set:
  • the BIA Iss software interface exports an interface that allows general purpose computers to interact with the system to authenticate and submit batch change requests. The following operation is supported: Issuer Batch
  • the BIA/Iss provides the following command set:
  • the BIA/Int exports a command set that allows general purpose computers to interact with the system to identify individuals. The following operation is supported:
  • the BIA/Int provides the following command set:
  • the BIA/ATM software interface exports a command set that allows ATMs to identify individuals. The following operation is supported:
  • the BIA/ATM provides the following command set: • Get Biometric ⁇ time>
  • the terminal is the device that controls the BIA and connects to the DPC via modem, X.25 connection, or Internet connection — methods well-known to the industry. Terminals come in different shapes and sizes, and require different versions of the BIA to perform their tasks. Any electronic device, which issues commands to and receives results from the biometric input device, can be a terminal.
  • Some terminals are application programs that run on a general purpose microcomputer, while other terminals are combinations of special purpose hardware and software.
  • the system While the terminal is critical for the functioning of the system as a whole, the system itself places no trust in the terminal whatsoever. Whenever a terminal provides information to the system, the system always validates it in some manner, either through presentation to the individual for confirmation, or by cross-checking through other previously registered information.
  • terminals While terminals are able to read some parts of BIA messages in order to validate that the data was processed properly by the BIA, terminals cannot read biometric identification information including the biometric, the PIC, encryption keys, or account index codes.
  • ATM Automatic Teller Machinery
  • ATM software load provides biometric-PIC access to ATM cash dispensers.
  • Standard BIA with Registration software load attached to a microcomputer provides banks with the ability to register new individuals with the system along with their financial asset accounts and other personal information.
  • Standard BIA with PC software load attached to a microcomputer provides individuals with the ability send, receive, archive, reject, and track certified email messages.
  • CPT Cable-TV Point of Sale Terminal
  • BIA/catv with CATV software load attached to the CATV broadband provides individuals with biometric-television (or "TV”) remotes with the ability to authorize television shopping purchases.
  • Standard BIA with Internal software load attached to a microcomputer system authorizes employees to construct database requests for the purposes of customer service.
  • Standard BIA with personal computer software load attached to a microcomputer provides individuals with the ability to construct and verify electronic signatures on documents.
  • IPT Internet Point of Sale Terminal
  • Standard BIA with personal computer software load attached to a microcomputer provides individuals with internet connections the ability to purchase products from a merchant that is connected to the Internet.
  • Standard BIA with Issuer software load attached to a microcomputer provides banks with the ability to send batched changes of asset accounts to the DPC.
  • ITT Internet Teller Terminal
  • Standard BIA with personal computer software load attached to a microcomputer with an internet connection provides individuals with the ability to perform transactions with their favorite Internet Bank.
  • BIA/catv with CATV software load integrated with a telephone provides individuals with the ability to authorize transactions over the telephone.
  • RPT Retail Point of Sale Terminal
  • Standard BIA with Retail software load attached to an X.25 network or using a modem allows an individual to purchase items using transaction authorizations in a store.
  • BIA/catv with Fax software load integrated with a fax machine provides individuals with the ability to send, receive, reject archive, and track secured fax messages.
  • Terminal Retail Point of Sale Terminal
  • the purpose of the RPT is to allow individuals to purchase items at a store without having to use either cash, check, or a debit or credit card.
  • the RPT uses a BIA/Retail to authorize financial transactions from an individual to a merchant.
  • the RPT provides standard debit and credit card scanning functions as well.
  • RPT will also consist of standard credit and debit magnetic stripe card readers, as well as optional smart card readers too.
  • Each RPT is connected to the DPC by a modem, an X.25 network connection, an ISDN connection, or similar mechanism.
  • the RPT may also be connected to other devices, such as an electronic cash register, from which it obtains the amount of the transaction and the merchant code.
  • the RPT consists of: an BIA/Retail an inexpensive microprocessor 9.6 kb modem/X.25 network interface hardware • merchant identification code number in non-volatile RAM a DTC serial port for connecting to the BIA magnetic stripe card reader (known in the industry) ECR (electronic cash register) connection port optional smart card reader (known in the industry)
  • the individual is identified by the biometric-PIC, and the merchant is identified by the DPC, which cross-checks the merchant code contained in the BIA's VAD record with the merchant code added to the transaction request by the RPT.
  • the merchant enters the value of the transaction into his electronic cash register. Then, the individual enters his biometric-PIC, his account index code, and then validates the amount.
  • the RPT then adds the product information and the merchant code to the BIA, instructs the BIA to construct the transaction, and then sends the transaction to the DPC through its network connection (modem, X.25, etc).
  • the DPC When the DPC receives this message, it validates the biometric-PIC, obtains the account number using the index code, and cross-checks the merchant code in the message with the registered owner of the BIA. If everything checks out, the DPC forms and sends a credit/debit transaction to execute the exchange. The response from the credit/debit network is added to the private code to form the transaction response message, which the DPC then sends back to the RPT. The RPT examines the response to see whether or not the authorization succeeded, and then forwards the response to the BIA, which then displays the individual's private code, concluding the transaction.
  • MAC MAC-based Security
  • the MAC allows the RPT to review the unencrypted parts of the message, but the RPT cannot change them. Encryption prevents the encrypted part of the message from being disclosed to the RPT.
  • Each retail BIA must be registered to a merchant. This helps to discourage BIA theft.
  • the RPT adds the merchant code onto each message, replacing a merchant's BIA with a different BIA is detected by the cross-check performed at the DPC.
  • IPT Internet Point of Sale Terminal
  • the purpose of an Internet Point of sale Terminal (IPT) is to authorize credit and debit financial transactions from an individual at a computer to a merchant, both of whom are on the Internet.
  • the IPT consists of:
  • the IPT In addition to identifying the individual, the IPT must also identify the remote merchant who is the counterparty to the transaction. The merchant must also identify both the DPC and the IPT.
  • the Internet Shopper program stores the hostname (or other form of net name) of the merchant from which the purchase is taking place in order to verify the merchant's identity. Since the merchant registers all of his legitimate internet hosts with the DPC, this allows the DPC to cross-check the merchant code with the merchant code stored under that hostname to verify the merchant's identity.
  • the IPT connects to the merchant using the Internet. Once a connection is established, the IPT secures it by generating and then sending a Session Key to the merchant. In order to assure that the session key is protected from disclosure, it is encrypted with the merchant's Public Key using Public Key Encryption. When the merchant receives this encrypted Session Key, he decrypts it using his Private Key. This process is called securing a connection through a Public Key Encrypted secret key exchange.
  • the IPT downloads the merchant code, and both price and product information from the merchant. Once the individual is ready to make a purchase, he selects the merchandise he wishes to buy. Then, the individual enters the biometric-PIC using the BIA/PC, the IPT sends the merchant code, the product identification information, and the amount to the BIA, and instructs it to construct a Remote Transaction Authorization request. Then the IPT sends the request to the merchant via the secure channel.
  • the merchant is connected to the DPC via the same sort of secure connection that the IPT has with the merchant, namely, using Public Key Encryption to send a secure session key. Unlike the IPT- merchant connection, however, merchant-DPC session keys are good for an entire day, not for just one connection.
  • the merchant connects to the DPC, securing the connection using the session key, forwarding the transaction to the DPC for validation.
  • the DPC validates the biometric-PIC, cross-checks the merchant code contained in the request with the merchant code stored under the hostname that was sent in the request, and then sends a transaction to the credit/debit network. Once the credit debit network responds, the DPC constructs a reply message including the credit/debit authorization, an encrypted private code, and the address of the individual, and sends that message back to the merchant.
  • the merchant receives the reply, it copies the individual's mailing address out of the reply, makes note of the authorization code, and forwards the reply message to the IPT.
  • the IPT hands the reply to the BIA, which decrypts the private code and displays it on the LCD screen, indicating that the DPC recognized the individual.
  • the IPT also shows the result of the transaction as well, be it success or failure.
  • Terminal Internet Teller Terminal
  • the Internet Teller Terminal is used to identify individuals for internet banking sessions.
  • the DPC, the bank's computer system, and the individual are all connected to the Internet.
  • the second is providing unimpeachable identity credentials to the internet bank. Once both are accomplished, the ITT can provide a secure internet banking session.
  • the BIA's challenge-response verification capability is used to provide additional security for all high-value and/or irregular transactions.
  • the ITT consists of: an BIA (standard PC model) a microcomputer an Internet Teller software application
  • the ITT accepts biometric identification using an BIA/PC connected to the microcomputer serving as the individual's Internet terminal.
  • the network credential includes the individual's identification as well as the context of the connection (i.e., the TCP/IP source and destination ports).
  • the DPC identifies the bank by cross-checking the code that the bank sends to the ITT with the bank's hostname that the ITT sends to the DPC.
  • the ITT connects to the internet bank, making sure that the bank has the computing resources required to handle a new session for the individual. If the bank has sufficient resources, it sends back the bank identification code to the ITT. Once connected, the ITT instructs the BIA to obtain the biometric-PIC and the account index code from the individual. Then the ITT adds both the bank's hostname as well as the bank code. Using all this information, the BIA is then asked to form a network credential request message which the ITT sends to the DPC via the Internet.
  • the DPC When the DPC receives this message, it validates the biometric- PIC, obtains the account number using the index code, and makes sure that the bank code from the message matches the bank code stored under the bank's hostname in the Remote Merchant database. The DPC also checks to make sure that the account number returned by the index code belongs to the bank as well. If all checks out, then the DPC creates a network credential using the individual's account identification, the time of day, and the bank code. The DPC signs this credential using Public Key Encryption and the DPC's Private Key. The DPC retrieves the bank's public key, and the individual's private code, and with the credential forms the network credential response message.
  • the response message is encrypted using the BIA response key, and is then sent back to the ITT.
  • the ITT receives the response, it hands the response message to the BIA.
  • the BIA decrypts and then displays the individual's private code on the LCD screen.
  • the bank's public key is stored in the Public Key register.
  • Two random session keys are generated by the BIA.
  • the first key called the Shared Session Key
  • the ITT uses this shared session key to secure the connection with the bank.
  • the other session key called the Private Session Key
  • the ITT After receiving the Shared Session Key, the ITT asks the BIA to form a Secure Connection Request message, which includes both session keys and the network credential, and are all encrypted with the bank's public key. The ITT then sends the Secure Connection Request message to the bank.
  • the bank When the bank receives the request message, it decrypts the message using its own Private Key. Then, it decrypts the actual network credential using the DPC's public key. If the network credential is valid and has not expired (a credential times out after a certain number of minutes), the individual is authorized, and the conversation continues, with the session key used to ensure security.
  • the bank may wish to ask the individual to validate those transactions for extra security. To do so, the bank sends a challenge-response message encrypted with the Private Session Key to the ITT, which forwards that challenge-response message to the BIA.
  • the BIA decrypts the message, displays the challenge (usually of the form "Transfer of $2031.23 to Rick Adams OK?"), and when the individual validates by hitting the OK button, the BIA re-encrypts the response with the Private Session Key and sends that message to the ITT, which forwards it to the bank, validating the transaction.
  • the system makes use of public key cryptography to both provide credentials and to secure communications between the ITT and the bank.
  • the bank must know the DPC's public key, and the DPC must know the bank's public key. It is critical to the security of the system that both parties keep the respective public keys secure from unauthorized modification. Note that public keys are readable by anyone, they just cannot be modifiable by anyone. Of course, any session or secret keys must be kept secure from observation, and those secret keys must be destroyed after the session has ended. The extra validation step for non-routine transactions is necessary because of the relative difficulty involved in securing personal computer applications on the Internet due to viruses, hackers, and individual ignorance. Banks should probably restrict routine money transfers available to ITT's to include only money transfers to well-known institutions, such as utility companies, major credit card vendors, and so on.
  • the electronic signature terminal (EST) is used by individuals to generate electronic signatures that cannot be forged for electronic documents.
  • the EST either allows individuals to sign electronic documents, or verifies electronic signatures already on such documents.
  • the EST consists of:
  • the EST uses an BIA/PC attached to a microcomputer, with events controlled by an electronic signature software application.
  • the document to be signed needs to be uniquely identified, the time of day needs to be recorded, and the individual performing the signature needs to be identified. This links the document, the individual, and the time, creating a unique time stamped electronic signature.
  • a message digest encoding algorithm that generates a message digest code.
  • One such algorithm is the MD5 algorithm by RSA, which is well known in the industry.
  • message digest algorithms are specifically designed so that it is almost impossible to come up with another document that generates the same message digest code.
  • the individual enters his biometric-PIC using the BIA, the message digest code is handed to the BIA, the name of the document is added, and the resulting Digital Signature request message is sent to the DPC for authorization and storage.
  • the DPC When the DPC receives the request, it performs a biometric identity check, and once the individual is verified, it collects the message digest encoding, the individual's biometric account number, the current time of day, the name of the document, and the identification of the BIA that gathered the signature, and stores them all in the Electronic Signatures Database (ESD). The DPC then constructs a signature code text string that consists of the ESD record number, the date, the time, and the name of the signer, and sends this signature code along with the individual's private code back to the EST.
  • ESD Electronic Signatures Database
  • the document is sent through the MD5 algorithm (known in the industry), and the resulting value together with the electronic signature codes are given to the BIA along with the requesting individual's biometric-PIC, and the message is sent to the DPC.
  • the DPC checks each signature for validity, and responds as appropriate.
  • the BIA doesn't encrypt any of the data relating to electronic signatures, so document titles along with specific MD5 values are sent in plaintext. The same situation holds true for signature validations.
  • the pu ⁇ ose of the Certified Email Terminal is to provide individuals a way of delivering electronic messages to other individuals in the system while providing for identification of sender, verification of both receipt and recipient, and assuring confidentiality of message delivery.
  • the CET uses a BIA/PC to identify both the sender and the recipient. Security is established by encrypting the message, and then by encrypting the message key using the sender's BIA during the upload, and then decrypting the message key using the recipient's BIA during the download.
  • Both the transmitter and the recipient CET consists of:
  • a CET is actually a microcomputer with an electronic mail application and a network connection which invokes the BIA to generate biometric-PIC authorizations to send and receive certified electronic mail.
  • both sender and recipients In order to guarantee delivery of the message, both sender and recipients must be identified.
  • the sender identifies himself using his biometric-PIC when he uploads the message to the DPC.
  • Each recipient the sender wishes to send the document to is identified either by biometric account identification number, or by fax number, and extension.
  • a recipient In order for a recipient to download the message, he identifies himself using his biometric-PIC. This procedure resembles a person-to— person telephone call.
  • Message delivery starts with an individual uploading a document or message, and identifying himself using his biometric-PIC. The individual then verifies the name of the document, and the email message is encrypted and uploaded.
  • the sender receives a message identification code that can be used to request the current delivery status of the document to each of the recipients.
  • the DPC sends an electronic mail message to each recipient, notifying them when a certified message has arrived.
  • the recipient may at his leisure either choose to accept or refuse that message or a group of messages by submitting his biometric-PIC and having it validated by the DPC.
  • a document is removed after a predetermined period, generally 24 hours.
  • Individuals wishing to archive the document, along with an indication of all of the individuals to whom the message was sent may submit message archival requests prior to the deletion of the message.
  • the document is protected from disclosure en route.
  • the CET accomplishes this using the 56-bit Message Key generated by the BIA. Since the BIA takes responsibility for encrypting the Message Key as part of the biometric-PIC, the encryption key is securely sent to the DPC. When an individual downloads the message, the message key is sent encrypted along with the private code, to allow the recipient to decrypt the message. Note that it is fine to have all recipients have this message key, as they all receive the same message.
  • Terminal Secure Fax Terminal
  • the pu ⁇ ose of the secure fax terminal is to provide individuals a way of delivering fax messages to other individuals in the system while providing for identification of sender, verification of both receipt and recipient, and assuring confidentiality of message delivery.
  • Each SFT uses an integrated BIA/catv to identify both the sender and the recipient. Communications security is accomplished through encryption.
  • Both the transmitter and the recipient SFT consists of: • an BIA/catv
  • a SFT is a fax machine connected to the DPC via a modem.
  • the system treats faxes as just another type of certified electronic mail. There are several different levels of security for secure faxes, but in the most secure version, the identity of the sender and all recipients is verified.
  • the sender identifies himself using his biometric-PIC and title index code when he sends his message to the DPC.
  • To pick up the fax each recipient listed identifies himself, again using biometric- PIC and title index code.
  • the receiving site is identified by phone number. This phone number is registered with the DPC. For secured- confidential faxes, each recipient is identified with the phone number and the extension.
  • Unsecured faxes are equivalent to a standard fax.
  • the sender enters the phone number of the recipient site, and sends the fax. In this case, the sender remains unidentified, and the fax is sent to a given phone number in the hopes that it will be delivered to the proper recipient.
  • An SFT marks the top line on all such unsecured faxes prominently as being "UNSECURED”. All faxes received from non- SFT fax machines are always marked as being unsecured.
  • a sender-secured fax the sender selects the "sender- secured" mode on the fax machine, enters their biometric-PIC followed by their title index code.
  • the fax machine then connects to the DPC, and sends the biometric-PIC information.
  • the individual then sends the fax by feeding the document into the fax scanner. In this case, the fax is actually sent to the DPC, which stores the fax digitally.
  • the DPC commences sending the fax to each destination, labeling each page with the name, title, and company of the sender, along with the banner of "SENDER- SECURED" at the top of each page.
  • the sender selects the "secured" mode on the fax machine, enters their biometric-PIC followed by their title index code, and then enters the phone numbers of the recipients. Once the system verifies the sender's identity and each of the recipients phone numbers, the individual then sends the fax by feeding the document into the fax scanner. The fax is then sent to the DPC, which stores the fax digitally. Once the entire fax arrives at the DPC, the DPC sends a small cover page to the destination indicating the pending secured fax, the sender's title and identity, as well as the number of pages waiting, along with a tracking code. This tracking code is automatically entered into the memory of the recipient's fax machine.
  • any employee of the recipient company can select the "retrieve fax" button on his fax machine, select which pending fax to retrieve by using the tracking code, and then enter biometric-PIC. If the fax is unwanted, the individual may press the "reject fax” button, though he must still identify himself to the system in order to do this. Once validated as a member of the company, the fax is then downloaded to the recipient's fax machine. Each page has "SECURED" on the top of each page, along with the sender's identity and title information. IV. Secured Confidential Fax
  • the sender selects the "secured-confidential" mode on the fax machine, enters his biometric- PIC followed by his title and index code, and then enters the phone number and system extension of each recipient.
  • the DPC verifies the sender's identity and each of the recipients phone numbers and extensions, the individual then sends the fax by feeding the document into the fax scanner.
  • the fax is sent to the DPC, which stores the fax digitally. Once the entire fax arrives at the DPC, the DPC sends a small cover page to each destination indicating the pending secured- confidential fax, the sender's title and identity, the recipient's title and identity, as well as the number of pages waiting, along with a tracking code. This tracking code is automatically entered into the memory of the recipient's fax. However, the only individual that can retrieve the fax is the individual whose extension code is indicated.
  • This individual selects the "retrieve fax” button, selects the pending fax to retrieve, and then enters his biometric-PIC. Once validated as the recipient, the fax is then downloaded to the recipient's fax machine. Each page has "SECURED-CONFIDENTIAL" on the top of each page, along with the sender's title and identity information.
  • This fax is processed identically to the secured- confidential fax in terms of the actual delivery of the fax to the recipients, except that the fax is titled "contract" instead of secured- confidential.
  • the DPC automatically archives contract faxes. Any recipient may accept or reject the contract through the SFT subsequent to receiving the contract fax. Hence with the option, the DPC performs the role of an electronic notary.
  • Any fax that is sent to the system and then forwarded to the recipient may be sent to any number of recipients without tying up the sending fax machine. Additionally, the tracking number of any fax sent is entered into the memory of the fax machine; a status report on any ongoing fax can be generated at the sending machine by selecting the "status" button and then selecting the particular fax pending tracking code. The DPC issues a report that is immediately sent to the sending fax machine detailing the state of the sending for each recipient.
  • any secured or secured-confidential fax an option exists for either the sender or one of the recipients to archive the fax (along with the specifics as to who sent and received the fax) for future reference. To this end, any secured fax is retained for some time period (i.e., 24 hours) following successful delivery.
  • An archival tracking code is returned to the individual whenever an archive is requested. This archival code is used to retrieve faxes and fax status reports archived with the system.
  • Archived faxes are placed on read-only secondary storage after some time period (i.e., 24 hours). Retrieving an archived fax requires human intervention, and may take up to 24 hours to perform.
  • the SFT system works hard to assure the recipient of the sender's identity, and it works just as hard to assure the sender that the recipient actually acknowledged receipt of the document.
  • the fax terminal encrypts the fax using the Message Key facility provided by the BIA. Since the BIA takes responsibility for encrypting the Message Key as part of the biometric-PIC, the encryption key is securely sent to the DPC. When an individual receives a secured fax of any type, the message key is sent encrypted along with the private code, to allow the recipient to decrypt the message. Note that it is fine to have all recipients have this message key, as they all receive the same message.
  • Sending secured faxes is very similar to sending electronic mail, and reuses much of the same software.
  • fax terminals that do not have integral BIA/fax devices but that have a port suitable for attaching an external BIA/pc and software appropriate for using the BIA.
  • the pu ⁇ ose of the Biometric Registration Terminal is to register new individuals including their biometric-PIC, mailing address, private code, electronic mail addresses, a list of titles and title index codes used to send and receive electronic messages and faxes, and a list of financial asset accounts and account index codes that they can access, all using their biometric- PIC.
  • the objective of the enrollment process is to obtain personal information from an individual at the location of a responsible institution where that information can be validated. This includes, but is not limited to retail banking outlets, and co ⁇ orate personnel departments. Each participating responsible institution has one BRT that is used by a group of employees who have been authorized to perform registrations. Each employee is accountable for each individual registered.
  • the BRT consists of:
  • the BRT uses an attached BIA/Reg for biometric entry, and is connected to the system by a 9.6kb modem or an X.25 network connection (known in the industry).
  • Biometric registration terminals are located in places that are physically secure such as retail banking outlets.
  • the institution and the BIA are identified by cross-checking the owner of the BIA with the institution code set by the BRT.
  • the employee identifies himself to the system by entering his biometric- PIC upon starting the registration application.
  • the institution uses its standard customer identification procedure (signature cards, employee records, personal information, etc) before registering the individual on the system. It is important for the institution to verify individual identity as assiduously as possible, since the registering individual will be empowered to transfer money from those accounts at will, and/or send electronic messages using the name of the company.
  • the individual enters both a primary and secondary biometric. The individual must use both index fingers; if the individual is missing index fingers, the next innermost finger may be used. Requiring specific fingers to be used allows the prior fraud check to work.
  • the individual is encouraged to select a primary and a secondary finger; the primary finger is given preference during the DPC identity check, so the individual should present the most-often used finger as the primary.
  • the DPC could choose to alter the designation of primary and secondary biometrics based on operations if it turns out to be important to do so.
  • the BIA/R determines if the individual has entered "a good print.” Note that there are some individuals whose jobs result in the accidental removal of their finge ⁇ rints, such as individuals who work with abrasives or acids. Unfortunately, these individuals cannot use the system. They are detected at this stage in the process and informed that they cannot participate.
  • the individual selects a PIC of from four to twelve digits from a series of PIC options provided by the system's central database.
  • the PIC must be validated by the system. This involves two checks: one, that the number of other individuals using the same PIC aren't too great (since the PIC is used to reduce the number of individuals checked by the biometric comparison algorithm) , and that the individual being registered isn't too "close", biometrically speaking, with other individuals within the same PIC group. If either happens, the enrollment is rejected, an error message is returned to the BRT, and the individual is instructed to request a different PIC.
  • the system may optionally return with an "identical match" error condition, which indicates that the individual already has a record in the system under that PIC.
  • a PIC of 0 allows the system to assign a PIC to the individual.
  • the individual constructs a confidential private code consisting of a word or phrase. If the individual does not wish to construct one, a private code will be constructed randomly by the terminal.
  • the individual may also arrange their financial asset code list.
  • This list describes which account index code points at which account (i.e. 1 for debit, 2 for credit, 3 for emergency debit, etc). Note that this can only occur if the registering institution is a bank, and only if the accounts are owned by that particular banking institution.
  • the DPC institutes a database- wide involuntary biometric database search for the criminal. Several of these are performed each night, so individuals who are particularly wanted by the system are winnowed out of the database by using a time consuming process during conditions of light activity.
  • the employees performing the registration operation identify themselves using biometric-PIC only when initially activating the registration system. This is a convenience for the employee, but a possible security problem for the system, as unattended or "temporarily borrowed" BRTs could be the source for fraud. As a result, the registration application exits after a predetermined period of no activity.
  • the pu ⁇ ose of the customer service terminal is to provide internal DPC support personnel access to the various aspects of the system databases. Support people need to answer inquiries by individuals, issuers, institutions, and merchants that are having trouble with the system.
  • the CST consists of:
  • Each CST is connected to the system via a high speed local area network connection such as token ring, ethernet, fiber (FDDI), etc.
  • Each CST has the capability to query each of the databases, and display the results of these queries.
  • the CST only displays fields and records based on the privilege of the individual terminal user. For instance, a standard customer service employee won't be able to see the encryption code for a given BIA's VDB record, though they can see which merchant or individual currently owns that BIA.
  • the individual and the BIA must be identified by the system.
  • the individual's privilege level must also be determined, so that the database can restrict access appropriately.
  • An individual using a CST starts a session by providing identification by entering their biometric-PIC.
  • the BIA constructs an Identification Request message, and send it to the DPC for verification. Once the system verifies the individual, the CST application can operate normally, though limited by the individual's previously assigned DPC privilege level.
  • the DPC will terminate a connection to the CST application after a predetermined idle time period.
  • the CST encrypts all traffic between the CST and the database. To do this, the CST generates a session key that is sent to the server during the login session with the system. This session key is used to encrypt and decrypt all communications with the DPC that occur during the period. Even assuming secure communications and no modified database applications, the DPC makes certain that DPC data fields that are not accessible to the individual operating the CST are not sent to the CST's database application. Likewise, at no time do any CST personnel have access to or permission to modify individual biometric information.
  • the DPC and the support center can be co-located, or because of the fairly tight security surrounding the CST itself, the support center can be split off on its own.
  • the pu ⁇ ose of the issuer terminal is to allow employees at issuing banks to submit batch asset account modification operations to the DPC in a secure and identifiable manner.
  • the IT consists of:
  • the Issuer Terminal uses an issuer BIA to authorize mass additions and deletions of financial asset information.
  • the bank must be identified, a properly- authorized bank employee must be identified, and all of the individuals whose asset accounts are being added or removed must also be identified.
  • the bank is responsible for identifying the individuals who wish to add their accounts at that bank to their asset account list. As in biometric registration, this is done by the bank using signature cards and personal information.
  • the DPC identifies the bank by cross-checking the issuer code submitted by the IT with the issuer code registered in the VAD record of the BIA/Iss.
  • a biometric-PIC is used to identify the bank employee actually submitting the batch.
  • an individual gives his biometric identification number to the bank (the identification number is given to the individual during the initial biometric registration step) along with the accounts that are to be added. After the individual is properly identified, this identification code and account list are forwarded to the IT for subsequent batch submission to the system.
  • an authorized individual at the bank instructs the IT to upload the batched account additions/deletions to the DPC. To do this, the authorized individual enters his biometric-PIC, the IT adds a session key, adds the bank's issuer code, and from that the BI-A/Iss constructs an Issuer Batch Request message that the IT then forwards to the DPC.
  • the IT encrypts the batch using the message code, and then sends that as well.
  • the system receives the Issuer Batch Request, it validates that the BIA is an BIA/Iss, that the BIA/Iss is registered to the bank claimed by the issuer code, and that the individual identified in the biometric-PIC is allowed to submit batch requests to the DPC for that bank. If so, the DPC processes all the requests, keeping track of errors as required. Once done, the DPC returns the individual's private code, along with an encrypted batch containing any errors that occurred during processing.
  • Encryption guarantees that the transmission between bank and DPC cannot be intercepted, and thus account numbers are protected in transit.
  • Cross-checking the bank with the BIA/Iss means that both the IT and the BIA must be compromised to submit false add/delete messages to the DPC.
  • the bank must ensure that the IT is physically secure, and that only authorized individuals are allowed to access it.
  • Requiring an individual to submit the batch provides for a responsible human to be "in the loop" whose job it is to make sure that proper bank security measures have been followed in the construction and submission of the batch.
  • the pu ⁇ ose of the biometric ATM is to provide individuals access to cash and other ATM functions without having to use an Interbank card. It does this by submitting a biometric-PIC and an account index code and retrieving a bank account number. For users of the system, this replaces the Interbank card (known in the industry) + PIC mechanism as a method for identifying the account and authorizing the individual. It is assumed that all ATMs still continue to accept Interbank cards.
  • the ATM consists of:
  • the biometric ATM uses an integrated BIA/ATM to identify individuals and allow them access to financial assets using a biometric-PIC and an account index.
  • An BIA ATM is installed into the ATM, making use of the ATM's current PIC pad for PIC and account index code entry.
  • the ATM is connected to the system using X.25 or modem.
  • the BIA ATM is structured in such a way as to make integration with an existing ATM network as simple as possible. This results in a compromise between security and ease of integration.
  • the bank is identified by cross-checking the ATM's stored bank code with the BIA/ ATM's bank code.
  • the BIA/ATM is identified by successfully locating the BIA/ATM in the VAD, and the individual is identified through the standard biometric-PIC.
  • To access an ATM an individual enters their biometric- PIC into the BIA along with the account index code.
  • the BIA forms an account access request message, which is then sent to the DPC by the ATM.
  • the DPC validates the biometric-PIC as well as the emergency account index code, and then sends the resulting asset account number along with the private code back to the ATM.
  • the ATM asks the BIA to decrypt the response, and then displays the private code on the ATM's display screen.
  • the ATM also examines the response to see whether or not the individual is performing a standard account access, or a "duress" account access. If a duress account access is indicated, the ATM may provide false or misleading information as to the amounts available to the individual; the specifics of this behavior will vary from ATM to ATM. However, no ATM will ever provide any indication to the individual that a duress transaction is in progress.
  • MAC means that the ATM cannot change the contents of the message without being detected, and encryption prevents the encrypted part of the message from being disclosed.
  • the BIA/ATM Because the BIA/ATM has no LCD or no PIC pad attached, it requires the ATM to provide all the text prompts and to gather all the input from the individual. This is less secure than if the BIA were performing the operation, but as ATMs are generally physically robust, it can probably be called a wash.
  • a particular bank may choose to limit access, or alter balance information, or a false screen may be displayed.
  • a false screen is a display of data which has been intentionally pre-determined to be inaccurate such that a coercing party will not illegally obtain accurate data about an individual's financial assets. It is beyond the scope of the invention to specify the precise behavior of an ATM under these circumstances.
  • Terminal Phone Point of Sale Terminal
  • the pu ⁇ ose of the phone point of sale terminal is to authorize credit or debit financial transactions from an individual using a specially-equipped telephone to make a purchase from a merchant.
  • the PPT consists of:
  • a rapid-connect digital modem [see the VoiceView patent (known in the industry)] • a telephone (keypad, ea ⁇ iece, microphone) a microprocessor a DSP (digital signal processor) a standard telephone line
  • the PPT accepts biometric identification using an BIA/catv connected to and integrated with a cordless, cellular, or standard telephone.
  • biometric-PIC identification is used.
  • the PPT uses a special modem that shares the telephone voice line to exchange digital information with the merchant.
  • the PPT keeps track of the phone number that was typed by the user, in case the individual decides to make a purchase.
  • a DSP is used to detect dialtone, ring, connection, and so on, in order to tell what the actual phone number entered was, as distinct from extensions, or the navigation of phone message systems, and so on.
  • the PPT When the product information is downloaded, the PPT then prompts the individual for the biometric-PIC, the account index code, and then asks the individual to validate the purchase amount. Then the phone number and the merchant code are added, and the message is encrypted. The rapid-connect modem is again engaged to send the authorization information to the merchant.
  • the merchant When the merchant receives the authorization information, the merchant verifies that the price and product information are correct, and then forwards the transaction to the DPC using a secured communications channel using either the Internet or some other general pu ⁇ ose network.
  • the connection to the DPC is secured using Public Key Encryption and a secret key exchange.
  • the DPC Upon receiving and decrypting a phone authorization, the DPC checks the phone number against the merchant code, validates the biometric-PIC, and then sends the transaction to the credit/debit network for authorization. If authorization succeeds, the DPC appends the buyer's address to the response message and sends the response to the merchant.
  • the merchant receives the response from the DPC, copies the mailing address, and forwards the message to the individual again via a brief session with the rapid-connect modem.
  • a chime sounds, the modem disconnects, and the individual's private code (decrypted by the BIA) is displayed on the LCD screen.
  • the merchant's sales rep confirms that the individual's mailing address is valid; if so, the call is terminated and the transaction is complete.
  • One of the security concerns about phone transactions is the security of the phone system itself. Apart from the biometric identification, the central problem is making sure that the number the individual called actually reaches the merchant in question.
  • Terminal Cable-TV Point of Sale
  • the pu ⁇ ose of the CATV point of sale terminal is to authorize credit or debit financial transactions from an individual in front of his television (or "TV") set to a merchant who is presenting objects for sale on television.
  • the CPT consists of:
  • the CPT accepts biometric identification using an BIA/catv that is integrated with the television's remote control device.
  • the remote control communicates with a television top box that itself communicates with the broadband cable television network.
  • the terminal consists of the television remote logic that communicates with the BIA, as well as the television top box that communicates over the cable broadband network.
  • the individual is identified by the biometric-PIC.
  • the merchant is identified by a merchant credential, created by the CATV broadcaster at the time the product is shown on television.
  • Each product broadcast has a merchant-product credential consisting of a merchant code, a time, a duration, and a price which is signed using Public Key Encryption and the CATV network broadcaster's private key. This merchant- product credential can only be generated by the network broadcaster.
  • the Cable television network also broadcasts simultaneous digital information that describes a short description, price, as well as the merchant-product credential. This digital information is processed and temporarily stored by the CPT, ready to be accessed by the individual when a decision to purchase is made.
  • the individual selects the on-screen display function of the special television Remote, which instructs the CPT to display text information on the screen regarding the currently viewed product.
  • the individual is first prompted for the number of the items he wishes to buy through the onscreen display. Then he is prompted to enter his Biometric-PIC, and his account index code. Once he verifies that the final purchase price is okay, the product, price, merchant code, merchant-product credential, and channel number along with the Biometric-PIC are used to construct a Remote Transaction Authorization request message. The request is sent to the merchant for authorization by way of the Cable-television broadband two-way communications channel.
  • each merchant that desires to sell products in this manner must have the ability to receive order information using the broadband Cable television network.
  • the merchant submits it to the DPC using a secured Internet connection or an X.25 connection.
  • the DPC If the DPC authorizes the transaction, it constructs an authorization response that includes the current mailing address of the individual in addition to the authorization code, and the encrypted private code. Once the merchant receives the authorization, he copies the authorization and the mailing address, and then forwards the authorization back to the CPT, who then displays the private code to the individual, terminating the transaction.
  • the messages may be encrypted using an optional CATV Center's public key, or other "link level" encryption between the CATV set-top box (known in the industry) and the CATV local office.
  • the connection uses a session key changed daily that has been previously exchanged using a public key encryption key exchange system.
  • the Data Processing Center handles financial transaction authorizations and individual registration as its main responsibilities.
  • the DPC provides storage and retrieval for secure faxes, electronic documents, and electronic signatures.
  • Each DPC site is made up of a number of computers and databases connected together over a LAN (known in the industry) as illustrated in the DPC Overview Figure (number**). Multiple identical DPC sites ensure reliable service in the face of disaster or serious hardware failure at any single DPC site.
  • each DPC site has electrical power backup and multiple redundancy in all of its critical hardware and database systems.
  • DPC components fall into three categories: hardware, software, and databases. Below is a short description, by category, of each component. More detailed descriptions appear in the following sections. Hardware
  • Firewall Machine the entry point of the DPC site.
  • GM the entry point of the DPC site.
  • Gateway Machine the system coordinator and message processor.
  • DPC Local Area Network connects the DPC sites
  • Individual Biometric Database identifies individuals from their biometric and PIC code.
  • Prior Fraud Database lists individuals who have defrauded the system and can check if a biometric matches any of these individuals.
  • Valid Apparatus Database stores information required to validate and decrypt BIA messages.
  • AOD Apparatus Owner Database stores information about the owners of BIA devices.
  • Issuer Database identifies issuing banks that participate with the system.
  • Authorized Individual Database stores the list of individuals allowed to use personal or issuer BIA devices.
  • Remote Merchant Database stores information necessary to process transactions with telephone and cable television merchants.
  • EDD Electronic Document Database stores electronic documents, such as faxes and electronic mail, for retrieval by authorized individuals.
  • Electronic Signature Database stores electronic document signatures for verification by a third party.
  • Message Processing Module handles the processing of each message by coordinating with the other software modules anddatabases required to perform the message's task.
  • Sequence Number Module handles DUKPT sequence number processing.
  • Message Authentication Code Module handles MAC validation and generation.
  • MDM Message Decrypt Module handles encrypting and decrypting of BIA requests and responses.
  • PIC Group List handles the lookup of PIC groups by PIC and the configuration of database elements that depend on the list of PIC groups. IML
  • IBD Machine List handles the lookup of the main and backup database machines dedicated to holding IBD records for a given PIC group.
  • int ⁇ X> an integral type using ⁇ X> bytes of storage char ⁇ X> a character array of ⁇ X> bytes text a variable length character array
  • ⁇ type>[X] a length ⁇ X> array of the specified type.
  • time a type used for storing time and date biometric a binary data type used for storing the biometric fax a binary data type used for storing fax images
  • expected means the expected condition of a fully loaded system.
  • Terminals accomplish their tasks by sending request packets to a DPC site.
  • the DPC site sends back a reply packet containing the status on the success or failure of the request.
  • Communication is via a logical or a physical connection- oriented message delivery mechanism such as X.25 connections, TCP/IP connections, or a telephone call to a modem bank.
  • a logical or a physical connection- oriented message delivery mechanism such as X.25 connections, TCP/IP connections, or a telephone call to a modem bank.
  • Each session holds the connection to the terminal open until the DPC sends its response back to the terminal.
  • the request packet contains a BIA message part and a terminal message part:
  • BIA message part protocol version number message type 4-byte BIA Identification 4-byte sequence number ⁇ message specific data> Message Authentication Code (MAC)
  • the BIA message part is constructed by an BIA device. It includes one or two biometrics, a PIC, authorization amounts, and the contents of the general registers which are set by the terminal. Note: the MAC in the BIA message part only applies to the BIA part and not to the terminal part.
  • a terminal may place additional data for the request message in the terminal message part.
  • the BIA provides a message key to allow the terminal to secure the terminal part data.
  • the BIA automatically includes the message key in the packet's encrypted biometric-PIC block when necessary.
  • the terminal performs the message key encryption itself, however.
  • the response packet contains a standard header and two optional free-form message parts: one with a MAC and one without:
  • the message part with a MAC is sent to the BIA so that it may validate that this part of the response has not been tampered with and to display the individual's private code.
  • the message part without a MAC is used for transmitting large amounts of data, such as fax images, that are not sent to the BIA for MAC validation as the BIA to terminal connection may be of limited bandwidth.
  • a terminal need only send its request to one of the DPC sites, typically the closest, because that site automatically handles updating the others by running distributed transactions as necessary.
  • Each GM has a Message Processing Module that handles the coordination between the DPC components required to process the request and sends the response back to the sender.
  • All packets the DPC receives contain an BIA hardware identification code (die BIA Identification of the packet), a sequence number, and a Message Authentication Code (MAC).
  • the GM asks the MAC Module to validate the packet's MAC and then checks the sequence number with the Sequence Number Module. If ot c ec ou , e passes e pac e o e essage ecryp o u e or ecryp on. any one of the checks fail, the GM logs a warning, terminates processing for the packet, and returns an error message to the BIA device.
  • Each packet the DPC receives may contain an optional response key stored in the encrypted biometric-PIC block of the packet.
  • the DPC Before the DPC replies to a request that includes a response key, it encrypts the reply packet with the response key. It also generates a Message Authentication Code and appends it to the packet.
  • response packets include a status or reply code that can indicate whether the request succeeded or not. For example, when the DPC declines a credit authorization, it does not return an error packet, it returns a normal transaction response packet with a reply code set to "failed".
  • the DPC has two procedures commonly used while processing requests.
  • the DPC executes the following procedure: using the PIC code, the DPC searches the IBD Machine List for the main and backup IBD machines responsible for handling identifications for the given PIC code. Next, the DPC sends the identification request to either the main or backup machines depending on which is the least loaded. The IBD machine responds with the IBD record for the individual or an "individual not found" error.
  • the IBD machine retrieves all the IBD records for the given PIC. Using a proprietary biometric hardware device, the IBD machine compares each record's primary biometric with the individual's biometric arriving at a comparison score indicating the similarity of the two biometrics. If no biometric has a close enough comparison score, the comparisons are repeated using the secondary biometrics. If none of the secondary biometrics have a close enough comparison score, then the IBD machine returns an "individual not found" error. Otherwise, the IBD machine returns the full IBD record of the individual, from which such fields such as the private code, account numbers, titles, and so on may be obtained.
  • the DPC For requests that include an account index, the DPC handles the case where the individual chooses his or her emergency account index.
  • the GM processing the request immediately notifies the DPC customer support staff, logs a warning, and if the response packet has a reply code, sets it to "emergency". It is the responsibility of the owner of the BIA device that submitted the request to watch for an "emergency" reply code and provide further assistance, such as the false screen mechanism described in the ATM terminal section.
  • the DPC also increments the emergency use count of the individual's IBD record whenever the emergency account index gets accessed.
  • Protocol Requests The following sections describe each protocol request/response and the actions the DPC takes to perform them.
  • protocol packets are:
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric
  • the Individual Identification request includes a biometric-PIC block which the DPC uses with the individual identification procedure to identify the individual. If the individual is identified, then the DPC responds with the individual's name, biometric identification, and private code. Otherwise, the DPC responds with an "unknown individual" error.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key
  • Transaction Authorization Response encrypted(response key) private code text authorization response authorization detail (autho code, transaction identification, etc) [optional individual address information] reply code (fail, ok, emergency) MAC
  • private code text authorization response authorization detail autho code, transaction identification, etc
  • reply code return code (fail, ok, emergency) MAC
  • the DPC identifies the purchasing individual by the biometric-PIC block of the request. If the individual cannot be identified, the DPC replies with an "unknown individual" error.
  • the DPC sends an external authorization request (crediting the asset account of the BIA device's owner and debiting the individual's asset account) to one of several existing financial authorization services depending on the type of asset accounts involved (such as Visa_ or American Express_). If the external financial authorization service approves the transaction, the DPC returns the external authorization codes and an "ok" reply code to the BIA device. Otherwise, the DPC returns the reason why the authorization was denied and sets the reply code to "failed", ln either case, the DPC includes the individual's private code in the response. When the DPC looks up the individual's asset account using the account index of the request, the chosen account may be the "emergency" account. If this happens, the DPC follows the emergency response procedure. The external authorization still takes place, however.
  • Remote authorization are generated by telephone, mail- order, or cable television merchants.
  • the DPC handles remote authorizations the same way it does a retail authorization but with the following exceptions: i) Remote authorizations include a remote merchant code which the DPC checks against the Remote Merchant Database to validate whether the packet's merchant Identification matches the one stored in the database. Furthermore, the asset account credited is the remote merchant's account, not the account of the BIA device's owner. ii) Additionally, BIA devices that generate the remote authorizations tend to be personal BIA devices. The DPC checks the biometric Identification of the identified individual against the Authorized Individual Database's list of individuals allowed to use the BIA device. If the individual is not authorized to use the device, then the DPC denies the authorization request. iii) Finally, the authorization packet may contain a "send-address" indicator. This indicator informs the DPC to include the individual's address in the reply packet and is usually used only for mail order purchases.
  • Biometric-PIC block 1000-byte primary biometric
  • Terminal Part encrypted(message key): name address zipcode private code asset account list (account index code, account #) emergency account (account index code, account #) title list (title index code, title name)
  • the BRT sends the DPC a registration packet containing primary and secondary biometrics and personal identification code, along with ancillary data such as the individual's name, address, a list of financial asset accounts, the private code, and the emergency account.
  • the individual may include an electronic mail address, and a title list including titles and the title index code, as well as an Social Security Number (or "SSN").
  • SSN Social Security Number
  • the individual may choose his or her own PIC code or allow the system to choose it. In a modification step any previously entered data can be modified or deleted.
  • DPC site acts as the registration site, for implementation simplicity. Registration request packets received by non-registration DPC sites are forwarded to the current registration site.
  • the registration DPC site performs the entire registration check, assigning of IBD records to IBD machines, and the distributed transaction required to update all other DPC sites.
  • the registration DPC site selects the PIC code for registration requests that don't specify one, stores the IBD record on the main and backup IBD machines (as specified in the PIC Group List), and checks the PIC and biometric suitability of the registration packet before running the distributed transaction to update the other DPC sites.
  • the DPC runs a personal identification code and biometric sample duplication check step wherein the biometrics and personal identification code gathered during the registration step is checked against all prviously registered biometrics currently associated with the identical personal identification code.
  • the DPC may reject the registration for the following reasons: the PIC code is too popular, or the biometrics are too similar to other biometrics stored under the chosen PIC.
  • the DPC generates a short list of PIC codes for which the registration will be guaranteed that it reserves for a period of time.
  • the BRT then prompts the individual for a new PIC which may be chosen from the good PIC list.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key
  • account index [optional 56-bit message key] account index MAC Terminal Part: (not used) Account Access Response encrypted(response key): private code text [optional PIC] asset account number reply code (fail, ok, emergency) MAC
  • the account access request allows BIA-equipped Automated Teller Machines to provide a safer and more convenient way for individuals to identify themselves to the ATM.
  • the GM identifies the individual by the packet's biometric-PIC and uses the specified account index to choose which asset account number to retrieve.
  • the chosen account may be the "emergency" account. If this happens, the GM follows the emergency response procedure.
  • the Issuer Batch request allows an issuing bank or other authority to perform routine maintenance on the Individual Biometric Database.
  • the DPC logs a security violation warning if it receives any Issuer Batch requests from non-issuer BIA devices, and it also refuses to process the request.
  • the DPC identifies the individual submitting the batch request by following the individual identification procedure. The DPC then checks that the individual is registered in the Authorized Individual Database to use the BIA device embedded in the sending Issuer Terminal.
  • the DPC also uses the issuer code in the request to look up the apparatus owner Identification in the Issuer Database and compare it against the apparatus owner Identification stored in the Valid Apparatus Database to ensure that the issuer code is not forged.
  • the DPC then executes the add and delete commands in the message-key encrypted batch list.
  • the batch list is a newline separated list of commands.
  • Valid commands are:
  • the add command adds the asset account to the account list at the specified account index.
  • the optional emergency flag indicates whether the particular account index is treated as the individual's emergency account. If the asset account currently stored in the account list does not belong to the issuer, the command fails. This feature prevents one bank from adding or removing asset accounts from other bank's customers without the individual's knowledge or authorization.
  • the remove command clears the individual's asset account stored at the specified account index in the account list. If the asset account currently stored in the account list does not match the account the issuer is attempting to remove, the command fails.
  • the GM logs a security violation warning and appends an entry to the failed list of the response. The failed entry includes the text for the command and the error code.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC
  • 56-bit response key 56-bit message key security mode (unsecured, sender-secured, secured, secured-confidential) sender title index code sender fax number sender fax extension recipient list
  • Terminal Part (not used) Secure Fax Submit Response encrypted(response key): private code text fax tracking number MAC
  • the DPC When the DPC receives a Secure Fax Submit request, it identifies the individual from the request's biometric-PIC by following the individual identification procedure. This identification, along with the individual's title described by the title index code, is presented to the recipients so that the sender of the fax is always reliably identified.
  • the DPC generates a tracking number for tracking pu ⁇ oses and stores it, the sender's biometric Identification, the security mode, and the message key in a newly created EDD Document record. For each recipient in the recipient list, the DPC also creates a Recipient record. The DPC then waits for the sending fax machine to transmit the fax data encrypted under the message key. If the request includes an "archive fax" or "contract/agreement” indicator, the EDD places a copy of the Document and Recipient records in the archive database. Any subsequent updates to these records are also made to the archived versions.
  • the fax data is sent in a separate step so that if the sender makes a mistake entering his biometric and PIC, the system notifies him before he wastes any time feeding the document into the fax machine.
  • Terminal Part fax tracking number encrypted(message key): fax image data
  • the Secure Fax Data request allows a secure fax machine to send the fax image to the DPC for delivery to the previously specified recipient(s). This request does not involve any biometric identification and instead relies upon the secret message key to securely transmit the image.
  • the fax image data is encrypted by the message key registered by the Secure Fax Submit request.
  • the DPC sends a Secure Fax Arrival Notice message to each of the recipient's fax numbers.
  • the DPC retrieves the list of recipients by querying the EDD for all Recipient records containing the fax tracking number.
  • the Recipient record contains the destination fax number and optional extension.
  • the DPC updates each Recipient record's delivery status field to "notified". Note: if the destination fax number is busy, the DPC marks the delivery status field to "busy” and retries sending the notice periodically (i.e., every 10 minutes) until successful and at that time, updates the status field to "notified".
  • the Arrival Notice is as follows: Secure Fax Arrival Notice (Fax message) sender name, company, title, and fax number fax tracking number instructions on how to download the fax
  • the DPC only sends the sender a Status Notice via fax after all recipients have either retrieved or rejected the fax.
  • the sender may query the DPC using the Secure Fax Tracking request (see below) to get the current status of all recipients.
  • the DPC finds each individual's company and title information in the EDD Organization table. For individuals who are not registered in the system and hence cannot receive secure faxes or for non-recipient secured modes, the DPC does not send them a Secure Fax Arrival Notice. Instead, the DPC sends them the fax directly. If the fax line is busy, the DPC retries every 10 minutes until it succeeds in delivering the fax.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key
  • Secure Fax Tracking Response encrypted(response key) private code text message digest for tracking response fax image status code (ok, failed) MAC fax image for recipient status list
  • the DPC handles the Secure Fax Tracking request by retrieving all EDD Recipient records for the fax and generating a fax message to display the records. If the individual making the tracking request is not the sender of the fax document, then the DPC sets the status code to failed and puts an empty fax in the response.
  • the tracking response fax contains information describing the status of the delivery of the fax to each recipient. This fax contains such status information as line busy, fax arrival notice sent, fax sent, fax rejected, contract accepted, and so on.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key fax tracking number MAC Terminal Part: (not used)
  • the DPC uses the biometric-PIC to identify the individual making the retrieve request by following the individual identification procedure. If no EDD Recipient record exists for the individual and for the specified fax, then the DPC responds with an "invalid recipient" status.
  • the DPC retrieves the encrypted fax image from the EDD Document record with the correct fax tracking number and biometric Identification which it returns to the requester.
  • the fax image includes a cover page that displays whether the fax is a contract/agreement and the sender's name, company, title, fax number, and extension.
  • the DPC sends a Status Notice via fax (see Secure Fax Data, above) to the fax's sender and then schedules to remove the Document and Recipient records from the EDD within a configurable time period.
  • the time period is intended to allow the recipients sufficient time to decide whether or not to archive the fax.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key fax tracking number MAC Terminal Part: (not used)
  • the DPC uses the biometric-PIC to identify the individual making the secure fax reject request.
  • the DPC finds the EDD Recipient record keyed by the request's fax tracking number and the individual's biometric Identification. If the record cannot be found then the request fails with an "invalid recipient" status.
  • the DPC sends a Status Notice via fax (see Secure Fax Data, above) to the fax's sender and then schedules to remove the Fax and Tracking records from the EDD within a configurable time period.
  • the time period is intended to allow the recipients sufficient time to decide whether or not to archive the fax.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key fax tracking number MAC Terminal Part: (not used)
  • the DPC uses the biometric-PIC to identify the individual making the secure fax archive request.
  • the DPC finds the EDD Recipient record keyed by the request's fax tracking number and the individual's biometric Identification. If the record cannot be found and the individual is not the sender or one of the recipients, then the request fails with an "invalid individual" status. Otherwise, the DPC copies the Document and Recipient records into the EDD archive database. Any subsequent changes to these records are also copied to the archived versions.
  • the DPC uses the biometric-PIC to identify the individual making the Contract Accept request.
  • the DPC finds the EDD Recipient record keyed by the request's fax tracking number and the individual's biometric Identification. If the record cannot be found then the request fails with an "invalid recipient" status. Otherwise, the DPC updates the Recipient record's contract status field to "accepted” and generates a Status Notice to the fax's sender (see Fax Data, above).
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key fax tracking number MAC Terminal Part: (not used)
  • the DPC uses the biometric-PIC to identify the individual making the Contract Reject request.
  • the DPC finds the EDD Recipient record keyed by the request's fax tracking number and the individual's biometric Identification. If the record cannot be found then the request fails with an "invalid recipient" status. Otherwise, the DPC updates the Recipient record's contract status field to "rejected" and generates a Status Notice to the fax's sender (see Fax Data, above).
  • Secure Fax Organization Change sender name, company, title, and fax number list of organizational changes
  • Biometric-PIC block 4-byte sequence number encrypted ⁇ UKPT key) Biometric-PIC block:
  • the DPC When the DPC receives an Electronic Document Submit request, it identifies the individual by following the individual identification procedure.
  • the DPC then creates an EDD Document record and assigns it a unique tracking number.
  • the DPC initializes the record's sender identification code to be the biometric identification code of the identified individual and the message key to be the message key in the request.
  • the DPC searches the Individual Biometric Database for each recipient and creates an EDD Recipient record for each one.
  • Each record is initialized with the tracking number, the recipient's biometric identification code, and a delivery status of "incomplete”. If any of the recipients cannot be found, the DPC replies with an "invalid recipient" status.
  • Terminal Part tracking number command (either abort or data)
  • the Electronic Document Data request allows an individual to send the document text (in one or more parts) to the EDD for delivery to the recipient(s). This request does not involve any biometric identification, instead, it relies upon the secret message key to securely transmit the document text.
  • the request text is assumed to be encrypted by the message key stored in the EDD document record and is appended to the document text already stored in the record.
  • the EDD When the EDD receives a packet with the "document complete" indicator, it knows that the sender has finished transmitting the document. The EDD now sends an Arrival Notice to all recipients of the document via Internet electronic mail informing them that they have a document waiting.
  • the EDD also updates the status of the EDD recipient record to "notified".
  • the DPC sends a Status Notice via Internet electronic mail to the document originator.
  • the DPC finds each individual's company and title information in the EDD Organization table.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key tracking number
  • the DPC uses the biometric-PIC to identify the individual making the electronic document retrieve request by following the individual identification procedure.
  • the DPC next finds the EDD Recipient record keyed by the tracking number and the individual's biometric Identification. If the record cannot be found, then the request fails with an "invalid recipient" status. Otherwise, the DPC sends the document's message key and the document (still encrypted by the message key) to the requester.
  • the EDD then updates the status of the EDD recipient record to "retrieved".
  • the DPC sends a Status Notice via Internet electronic mail to the document originator (see Electronic Document Data, above) and then schedules to remove the Document and Recipient records (see Secure Fax Retrieve, above).
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC
  • the DPC uses the biometric-PIC to identify the individual making the electronic document reject request.
  • the DPC next finds the EDD Recipient record keyed by the tracking number and the individual's biometric Identification. If the record cannot be found, then the request fails with an "invalid recipient" status.
  • the EDD updates the status of the EDD recipient record to "rejected".
  • the DPC then follows the same notification and deletion procedure as described in Electronic Document Retrieve, above.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key tracking number MAC Terminal Part: (not used)
  • the DPC uses the biometric-PIC to identify the individual making the electronic document archive request.
  • the DPC finds the EDD Recipient record keyed by the request's tracking number and the individual's biometric Identification. If the record cannot be found and the individual is not the sender or one of the recipients, then the request fails with an "invalid individual" status. Otherwise, the DPC copies the Document and Recipient records into the EDD archive database. Any subsequent changes to these records are also copied to the archived versions.
  • 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key optional title index code, sending fax number, and extension tracking number
  • the DPC can receive an Electronic Document Archive Retrieve request from either a Secure Fax Terminal or a Certified Email Terminal.
  • the DPC uses the individual identification procedure to determine the individual submitting the archive retrieve request. The individual must be either the sender or one of the recipients or else the DPC denies the request by setting the status code to "invalid individual". However, if the archived document was a fax sent using a co ⁇ orate title, the DPC allows additional individuals whose titles are higher in the co ⁇ orate hierarchy to retrieve the archived document as well.
  • the EDD maintains an archive database, indexed by the document's original tracking number, stored on off-line media such as CD- ROMs and tape that can take considerable time to search for the archived document.
  • the DPC does not return the archived document immediately, but instead informs the requesting individual that the DPC has begun the search.
  • the DPC finishes the search it notifies the requester that the archived document is ready to be retrieved through the standard document arrival notification mechanisms — either via fax or email, depending on the format of the original document.
  • the DPC creates an EDD archive request record to store information about the requester so that when the search completes, the DPC remembers to whom to send the document.
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key document name document MD5 calculation MAC Terminal Part: (not used)
  • the DPC To process the electronic signature request, the DPC first performs a biometric identification using the biometric-PIC. Then, the DPC creates an ESD record, assigns it a unique signature identification code, and sets the record's signature field to the electronic signature in the request. The DPC then returns a signature string that can be submitted for later verification: " ⁇ Dr. Bunsen Honeydew> ⁇ Explosions in the Laboratory> 5/17/95 13:00 PST
  • Biometric-PIC block 300-byte authorization biometric 4-12 digit PIC 56-bit response key signature string MAC Terminal Part: (not used)
  • the DPC performs a biometric identification, extracts the signature tracking code from the signature string, retrieves the indicated ESD record, and verifies that it matches the signature string. The DPC returns the private code and the outcome of the signature comparison.
  • the DPC identifies the individual using the request's biometric-PIC and retrieves the individual's asset account stored at the specified index. If the account index is the emergency account, then the network credential response status code is set to "failed" and no credential is generated.
  • the DPC constructs the credential using the current time, the retrieved asset account, and the TCP/IP addresses of the terminal and the bank.
  • the DPC then uses public key encryption to sign the credential with its private key.
  • the response also includes the bank's public key, which the DPC retrieves from the Remote Merchant Database.
  • the DPC handles additional message types classified as internal messages.
  • the DPC generally does not accept these messages from non-DPC systems.
  • the messages are database vendor specific.
  • the internal network uses DES-encrypted packets to provide additional security.
  • the Customer Service and System Administration tasks are implemented using the database vendor's query language and application development tools.
  • IBD find, activate, deactivate, remove, correct records.
  • AID add or remove authorized individuals.
  • AOD find, add, remove, correct records.
  • VAD find, activate, deactivate, remove, correct records.
  • RMD find, add, remove, correct records.
  • the FW Machines provide a first line of defense against network viruses and computer hackers. All communication links into or out of the DPC site first pass through a secure FW Machine.
  • the FW Machine an internet-localnet router, only handles messages destined for the GM Machines.
  • BIA-equipped terminals send packets to a single DPC s te v a modem, X.25, or other communication medium.
  • the DPC relies on a third party to supply the modem banks required to handle the volume of calls and feed the data onto the DPC backbone.
  • the FW Machines For DPC to DPC communication, primarily for distributed transactions and sequence number updates, the FW Machines send out double-length DES encrypted packets.
  • the DPC LAN component handles the encryption and decryption: the FWs do not have the ability to decrypt the packets.
  • a properly configured network sniffer acts as an intruder detector as backup for the FW. If an anomalous message is detected, the intruding messages are recorded in their entirety, an operator is alerted, and the FW is physically shut down by the sniffer.
  • the FW disallows any transmissions from the internal network to the rest of the Internet.
  • a transaction authorization request requires about 400 bytes and registration packets require about 2 KB.
  • the FW Machines are able to process about 400 KB per second (all known in the industry) .
  • Each DPC site requires an aggregate bandwidth of nearly three Tl connections to the third party modem bank and the other DPC sites.
  • the GM Machine through the FW Machines, link the outside world (BIA-equipped terminals and other DPCs) to the internal components of the DPC.
  • the DPC has multiple GMs, typically two.
  • the GM supervises the processing of each BIA request, communicates with the various DPC components as necessary, and sends the encrypted results of the request back to the sender.
  • the software performing this task is called the Message Processing Module.
  • the GM logs all requests it receives and any warnings from components it communicates with. For example, the GM logs any emergency account accesses, sequence number gaps, and invalid packets.
  • Processing a request may require the GM to inform GMs at all other DPCs of a change in the DPC databases. When this happens, the GM runs a distributed transaction to update the remote databases.
  • Synchronous distributed transactions require the GM to wait for the distributed transaction to commit before continuing to process the packet.
  • Asynchronous distributed transactions do not require the GM to wait for the commit, and allow it to finish processing the request regardless of whether the distributed transaction commits or not.
  • Asynchronous distributed transactions are only used to update data for which database consistency is not an absolute requirement: sequence numbers and biometric checksum recordings may be performed asynchronously, whereas creating database records, such as Individual Biometric records, may not.
  • the requesting GM When executing a synchronous distributed transaction, the requesting GM only considers the entire transaction successful if all sites can successfully commit the transaction locally. Otherwise, the GMs back out the changes locally and reject the request due to a transaction error.
  • the list of valid DPC sites is normally all of the sites. In the case of an extreme site failure, however, a system administrator may manually remove that site from the valid site list.
  • the most likely cause of distributed transaction failures are temporary network failures that are unrelated to any DPC equipment. Requests that require a synchronous distributed transaction cannot be performed until network connectivity is restored or the site is removed from the valid site list. Before a site can be added back to the valid site list, the system administrator brings the site's databases up to date with those of a currently active site.
  • Each GM runs the following software components locally for performance reasons:
  • the message bandwidth required by the GMs is similar to that required by the FW Machines.
  • a FDDI network interface provides 100 MBits per second and easily covers any bandwidth requirements.
  • the DPC Local Area Network links the machines of the DPC sites together using a fiber optic token ring.
  • the fiber optic token ring provides both high bandwidth and good physical security.
  • the network interfaces used by the machines on the DPC LAN include encryption hardware to make tapping or intercepting packets useless without the encryption key.
  • the encryption key is the same for all machines on the LAN and is stored in the encryption hardware.
  • a properly configured network sniffer acts as an intruder detector as backup for the FW. If an anomalous message is detected, the intruding messages are recorded in their entirety, an operator is alerted, and the FW is physically shut down by the sniffer.
  • the Message Processing Module handles the processing for a request packet. It communicates with other components of the DPC as necessary to perform its tasks. The presence of an MPM on a machine brands it as a GM. The MPM maintains a request context for each request it is currently processing. The request context includes the information necessary to maintain the network connection to the terminal making the request, the BIA device information, the response key, and the response packet.
  • the Message Authentication Code Module's (MACM) tasks are to validate the Message Authentication Code on inbound packets and to add a Message Authentication Code to outbound packets.
  • the MACM maintains an in-memory hash table of 112-bit MAC encryption keys keyed by BIA hardware identification code.
  • the MACM When the MACM receives a request from the GM to validate a packet's MAC, it first looks up the packet's hardware identification code in the hash table. If no entry exists, then the MACM replies to the GM with an "invalid hardware identification code" error.
  • the MACM performs a MAC check on the BIA message part of the packet using the 1 12-bit MAC encryption key. If the MAC check fails, then the MACM replies to the GM with an "invalid MAC” error. Otherwise, the MACM replies with a "valid MAC” message.
  • the MACM also checks the merchant code against the owner identification code in the hash table. If the codes don't match, then the MACM replies with an "invalid owner" error.
  • the MACM receives a request from the GM to generate a MAC for a packet, it looks up the MAC encryption key using the packet's hardware identification code. With the MAC encryption key, the MACM generates a MAC and adds it to the packet. If the MACM cannot find the hardware identification code in its hash table, it replies with an invalid hardware identification code error instead.
  • the MACM hash table entry contains:
  • the table is hashed by hardware identification code.
  • the hash table requires about 120 MB of storage. For performance reasons, this hash table is cached completely in memory.
  • the MACM only contains records referencing active BIA hardware identification codes and active apparatus owners. Whenever an apparatus or apparatus owner is suspended or deleted from the system, the MACM removes any entries that reference the identification code. When an apparatus is activated, the MACM then adds an entry for it.
  • the MACM also caches the MAC encryption key from the Valid Apparatus Database. Since the system does not allow the encryption key of an BIA to be changed, the MACM does not need to worry about receiving encryption key updates.
  • the Message Decrypt Module's (MDM) task is to reconstruct the DUKPT transaction key and with it decrypt the biometric- PIC block of the packet. It maintains a list of the DUKPT Base Keys that are required to generate the transaction key.
  • the MDM constructs the DUKPT transaction key using the packet's sequence number as the DUKPT transaction counter, the upper 22 bits of the BIA hardware identification code as the DUKPT tamper resistant security module (or "TRSM") Identification, and the low 10 bits of the BIA hardware identification code as the DUKPT Key Set Identification.
  • the DUKPT standard specifies how the transaction key is generated.
  • the Key Set Identification is used to look up a Base Key from the Base Key List.
  • the Base Key is used to transform the TRSM Identification into the initial key via a DES encrypt/decrypt/encrypt cycle.
  • the transaction counter is then applied to the initial key as a series of DES encrypt/decrypt/encrypt cycles to generate the transaction key.
  • two Base Key Lists are maintained, one for low security BIA devices and one for high security devices.
  • the MDM chooses which Base Key List to use depending on the security level of the device.
  • the Base Key List is indexed by Key Set Identification.
  • the MDM maintains an in-memory list of the DUKPT Base Keys. Each key requires 112— bits.
  • the MDM maintains two sets of 1024 keys requiring 32 KB total.
  • the MDM has no direct dependencies on any other DPC component.
  • the PIC Group List (PGL), in conjunction with the Individual Biometric Database Machine List, defines the configuration of the IBD machines.
  • the PGL stores a list of the PIC groups in the system which is used to simplify the management of the PICs.
  • a PIC group is a set of consecutive PIC codes.
  • a PGL exists on each GM Machine (GM).
  • the PGL when given a PIC code, searches through its list of PIC groups for the group containing the PIC code.
  • the PGL maintains the list of groups in order and uses a binary search to quickly find the correct group.
  • the initial configuration for the PGL is one giant PIC group containing all possible PICs. After a threshold number of PICs are assigned, the giant PIC group is split in two. Thereafter, this process is applied to all succeeding PIC groups.
  • the PGL assigns a new main and backup IBD machine based on available storage on a first-come-first serve basis.
  • the PGL coordinates with the IBD machines to first copy the affected records from the old main and backup machines to the new ones, update the IML record, and last remove the old main and backup copies.
  • Splitting a PIC group is an involved task.
  • the PGL batches split requests to be run when the DPC is lightly loaded, for instance, at night.
  • the system administrator may also change the main and backup IBD machines for a given PIC group if the machines' free storage falls below a level required for handling the expected amount of new registrations.
  • the schema for the PIC Group records are:
  • Each PIC group is identified by a unique identifier.
  • the PIC group identification code is the lowPin code for the group, however the system does not otherwise rely upon this fact.
  • the PGL is keyed by the lowPin field.
  • the PGL is expected to contain about 3000 groups (each PIC group contains about 1000 active PICs, but may span millions of actual PICs).
  • the entire PGL requires about 72 KB of storage and is cached completely in memory.
  • the PGL is responsible for informing the IBD Machine List of the changes and for directing the movement of IBD records from one IBD machine to another.
  • the IBD Machine List (IML), in conjunction with the PIC Group List, codifies the configuration of the IBD machines.
  • the IML maps a PIC code to the main and backup IBD machines storing IBD records for the PIC.
  • the IML is actually keyed by PIC Group (a set of consecutive PIC codes) rather than by individual PICs because this greatly reduces the memory required to store the list.
  • An IML exists on each GM Machine (GM).
  • the GM When a GM processes a request that requires a biometric identification, the GM finds the IML record keyed by the biometric's PIC group. The GM then knows the main and backup IBD machines to use for the biometric identification.
  • the schema for the IML list entries are:
  • the IML is keyed by pinGroup.
  • the IML is expected to contain about 3000 entries (the number of PIC Groups). Each MachinePair record is 12 bytes requiring about 36 KB of storage and is cached completely in memory.
  • the Sequence Number Module's (SNM) primary function is to prevent replay attacks by validating packet sequence numbers. Its secondary task is to minimize the effects of a resubmission attack by informing other SNMs in remote DPC sites of sequence number updates and to periodically update the sequence numbers in the Valid Apparatus Database.
  • the SNM maintains an in-memory hash table of sequence numbers keyed by BIA hardware identification code codes to allow quick validation of packet sequence numbers.
  • the SNM When the SNM receives a validate request from the GM for a given hardware identification code and sequence number, it looks up the hardware identification code in the hash table. If no entry exists, then the SNM replies to the GM with an "invalid hardware identification code" error.
  • the SNM checks the given sequence number against the sequence number stored in the hash table entry. If the sequence number is less than or equal to the stored sequence number, the SNM replies with an "invalid sequence number” error. Otherwise, the SNM sets the sequence number in the hash table entry to the given sequence number and replies with a "valid sequence number” message.
  • the SNM may observe a sequence number gap.
  • a sequence number gap occurs when the SNM receives a sequence number that is more than one greater than the sequence number stored in the hash table entry. In other words, a sequence number was skipped.
  • the SNM discovers a sequence number gap, it replies with a "sequence number gap" message to the GM instead of a "valid sequence number” message.
  • the GM treats the packet as valid, but it also logs a "sequence number gap” warning.
  • Sequence number gaps usually occur when network connectivity is lost: packets are dropped or can't be sent until the network is restored to working order. However, sequence number gaps occur for fraudulent reasons as well: malicious parties could intercept packets preventing them from arriving at the DPC or they could even attempt to counterfeit packets (with a large sequence number so that it isn't immediately rejected).
  • the SNM's secondary function is to inform other DPCs of the updated sequence numbers.
  • Quickly updating sequence numbers at all DPC sites thwarts resubmission attacks wherein a malicious entity monitors packets destinated for one DPC site and immediately sends a copy to a different DPC site in the hope of exploiting the transmission delay of sequence number updates from one DPC site to another resulting in both sites accepting the packet as valid, when only the first site should accept the packet.
  • the SNMs send update messages to each other whenever they receive a valid sequence number. If an SNM receives an update message for a sequence number that is less than or equal to the sequence number currently stored in its hash table, that SNM logs a sequence number resubmission warning. All resubmission attacks are detected in this manner.
  • a simpler way to thwart resubmission attacks completely, is to have only one SNM validate packets. Under this scheme, there is no update transmission delay window to exploit with a resubmission attack. Alternately, multiple SNMs can be active at the same time provided none of them handle sequence number validation for the same BIA-equipped device.
  • the SNM When the SNM boots up, it loads the sequence number hash table from the sequence numbers for active BIA stored in the VAD.
  • the SNM downloads the current sequence numbers to the local Valid Apparatus Database (VAD).
  • VAD Valid Apparatus Database
  • the VAD is responsible for sending add-entry and remove- entry messages to the SNMs for any BIA-equipped devices that are activated or deactivated to keep the SNM hash table up-to- date.
  • the SNM hash table entry contains:
  • the hash table is keyed by hardwareld.
  • the hash table Assuming about 5 million BIA-equipped devices in service requires the hash table to be about 40 MB.
  • the SNM depends on the Valid Apparatus Database. When an apparatus is suspended or removed from the database, the SNM removes the corresponding entry. When an apparatus is activated, the SNM creates an entry for it.
  • the SNMs require a transmission bandwidth of about 8 KB per second to handle 1000 update sequence number messages per second.
  • the update sequence number messages is buffered and sent out once per second to minimize the number of actual messages sent.
  • the Apparatus Owner Database stores information on individuals or organizations that own one or more BIA-equipped devices. This information is used to double check that the BIA devices are used only by their rightful owners, to provide asset account information for financial credit and debit transactions, and to allow identification of all BIAs owned by a specific individual or organization.
  • Each AOD record includes an asset account to credit or debit the owner when the DPC processes a financial transaction submitted by one of the owner's BIA-equipped devices. For instance, transactions submitted from BIA attached to a retail point of sale terminal involves credits to the asset account, while certified electronic mail transmissions results in debits to the asset account.
  • the status field is one of: 0: suspended
  • the AOD is expected to store about 2 million Apparatus Owner records. Each entry is 130 bytes requiring about 260 MB of storage.
  • the AOD is stored as a hashed file keyed by owner identification code. A copy of the AOD is stored on each GM.
  • any Valid Apparatus Database records that reference those apparatus owners are marked as suspended.
  • the MAC Module and the Sequence Number Module remove their entries for the suspended apparatuses.
  • the Valid Apparatus Database is a collection of records representing all of the BIAs that have been manufactured to date.
  • the VAD record contains the Message Authentication Code encryption key for each BIA, as well as an indication of whether an BIA is active, awaiting shipment, or marked as destroyed.
  • the BIA In order for a message from an BIA to be decrypted, the BIA must exist and have an active record in the VAD.
  • each BIA When manufactured, each BIA has a unique public identification code and a unique MAC encryption key, both of which are entered into the VAD record prior to BIA deployment.
  • an BIA When an BIA is first constructed, it is given a unique hardware identification code. When an BIA is placed in service, its hardware identification code is registered with the system. First, the owner or responsible party of the BIA is entered into the Apparatus Owner Database (AOD). Then, the VAD record is pointed to the AOD record, and the BIA is then set active. Requests from that BIA are accepted by the DPC.
  • AOD Apparatus Owner Database
  • Each BIA type and model has a security level assigned to it that indicates its level of physical security.
  • the DPC processes requests from that BIA, it uses the BIA's security level to gauge what kind of actions are allowed.
  • the DPC also provides the security level to external financial transaction authorization services.
  • a financial transaction authorization service can decide to deny any request for over $300 from low security BIA, requiring individuals to use higher security BIA to authorize such sums.
  • the authorization service can also use the security level as a guide on how much to charge for the transaction, based on risk.
  • the security levels and the actions that they allow are determined operationally. Basically, the cost to defraud the system must be higher than the potential gain, so the security level is related to the cost to compromise the device.
  • Possible values for the type field are (one for each type of terminal):
  • the Valid Apparatus Database is keyed by hardware identification code.
  • the VAD handles about 5 million retail, issuer, and remote Valid Apparatus entries. Each entry is 51 bytes requiring about 255 MB total.
  • the VAD is stored as a hashed file keyed by hardware identification code. A copy of the VAD is stored on each GM.
  • the number of personal Valid Apparatus entries number in the range of 30 million requiring another 1.5 GB of storage.
  • the MAC Modules and Sequence Number Modules are informed of its change in status. For instance, when an apparatus becomes active, the MACP and SNM adds an entry for the newly active apparatus. When an apparatus becomes inactive, the MACP and SNM remove their entry for the apparatus.
  • IBD Individual Biometric Database records store information on individuals, including their primary and secondary biometrics, PIC code, list of financial asset accounts, private code, emergency account, address, and phone number.
  • the individual may optionally include their SSN and electronic mail address. This information is necessary for identifying an individual either by biometric or personal information, for accessing account information, or for providing an address or phone number to remote merchants for additional verification.
  • Biometric Registration Terminals located in retail banking establishments worldwide, or in local system offices.
  • individuals select their personal identification numbers, and add financial asset accounts to their biometric and PIC combination.
  • the IBD exists on multiple machines, each of which is responsible for a subset of the IBD records with a copy of each record stored on two different machines, both for redundancy and for load-sharing.
  • the IBD Machine List stored on the GM, maintains which machines hold which PICs.
  • Each IBD machine has additional indexes on the individual's Social Security Number, biometric identification code, last name, first name, and phone number to facilitate access to the IBD database.
  • Each IBD machine has 40 GB of secondary storage provided by one or more RAID devices.
  • Each IBD record is 2658 bytes (assuming the biometrics are IK apiece) allowing up to 15 million records per machine.
  • the IBD records are stored using a (perhaps clustered) secondary index on the PIC.
  • the index is stored in memory and requires no more than 64 MB (a 64 MB index handles about 16 million entries).
  • the DPC needs at least 40 IBD machines: 20 IBD machines for main storage and another 20 for backup. The number of IBD machines is easily scaled up or down depending on the number of registered individuals.
  • the IBD machines, PIC Group List, and the IBD Machine List remain up-to-date in terms of which PICs are on which machine.
  • the IBD machines update their databases and indexes appropriately.
  • the Authorized Individual Database For each issuer or personal BIA-equipped device, the Authorized Individual Database (AID) maintains a list of individuals who are authorized, by the owner of the device, to use it.
  • AID Authorized Individual Database
  • the AID exists for two reasons. The first is that it provides restricted access to a terminal. For example, the Issuer Terminal can only be used by an authorized bank representative. The second reason for the AID is to prevent criminals from secretly replacing the BIA in a retail point of sale terminal with that of a personal BIA from a phone Terminal and thus routing all purchases to a remote merchant account set up by the criminals.
  • the hardwareld refers to a record in the Valid Apparatus Database and the biometricld refers to a record in the Individual Biometric Database. Whenever the DPC needs to check whether an individual is authorized to use a personal or issuer BIA device, the DPC checks for the existence of an Authorized Individual record with the correct hardwareld and biometricld.
  • Personal BIA devices are identified by a use field set to 1 (personal) in the Valid Apparatus Database.
  • the entire database requires about 24 MB of storage.
  • the Prior Fraud Database is a collection of records representing individuals who have defrauded member issuers at some point in the past.
  • the PFD also runs background transactions during periods of low system activity to weed out individuals in the IBD who have matching records in the PFD.
  • the system does not automatically put individuals in the PFD, unless it detects that they are attempting to register again. Placing an individual in the PFD is a sensitive policy matter which is outside the scope of this document.
  • the individual's primary and secondary biometrics are checked against each and every biometric in the PFD using the same biometric comparison techniques as those used in the individual identification procedure. If a match is found for the new IBD record, the IBD record's status is set to "prior fraud". If the prior fraud check was executed as part of a registration request, the GM logs a "registering individual with prior fraud" warning.
  • the status field is one of: 0: suspended
  • the PFD is keyed by biometric identification code.
  • the PFD record is the same as the IBD record. Fortunately, the DPC needs to store a lot less of them so only two database machines are required to store the entire database, of which one is the backup.
  • the PFD does not have any direct dependencies on any other DPC component.
  • Issuer Database stores information on banks and other financial institutions that allow their asset accounts to be accessed through the system.
  • the issuing institutions are the only entities that can add or remove their asset account numbers to a given individual's IBD record.
  • the DPC uses the ID to validate requests from Issuer Terminals by searching the ID for a record containing the Issuer Terminal's issuer code.
  • the owner Identification stored in the record must match up with the owner stored in the Valid Apparatus Database for the BIA stored in the Issuer Terminal.
  • the schema for the Issuer record is:
  • the Issuer Database is keyed by issuerCode.

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Abstract

Système et procédé d'identification sans objet intermédiaire permettant d'autoriser des transactions (2) et des transmissions. Le système et le procédé sont basés principalement sur une comparaison de corrélation entre un échantillon biométrique unique, tel qu'une empreinte digitale ou un enregistrement vocal (12).
PCT/US1997/013032 1996-07-25 1997-07-24 Systeme biometrique et sans objet intermediaire d'autorisation de transaction WO1998004996A1 (fr)

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AU39636/97A AU3963697A (en) 1996-07-25 1997-07-24 Tokenless biometric transaction authorization system

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US08/687,225 1996-07-25
US08/687,225 US5685250A (en) 1995-06-30 1996-07-25 Quilting method and apparatus

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Cited By (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2000048135A1 (fr) * 1999-02-11 2000-08-17 Image Data, Llc Systeme de verification d'identite positive et procede incluant l'authentification anthropometrique de l'utilisateur
US6256737B1 (en) 1999-03-09 2001-07-03 Bionetrix Systems Corporation System, method and computer program product for allowing access to enterprise resources using biometric devices
WO2001050428A1 (fr) * 2000-01-05 2001-07-12 Colin Mitchell Procede et appareil pour authentifier des transactions financieres
GB2370889A (en) * 2000-08-08 2002-07-10 Nec Corp Electronic payment system using accounting function in a mobile communication network
WO2003041324A3 (fr) * 2001-11-08 2003-07-24 Ncr Int Inc Gabarit de biometrie
US7305562B1 (en) 1999-03-09 2007-12-04 Citibank, N.A. System, method and computer program product for an authentication management infrastructure
US7441263B1 (en) 2000-03-23 2008-10-21 Citibank, N.A. System, method and computer program product for providing unified authentication services for online applications

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5229764A (en) * 1991-06-20 1993-07-20 Matchett Noel D Continuous biometric authentication matrix

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5229764A (en) * 1991-06-20 1993-07-20 Matchett Noel D Continuous biometric authentication matrix

Cited By (16)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2000048135A1 (fr) * 1999-02-11 2000-08-17 Image Data, Llc Systeme de verification d'identite positive et procede incluant l'authentification anthropometrique de l'utilisateur
US7305562B1 (en) 1999-03-09 2007-12-04 Citibank, N.A. System, method and computer program product for an authentication management infrastructure
US6256737B1 (en) 1999-03-09 2001-07-03 Bionetrix Systems Corporation System, method and computer program product for allowing access to enterprise resources using biometric devices
US9398013B2 (en) 1999-03-09 2016-07-19 Citibank, N.A. System, method and computer program product for an authentication management infrastructure
US8090657B2 (en) 2000-01-05 2012-01-03 Electronic Finger Print Technologies Limited Method and apparatus for authenticating financial transactions
GB2375873B (en) * 2000-01-05 2003-12-03 Colin Mitchell Method and apparatus for authenticating financial transactions
GB2375873A (en) * 2000-01-05 2002-11-27 Colin Mitchell Method and apparatus for authenticating financial transactions
WO2001050428A1 (fr) * 2000-01-05 2001-07-12 Colin Mitchell Procede et appareil pour authentifier des transactions financieres
US7441263B1 (en) 2000-03-23 2008-10-21 Citibank, N.A. System, method and computer program product for providing unified authentication services for online applications
US9009798B2 (en) 2000-03-23 2015-04-14 Citibank, N.A. System, method and computer program product for providing unified authentication services for online applications
US9438633B1 (en) 2000-03-23 2016-09-06 Citibank, N.A. System, method and computer program product for providing unified authentication services for online applications
GB2370889B (en) * 2000-08-08 2004-12-01 Nec Corp Electronic payment system using accounting function in a mobile communication network
US7343344B2 (en) 2000-08-08 2008-03-11 Nec Corporation Electronic payment system using accounting function in a mobile communication network
GB2370889A (en) * 2000-08-08 2002-07-10 Nec Corp Electronic payment system using accounting function in a mobile communication network
WO2003041324A3 (fr) * 2001-11-08 2003-07-24 Ncr Int Inc Gabarit de biometrie
US7302583B2 (en) 2001-11-08 2007-11-27 Ncr Corporation Biometrics template

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