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WO1999008239A1 - Appareil et procede assurant la securite pendant l'entree d'informations de compte de credit a un guichet public - Google Patents

Appareil et procede assurant la securite pendant l'entree d'informations de compte de credit a un guichet public Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1999008239A1
WO1999008239A1 PCT/US1998/016225 US9816225W WO9908239A1 WO 1999008239 A1 WO1999008239 A1 WO 1999008239A1 US 9816225 W US9816225 W US 9816225W WO 9908239 A1 WO9908239 A1 WO 9908239A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
credit account
pin
potential user
instructions
account number
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US1998/016225
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Alan Edward Kaplan
Original Assignee
At & T Corp.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by At & T Corp. filed Critical At & T Corp.
Publication of WO1999008239A1 publication Critical patent/WO1999008239A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data

Definitions

  • PIN Personal Identification Number
  • This PIN associated with any credit account is usually chosen and memorized by the user of the credit account, and the user is authorized for access to the credit account upon verification of the PIN.
  • Patent No. 5,367,572 to Weiss discloses a hand-held device carried by the user that generates a unique, time- varying, nonpredictable code. This code is used to generate a different pseudo-random PIN to be entered at every instance of entry at a public terminal.
  • U.S. Patent No. 5,265,162 to Bush et al. discloses an enhanced credit card having added circuitry within the card for generating a similar "computer generated" time- varying pseudo-random number to be entered and transmitted to the credit account access system.
  • PCT Publication No. WO 97/11443 discloses the use of a portable terminal device which encodes the PIN to generate a time-varying pseudo-random number to be entered and transmitted to the credit account access system.
  • U.S. Patent No. 5,239,583 to Parrillo discloses a credit account access system that may provide security during credit account information entry at a public terminal and that does not require an additional device. This system requires the user to keep track of a sequence of PIN numbers
  • SUBSim ⁇ E SHEET (RD1E26) to be entered at each of a corresponding transaction in a sequence of transactions.
  • U.S. Patent No. 5,239,583 recommends that only one digit of the typical 4-digit PIN vary for each transaction and that the user cycle through a small finite number of such varying PINs.
  • a credit account access system that ensures security against unwanted observation of account information during account information entry at a public terminal with the user entering a different time-varying pseudo-random number for each transaction without the requirement of an additional device is desired.
  • a primary object of the present invention is to provide a credit account access system that ensures security against unwanted access to a credit account by a thief observing credit account information being entered by a legitimate user at a public terminal. More specifically, the present invention instructs the user to enter in a pseudo-random sequence of segments of the credit account number and of the PIN and does not require the user to carry around an extraneous device.
  • an instruction synthesizer generates instructions to a potential user at the public terminal to enter in a sequence of segments of a credit account number and of a PIN.
  • S ⁇ BS ⁇ mm SHEET (RULE 26) This sequence is determined by a pseudo-randomly selected scrambling code. The instructions are readily perceived only by the potential user.
  • a decoder generates a decoded credit account number and a decoded PIN by decoding the sequence of numbers entered by the potential user.
  • a control switch allows access to the credit account for the potential user if the decoded credit account number is substantially equal to the actual credit account number and if the decoded PIN is substantially equal to the actual PIN.
  • the present invention can be used to particular advantage when the public terminal includes a headphone from which only the potential user can hear the instructions or a screen from which only the potential user can observe the displayed instructions.
  • the present invention can be used to particular advantage when the public terminal is a telephone having a handset with a receiver portion from which only the potential user can hear the instructions.
  • the potential user can be given the option of entering credit account information using the enhanced security apparatus and method of the present invention.
  • the potential user can forgo entering in the sequence of numbers according to a pseudo-randomly selected scrambling code.
  • the potential user may be given a predetermined number of chances to enter in the correct credit account number and PIN in accordance with the randomly selected scrambling code. If the potential user is not successful after the predetermined number of attempts, then the potential user is notified of a
  • Fig. 1 shows a telephone system that incorporates a calling credit account access system according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 2 shows components of the calling credit account access system of Fig. 1 according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention
  • Fig. 3 shows a flowchart of the operation of the calling credit account access system of Fig. 2;
  • Fig. 4 shows an example credit account card with its corresponding PIN
  • Fig. 5 shows example instructions to the user to enter in a sequence of segments of the credit account number and the PIN of Fig. 4;
  • Fig. 6 illustrates the corresponding decoding code for generating a decoded credit account number and a decoded PIN number from the sequence of numbers entered as in Fig. 5.
  • the preferred embodiment of the present invention will be described with respect to a telephone calling credit account.
  • Calling cards are commonly used at public telephones, and the user of the telephone credit account needs to be secure against unwanted observation of credit account information by a thief while the user enters in such information at the public telephone.
  • the present invention can be used for any credit account where the user enters in credit account information at a public terminal.
  • a public telephone network 100 includes a public telephone 102 having a handset 104 with a receiver portion 106 and a transmitter portion 107.
  • the user enters a series of numbers that indicates for a call on credit. For example, many calling card services require the user to dial a "0" before the ten digit phone number of the called party in order to charge the call to the calling card credit account.
  • a local office 108 for the public telephone 102 and a toll office 110 of the telephone network 112 recognize that the user wishes to make a call on credit.
  • a Traffic Service Position System (TSPS) unit 114 allows access to the calling credit account and allows the call to go through for the user only if the user can enter in a correct credit account number and PIN corresponding to that calling credit account.
  • the preferred embodiment of the present invention is implemented predominantly within the TSPS unit 114.
  • the TSPS unit 200 includes a central processing unit (CPU) 202 coupled to a random number generator 204, a database 206, and a memory 210 which is coupled to a touch tone decoder 211.
  • the CPU further includes an instruction synthesizer 212 coupled to the random number generator, the database, and the public terminal 102 of Fig. 1.
  • the CPU also includes a descrambling decoder 214, coupled to the database and the memory, and includes a switch control 216 coupled to the descrambling decoder, the database, and the toll office 110 of Fig. 1.
  • a descrambling decoder 214 coupled to the database and the memory
  • a switch control 216 coupled to the descrambling decoder, the database, and the toll office 110 of Fig. 1.
  • the potential user is then given the option of entering in credit account information using the enhanced security mode of the present invention, at step 304.
  • This feature of the present invention allows the potential user to enter in credit account information in the usual straight forward manner if the user feels that the current environment is relatively safe. In that case, the user is instructed to enter in the calling credit account number and the PIN, at step 306.
  • step 308 If the entered credit account number and entered PIN are substantially equal to an actual credit account number and a corresponding actual PIN stored in database 206 (step 308), then the potential user is allowed access to the calling credit account, and the call is allowed to go through, at step 310. Otherwise, the potential user is denied access to the calling credit account, and the call cannot go through with the potential user being informed of the failure to access the credit account, at step 312.
  • the potential user may be given a predetermined number of chances to enter in the correct credit account number and PIN at step 313 which goes back to step 306 if the potential user has not exceeded the predetermined number of attempts. All of these steps for the case the user does not wish to use the enhanced security mode can be carried out using the common calling credit account access systems of the prior art.
  • the random number generator 204 of Fig. 2 generates a random number.
  • the instruction synthesizer 212 uses this random number to randomly select a scrambling code from the database 206 that has a
  • the scrambling code for any credit transaction may be cycled through a large list of scrambling codes. For example, if a list of 5,000 scrambling codes is used, then a thief observing entry of credit account information according to a cycling through of such a list would perceive a random entry of numbers from one credit transaction to another in a finite reasonably observable number of credit transactions at a public terminal. Accordingly, the thief would not be able to easily decipher the actual credit account number and PIN with a cycling through of a large list of scrambling codes.
  • the user may be instructed by an number of well known means in any predetermined or preselected languages as is well known in the art, for example, by prerecorded announcement of each instruction, by speech synthesis of each instruction, or by display of each instruction.
  • the instruction synthesizer 212 generates the instructions according to these known means in the art.
  • the user may be prompted to choose the language of instruction such as, for example, English, Spanish, or Japanese.
  • caller ID in an alternative embodiment for recognizing whether the secure mode for account information entry should be used, can be used with a database that keeps track of which calling number is associated with a public terminal. If the calling number determined by a caller ID corresponds to a phone at a public terminal, then the credit account access system of the present invention may automatically use the secure mode of requiring entry of credit account information according to a scrambling code of the present invention.
  • the instructions provided to the potential user are readily perceived only by the potential user, and the instructions pseudo- randomly vary for each credit transaction. In this manner, a thief cannot figure out the credit account number and PIN of the user by observing the potential user enter in credit account information at a public terminal.
  • the potential user is instructed via the receiver portion 106 of the telephone handset 104 such that the instructions are readily audible only to the potential user.
  • any public credit account access system such as a cash dispensing station can use a headphone with speakers such that the instructions are readily audible only to the potential user.
  • a public credit account access system may use a screen which displays instructions that are readily observable only by the potential user.
  • An example set of instructions for a credit transaction is described with the example credit account number and PIN of Fig. 4.
  • a user carries a credit account card 402, and memorizes a PIN corresponding to this credit account card.
  • the credit account number is "5421 5567 8891 7766”
  • the corresponding PIN is "3456”.
  • each digit of the credit account number is indexed with its number position "1 2 3 4 5 .... 16" for ease of position reference of each digit of the credit account number.
  • an example set of instructions begins with a first instruction 502 which asks the potential user to enter in the thirteenth through sixteenth digits of the credit account number. If the potential user is using the credit account number of Fig. 4, "7766" is entered. Then, a second instruction 504 asks the potential user to enter in the second and third digits of the PIN. For the PIN of Fig. 4, "45" is entered. Then, a third instruction 502 which asks the potential user to enter in the thirteenth through sixteenth digits of the credit account number. If the potential user is using the credit account number of Fig. 4, "7766" is entered. Then, a second instruction 504 asks the potential user to enter in the second and third digits of the PIN. For the PIN of Fig. 4, "45" is entered. Then, a third
  • SUgSTTTdTE SHEET (RULE 26 instruction 506 asks the potential user to enter in the fifth through eighth digits of the credit account number. For the credit account number of Fig. 4, "5567” is entered. Then, a fourth instruction 508 asks for the first digit of the PIN, and for the PIN of Fig. 4, "3" is entered. Then, a fifth instruction 510 asks for the first though the fourth digits of the credit account number, and "5421" is entered. Then, a sixth instruction 512 asks for the fourth digit of the PIN, and "6" is entered. Finally, a seventh instruction 514 asks for the ninth through the twelfth digits of the credit account number, and "8891 " is entered.
  • the sequence of these numbers can be decoded to determine a decoded credit account number and a decoded PIN, at step 318.
  • the potential user may enter in the numbers from a public terminal via the keypad of a touch tone phone.
  • the touch tone decoder 211 decodes the touch tone signals from the public terminal into a digit format and stores the entered digits into memory 210.
  • the descrambling decoder 214 decodes the sequence of these digits stored in memory 210 to determine a decoded credit account number and a decoded PIN.
  • buttons on the telephone keypad can be an erase button.
  • the "*" button can be used by the potential user to erase the last entered digit in case of mistaken entry.
  • the user may speak the sequence of digits.
  • the present invention includes a speech recognition unit in place of the touch tone decoder 211 in Fig. 2.
  • the database 206 in Fig. 2 would include a corresponding counterpart decoding code for each scrambling code.
  • the decoder 214 obtains this decoding code from the database and performs the decoding steps. For the scrambling code of Fig. 5, Fig. 6 illustrates the corresponding
  • First line 601 includes the segments of numbers entered by the potential user as illustrated in Fig. 5. This line includes a first segment 602 resulting from the first instruction 502, a second segment 604 resulting from the second instruction 504, a third segment 606 resulting from the third instruction 506, a fourth segment 608 resulting from the fourth instruction 508, a fifth segment 610 resulting from the fifth instruction 510, a sixth segment 612 resulting from the sixth instruction 512, and a seventh segment 614 resulting from the seventh instruction 514.
  • the corresponding decoding code for determining the decoded credit account number is to take the number of the fifth segment 610, then of the third segment 606, then of the seventh segment 614, and finally of the first segment 602.
  • second line 616 shows the decoded credit account number.
  • the corresponding decoding code for deteimining the decoded PIN is to take the number of the fourth segment 608, then of the second segment 604, and finally of the sixth segment 612.
  • third line 618 shows the decoded PIN.
  • the decoded credit account number and the decoded PIN are compared to an actual credit account number and actual PIN respectively by the switch control 216 at step 320 of Fig. 3.
  • the switch control compares the decoded account number and the decoded PIN to the actual account numbers and actual PINs stored in database 206 of Fig. 2. If an actual credit account number and an actual PIN can be found in the database whereby the decoded credit account number is substantially equal to the actual credit account number and the decoded PIN is substantially equal to the actual PIN, then the potential user is allowed access to the credit account, at step 322 of Fig. 3. Otherwise, the potential
  • S ⁇ 8S ⁇ sSHEET r ⁇ L user is denied access to the credit account and is notified of failure to access the credit account in step 324.
  • the potential user may be given another chance to access the credit account by returning to step 314.
  • the potential user may be given a predetermined number of chances at step 326 for accessing the credit account before the potential user is terminated from the credit account access system. If the user fails to access the credit account after the predetermined number of attempts, then the calling credit account access system would tell the potential user "You are denied access to the calling credit account," and the system would hang up on the potential user.
  • the credit account number and corresponding PIN are scrambled such that a thief observing the entry of such a scrambled sequence of numbers cannot readily know either the actual credit account number or the corresponding actual PIN.
  • the sequence of segments of credit account number and PIN entered by a potential user at the public terminal is time-varying and
  • the present invention secures against unwanted observation of the credit account number and the PIN without the use of an added device.
  • a scrambling code may ask the user to enter extraneous digits in between any of the segments of the credit account number and PIN. For example, referring to the set of instructions of Fig. 5, the user may be instructed to enter in the digits "7" and “8” in between the first instruction 502 and the second instruction 504. The corresponding decoding code would then ignore the extraneous digits "7” and “8” in between the numbers "7766" and "45” when determining the decoded credit account number and the decode PIN.
  • Instructing the user to enter in such extraneous digits further secures against pilfering of a credit account number and the corresponding PIN during entry of such information at a public terminal. For example, if the thief were able to observe one credit transaction at a public terminal and to acquire the credit account number, then the thief may be able to know which digits that were entered during the observed transaction are part of the PIN. With the PINs typically being four digits, the thief may be able to try all of the at most 4! or 24 combinations of the left over four digits to
  • the thief may attempt to enter in the digits apart from the digits of the credit account number in the observed sequence in order to decipher the PIN.
  • the thief is likely to enter in grossly erroneous digits during instructions for entering in segments of the PIN.
  • the extraneous digits can be changed after a first transaction attempt where grossly erroneous digits are entered after instructions for entering in segments of the PIN.
  • the set of instructions of Fig. 5 is illustrative and numerous sequences of instructions for entering in any segments of the credit account number and PIN in any order are possible.
  • the present invention can be used to secure against unwanted observation of credit account number and PIN during entry at a public terminal for any credit accounts in addition to credit accounts for telephone calling cards.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

On décrit un système d'accès à des comptes de crédit qui assure la protection contre le vol d'informations de crédit telles que le numéro du compte de crédit et que le numéro d'identification personnel correspondant pendant l'entrée de ces informations effectuée par un utilisateur à un guichet public. Le système d'accès à des comptes de crédit de cette invention génère un code de brouillage sélectionné de manière pseudo-aléotoire associé à chaque transaction de crédit effectuée à un guichet public. Ce code de brouillage sélectionné de manière pseudo-aléatoire détermine les instructions que l'utilisateur se trouvant à un guichet public doit entrer de manière séquentielle sous forme de segments du numéro du compte de crédit et du numéro d'identification personnel correspondant. Ces instructions ne sont visibles que par l'utilisateur situé au guichet public. Avec un tel système d'accès à des comptes de crédit, le voleur qui observe un utilisateur se trouvant à un guichet public voit l'utilisateur entrer une séquence différente de nombres pour chaque transaction de crédit. La séquence de nombres contient des segments brouillés du numéro du compte de crédit et du numéro d'identification personnel qu'un voleur en observation ne peut facilement décoder pour déterminer le véritable numéro de compte de crédit et le véritable numéro d'identification personnel correspondant. En outre, étant donné que l'utilisateur reçoit l'ordre de brouiller les informations du compte de crédit et le numéro d'identification personnel par l'intermédiaire du guichet public, l'utilisateur ne transporte pas un dispositif supplémentaire qui lui assure une protection renforcée.
PCT/US1998/016225 1997-08-05 1998-08-04 Appareil et procede assurant la securite pendant l'entree d'informations de compte de credit a un guichet public WO1999008239A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US90593297A 1997-08-05 1997-08-05
US08/905,932 1997-08-05

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Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2802685A1 (fr) * 1999-12-17 2001-06-22 Ibm Systeme de comparaison de numero personnel d'identification (pin) pour une carte dotee d'un affichage variable
US6456984B1 (en) * 1999-05-28 2002-09-24 Qwest Communications International Inc. Method and system for providing temporary credit authorizations
EP1600899A1 (fr) * 2004-05-25 2005-11-30 Siemens Schweiz AG Méthode pour le génération d'une code d'accès
WO2013064359A1 (fr) * 2011-11-01 2013-05-10 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Document, procédé d'authentification d'un utilisateur, en particulier pour valider une fonction d'une carte à puce, et système informatique

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5239583A (en) 1991-04-10 1993-08-24 Parrillo Larry A Method and apparatus for improved security using access codes
US5265162A (en) 1990-01-16 1993-11-23 George Bush Portable pin card
WO1993023830A1 (fr) * 1992-05-08 1993-11-25 Wesco Software Limited Authentification de l'identite d'une personne autorisee
US5367572A (en) 1984-11-30 1994-11-22 Weiss Kenneth P Method and apparatus for personal identification
WO1997011443A1 (fr) 1995-09-18 1997-03-27 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Procede et dispositif pour l'authentification d'utilisateur

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5367572A (en) 1984-11-30 1994-11-22 Weiss Kenneth P Method and apparatus for personal identification
US5265162A (en) 1990-01-16 1993-11-23 George Bush Portable pin card
US5239583A (en) 1991-04-10 1993-08-24 Parrillo Larry A Method and apparatus for improved security using access codes
WO1993023830A1 (fr) * 1992-05-08 1993-11-25 Wesco Software Limited Authentification de l'identite d'une personne autorisee
WO1997011443A1 (fr) 1995-09-18 1997-03-27 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Procede et dispositif pour l'authentification d'utilisateur

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
"PHONE CARD FRAUD-REDUCTION METHOD", IBM TECHNICAL DISCLOSURE BULLETIN, vol. 38, no. 3, 1 March 1995 (1995-03-01), pages 185, XP000508021 *

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6456984B1 (en) * 1999-05-28 2002-09-24 Qwest Communications International Inc. Method and system for providing temporary credit authorizations
FR2802685A1 (fr) * 1999-12-17 2001-06-22 Ibm Systeme de comparaison de numero personnel d'identification (pin) pour une carte dotee d'un affichage variable
EP1600899A1 (fr) * 2004-05-25 2005-11-30 Siemens Schweiz AG Méthode pour le génération d'une code d'accès
WO2013064359A1 (fr) * 2011-11-01 2013-05-10 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Document, procédé d'authentification d'un utilisateur, en particulier pour valider une fonction d'une carte à puce, et système informatique
US9491154B2 (en) 2011-11-01 2016-11-08 Bundesdruckerei Gmbh Document, method for authenticating a user, in particular for releasing a chip card function, and computer system

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