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WO2018192637A1 - Système de communication et procédé de communication avec amélioration d'interférences ciblée - Google Patents

Système de communication et procédé de communication avec amélioration d'interférences ciblée Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018192637A1
WO2018192637A1 PCT/EP2017/059143 EP2017059143W WO2018192637A1 WO 2018192637 A1 WO2018192637 A1 WO 2018192637A1 EP 2017059143 W EP2017059143 W EP 2017059143W WO 2018192637 A1 WO2018192637 A1 WO 2018192637A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
interference
antenna
signal
communication system
channel quality
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/EP2017/059143
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English (en)
Inventor
Luca Rose
Axel Mueller
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co Ltd filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
Priority to PCT/EP2017/059143 priority Critical patent/WO2018192637A1/fr
Publication of WO2018192637A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018192637A1/fr
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/02—Diversity systems; Multi-antenna system, i.e. transmission or reception using multiple antennas
    • H04B7/04—Diversity systems; Multi-antenna system, i.e. transmission or reception using multiple antennas using two or more spaced independent antennas
    • H04B7/06—Diversity systems; Multi-antenna system, i.e. transmission or reception using multiple antennas using two or more spaced independent antennas at the transmitting station
    • H04B7/0686—Hybrid systems, i.e. switching and simultaneous transmission
    • H04B7/0691—Hybrid systems, i.e. switching and simultaneous transmission using subgroups of transmit antennas
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/02—Diversity systems; Multi-antenna system, i.e. transmission or reception using multiple antennas
    • H04B7/022—Site diversity; Macro-diversity
    • H04B7/024—Co-operative use of antennas of several sites, e.g. in co-ordinated multipoint or co-operative multiple-input multiple-output [MIMO] systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04J—MULTIPLEX COMMUNICATION
    • H04J11/00—Orthogonal multiplex systems, e.g. using WALSH codes
    • H04J11/0023—Interference mitigation or co-ordination
    • H04J11/0026—Interference mitigation or co-ordination of multi-user interference
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/20—Countermeasures against jamming
    • H04K3/28—Countermeasures against jamming with jamming and anti-jamming mechanisms both included in a same device or system, e.g. wherein anti-jamming includes prevention of undesired self-jamming resulting from jamming
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/43—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming power, signal-to-noise ratio or geographic coverage area
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04J—MULTIPLEX COMMUNICATION
    • H04J11/00—Orthogonal multiplex systems, e.g. using WALSH codes
    • H04J11/0023—Interference mitigation or co-ordination
    • H04J11/0026—Interference mitigation or co-ordination of multi-user interference
    • H04J11/003—Interference mitigation or co-ordination of multi-user interference at the transmitter
    • H04J11/0033—Interference mitigation or co-ordination of multi-user interference at the transmitter by pre-cancellation of known interference, e.g. using a matched filter, dirty paper coder or Thomlinson-Harashima precoder
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04J—MULTIPLEX COMMUNICATION
    • H04J11/00—Orthogonal multiplex systems, e.g. using WALSH codes
    • H04J11/0023—Interference mitigation or co-ordination
    • H04J11/005—Interference mitigation or co-ordination of intercell interference
    • H04J11/0053—Interference mitigation or co-ordination of intercell interference using co-ordinated multipoint transmission/reception
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
    • H04K2203/16—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for telephony
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/30—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components
    • H04K2203/32—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components including a particular configuration of antennas
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/30—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components
    • H04K2203/34—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components involving multiple cooperating jammers
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1475—Passive attacks, e.g. eavesdropping or listening without modification of the traffic monitored

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a communication system and a communication method, especially for performing a downlink communication from a base station to a mobile station.
  • Modern communication systems such as LTE, LTE-A and 5G, adopt multi source and/or multiple antenna systems to focus the signal power in region closely located to the intended receiver (IR); this is usually called spatial diversity multiplexing (SDM[A]).
  • SDM[A] spatial diversity multiplexing
  • This is usually achieved using a method known as beam forming, beam steering, or spatial precoding.
  • Such features automatically protect the transmitted messages from being intercepted by MUs that are located far from the IR.
  • a dangerous zone known as critical area
  • a MU can physically decode the message with high probability.
  • a malicious user can receive messages intended for the intended receiver. Only cryptographic measures remain for protecting the messages. This leads to a sub-optimal security of the communication.
  • an object of the present invention is to provide a communication system and a communication method, which allow for a very high communication security, especially in the downstream.
  • the object is solved by the features of claim 1 for the communication system and by the features of claim 14 for the communication method.
  • the features of claim 15 solve the problem for the associated computer program.
  • the dependent claims contain further developments.
  • a communication system comprising an interference unit, at least a first antenna unit and at least a second antenna unit, is provided.
  • the communication system is adapted to transmit a payload signal to an intended receiver.
  • the interference unit comprises an interference generator, adapted to generate at least one interference signal, and supply the at least one interference signal to the at least one first antenna unit.
  • the interference generator is adapted to generate the at least one interference signal so that interference is generated in an interference area around the intended receiver.
  • the interference unit moreover comprises an interference remover, adapted to generate at least one interference removal signal, and supply the at least one interference removal signal to the at least one second antenna unit.
  • the interference remover is adapted to generate the at least one interference removal signal, so that the interference generated by the at least one interference signal is cancelled out at the location of the intended receiver.
  • the interference unit comprises a long-term channel quality indicator determiner, which is adapted to determine or receive a long-term channel quality indicator of a communication channel to users within the interference area.
  • the interference generator is then adapted to generate at least one interference signal based upon the long-term channel quality indicator. It is thereby possible to accurately generate the interference signal and make sure that the interference is significantly increased within the interference area.
  • the long-term channel quality indicator determiner comprises a look-up-table adapted to store long-term channel quality indicators of a plurality of locations. The long-term channel quality indicator determiner is then adapted to determine the long-term channel quality indicator of the interference area from the stored look-up-table.
  • the communication system comprises a long- term channel quality indicator storage unit which is adapted to store long-term channel quality indicators of a plurality of locations. The long-term channel quality indicator determiner is then adapted to receive the long-term channel quality indicator of the interference area from the long-term channel quality indicator storage unit. It is thereby possible to accurately generate the interference signal based upon the long-term channel quality indicator.
  • the interference unit comprises a short-term channel quality indicator determiner, which is adapted to determine or receive a short-term channel quality indicator of a communication channel to the intended receiver.
  • the interference remover is adapted to generate the at least one interference removal signal based upon the short-term channel quality indicator. It is thereby possible to very accurately generate the interference removal signal and thereby very effectively remove the interference. This allows for the intended receiver to receive the payload signal without problems.
  • the short-term channel quality indicator determiner is adapted to receive from the intended receiver, at least one pilot symbol, and determine the short-term channel quality indicator from the pilot symbol transmitted by the intended receiver, or wherein the short-term channel quality indicator determiner is adapted to transmit at least one pilot symbol to the intended receiver, and receive the short-term channel quality indicator from the intended receiver. It is thereby possible to very accurately determine the short-term channel quality indicator.
  • the communication system is adapted to determine or receive a location of the intended receiver.
  • the interference generator is then adapted to generate the at least one interference signal based on the location of the intended receiver.
  • the interference remover is then adapted to generate the at least one interference removal signal based on the location of the intended receiver. A further increase in accuracy of generating the interference signal and the interference removal signal is thereby achieved.
  • the at least one first antenna unit is at least one single antenna or at least one antenna array. If the at least one first antenna is at least one antenna array, an individual interference signal is provided by the interference generator for each antenna of the antenna array. If the at least one first antenna unit is at least one single antenna, only a single interference signal is provided by the interference generator for the at least one antenna. Additionally or alternatively, the at least one second antenna unit is at least one single antenna or at least one antenna array. If the at least one second antenna unit is at least one antenna array, an individual interference removal signal is provided by the interference remover for each antenna of the antenna array. If the at least one second antenna unit is at least one single antenna, only a single interference removal signal is provided by the interference remover for the at least one antenna. It is thereby possible to accurately generate the interference in the interference area and remove it at the exact location of the intended receiver.
  • the communication system comprises a first base station.
  • the communication system moreover comprises a single first antenna unit and a single second antenna unit.
  • the first antenna unit and the second antenna unit are both arranged within the first base station. This allows for a very simple construction of the communication system.
  • the communication system comprises a first base station and a second base station.
  • the at least one first antenna unit is arranged in the first base station, and the at least one second antenna unit is arranged in the second base station. It is thereby possible to increase the interference generated in the interference area while at the same time keeping the interference at the exact location of the intended receiver minimal.
  • the communication system comprises a first base station, a second base station, and a third base station. At least one of the at least one first antenna units is arranged in the first base station. At least one of the at least one second antenna units is arranged in the second base station. At least one of the at least one second antenna units is arranged in the third base station. This further increases the effectiveness of interference remover at the exact location of the intended receiver.
  • the communication system comprises a first base station and a first relay unit. At least one of the at least one first antenna units is arranged in the first base station or in the first relay unit. At least one of the at least one second antenna units is arranged in the first relay unit or in the first base station.
  • a relay unit requires a significantly reduced hardware effort with regard to a base station. This approach therefore allows for a significant reduction in system complexity with regard to using two separate base stations.
  • the communication system is adapted to dynamically switch antennas and/or antenna arrays of different base stations or relay units to form the at least one first antenna unit and/or the at least one second antenna unit, based on a security need of the payload transmission and/or based on a short-term channel quality indicator and/or based on a long-term channel quality indicator.
  • the communication system comprises a payload transmitter, which is adapted to transmit the payload signal to the intended receiver.
  • the payload transmitter is arranged in a base station or in a relay unit. Additionally or alternatively, the interference unit is arranged in a base station. It is thereby assured that with low hardware effort, the payload signal as well as the interference signal and also the interference removal signal are generated.
  • a communication method for transmitting a payload signal to an intended receiver comprises generating, by an interference generator, at least one interference signal and supplying it to at least one first antenna unit for transmission. The at least one interference signal is generated so that interference is generated in an interference area around the intended receiver.
  • At least one interference removal signal is generated by an interference remover, and supplied to at least one second antenna unit for transmission.
  • the at least one interference removal signal is generated so that the interference generated by the at least one interference signal is cancelled out at the location of the intended receiver.
  • the signal-to-noise ratio for a malicious user within the interference area is significantly decreased, while it is not decreased for the intended receiver. This allows for physically preventing the malicious user from receiving the payload signal.
  • a long-term channel quality indicator is determined or received.
  • the at least one interference signal is determined based upon the long-term channel quality indicator. It is thereby possible to very accurately generate the interference signal and make sure that the interference is significantly increased within the interference area.
  • the long-term channel quality indicator is determined from a look-up-table or received from a storage. It is thereby possible to accurately generate the interference signal based upon the long-term channel quality indicator.
  • a short-term channel quality indicator is determined or received.
  • the interference removal signal is then determined based upon the short-term channel quality indicator. It is thereby possible to very accurately generate the interference removal signal and thereby very effectively remove the interference. This allows for the intended receiver to receive the payload signal without problems.
  • At least one pilot symbol is received from the intended receiver.
  • the short- term channel quality indicator is determined from this pilot symbol.
  • a pilot symbol is transmitted to the intended receiver.
  • the short-term channel quality indicator is then received from the intended receiver. It is thereby possible to very accurately determine the short-term channel quality indicator.
  • a location of the intended receiver is received.
  • the at least one interference signal and the at least one interference removal signal are generated based upon the received location.
  • a further increase in accuracy of generating the interference signal and the interference removal signal is thereby achieved.
  • an individual interference signal is provided for each antenna of the first antenna unit, if the first antenna unit is an antenna array.
  • only a single interference signal is provided to at least one antenna if the at least one first antenna unit is only at least one antenna.
  • an individual interference removal signal is provided to each antenna of an antenna array, if the at least one second antenna unit is at least one antenna array.
  • only a single interference removal signal is provided by the interference remover for at least one antenna, if the at least one second antenna unit is at least one antenna. It is thereby possible to very accurately generate the interference in the interference area and remove it at the exact location of the intended receiver.
  • a dynamic switching of antennas and/or antenna arrays of different base stations or relay units to form the at least one first antenna unit and/or the at least one second antenna unit is performed, based upon a security need of the payload transmission and/or based on a short-term channel quality indicator and/or based on a long-term channel quality indicator.
  • Fig. 1 shows an exemplary communication setup
  • Fig. 2 shows a first embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention
  • Fig. 3 shows a second embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention
  • Fig. 4 shows a detail of a fourth embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention.
  • Fig. 5 shows a detail of a fifth embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention.
  • Fig. 6 shows a detail of a sixth embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention.
  • Fig. 7 shows a detail of a seventh embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention.
  • Fig. 8 shows a detail of an eighth embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention.
  • Fig. 9 shows a detail of a ninth embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention.
  • Fig. 10 shows a detail of a tenth embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention
  • Fig. 11 shows an embodiment of the communication method according to the second aspect of the invention in a flow diagram
  • Fig. 12 shows a signal strength within a critical area in an exemplary communication system
  • Fig. 13 shows reception conditions within an interference area and at the location of the intended receiver in an eleventh embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention.
  • Fig. 14 shows reception conditions within an interference area and at a location of the intended receiver in a twelfth embodiment of the communication system according to the first aspect of the invention.
  • a base station (BS) 4 intends to transmit a payload signal to an intended receiver (IR) 2.
  • IR intended receiver
  • MU malicious user
  • the system can contain a plurality of each and all of these entities.
  • the BS 4 wishes to communicate a private/secret message m to the IR 2 over a wireless channel, possibly using a subset of available relays, and MU 3 is an attacker that wants to eavesdrop on the communication.
  • a MU 3 can be located anywhere, its location is unknown, it can be equipped with multiple antennas, and, as a worst case scenario, we assume that its received noise level is equal to zero.
  • the approach involves two entities:
  • Entity 1 also referred to as interference generator: It takes as an input, long term statistics of the channel towards the IR 2 and/or an approximate position of the IR 2. It generates (pseudo) random noise, also referred to as interference towards the IR 2. This will create a floor of noise around the zone close to the IR 2. Therefore, interference is generated in an interference area around the IR 2. This interference area advantageously overlaps the entire critical zone.
  • Entity 2 also referred to as interference remover: It takes as an input, the instantaneous channel gains, also referred to as short term channel quality indicators, and it uses it to cancel the effect of the Entity 1 exclusively at the location of the IR 2.
  • a BS 4 wishes to transmit a message m to an IR 2 avoiding one or more eavesdroppers or malicious users (MUs) 3, whose position is unknown to the BS 4.
  • p (x, y, z) an arbitrary position on the map containing the BS 4, the IR 2 and the MUs 3.
  • a message is transmitted by a source with power ?T , bandwidth W and a symbol rate R, Denote also by 3 ⁇ 4(P' r ) the power received by a receiver r at position V.
  • a receiver in position p is, thus able to decode the message if and only if the received signal power is above a detection threshold, that is if
  • °r represents the noise (thermal and otherwise) at the receiver r.
  • the minimum value of «*r 2 for which ( 1 ) is verified is called SINR threshold and it is referred to as ⁇ .
  • the SINR threshold grows exponentially with the symbol rate and decreases exponentially with the bandwidth, as follows:
  • ⁇ defines a decoding threshold.
  • the value of 3 ⁇ 4(P* r ) is known to depend on many factors such as distance from the transmitter, presence of objects between the transmitter and the receiver, fading, antenna gain.
  • the ratio between the transmit power ? ⁇ and the received power is the so called link budget
  • the transmitter had beforehand the value of for each point in space and each receiver, it can establish where, and which receiver, is able to decode the message.
  • a communication system and communication method to protect message delivery in wireless networks by means of physically reducing the ability of a malicious user 3 to eavesdrop on the message, are provided.
  • the approach consists of a transmission scheme that:
  • the communication system 1 comprises an interference unit 10, which is connected to a first antenna unit 12 and to a second antenna unit 13.
  • the interference unit 10 comprises an interference generator, which generates at least one interference signal 15 and supplies it to the at least one first antenna unit 12.
  • the interference signal is generated so that interference is generated in an interference area around an intended receiver 2.
  • the interference unit 10 moreover comprises an interference remover, which generates at least one interference removal signal 16 and supplies it to the at least one second antenna unit 13.
  • the interference remover generates the at least one interference removal signal, so that the interference generated by the at least one interference signal is cancelled out at the location of the intended receiver 2.
  • a payload transmitter 11 and at least one third antenna unit 19 are depicted.
  • the payload transmitter 11 generates the payload signal 17 and hands it to the at least one third antenna unit 19 for transmission towards the intended receiver 2.
  • a malicious user 3 is depicted. In general, we want to:
  • the transmission side is assumed to have the following information:
  • the second order statistics of the CSI directly relates to the spatial distribution of the direction(s) of arrival of the signal energy. This information can be easily extracted by knowing an array steering vector(s).
  • the location of the IR 2 can be obtained in several different ways; here we provide a few examples:
  • the IR 2 activates its GPS or other geo-location device and provides the BS with sufficiently precise localization information via a feedback protocol.
  • Implicit signaling The BS 4 determines the IR 2 position by combining the signals received by different BSs and originated by the IR 2. Notice that since only an approximate position of the IR 2 is necessary this information can be slightly outdated of a few seconds. Implicit signaling also contains the direction estimation approach from before.
  • CSI is obtained via pilot schemes or other methods.
  • the interference unit comprises a long-term channel quality determiner 30, connected to an interference generator 31.
  • the interference unit 10 comprises a short-term channel quality determiner 33, connected to an interference remover 32.
  • a long-term channel quality indicator is determined or received by the long-term channel quality determiner 30.
  • This long-term channel quality indicator is handed to the interference generator 31, which generates the interference signal based thereupon. Additionally, the interference generator 31 can generate the interference signal based upon the location of the intended receiver 2.
  • the short-term channel quality determiner 33 determines or receives a short-term channel quality indicator and hands it to the interference remover 32.
  • the interference remover 32 generates the at least one interference removal signal based upon the short-term channel quality indicator. Additionally, the interference remover 32 can generate the interference removal signal based upon the exact location of the intended receiver 2.
  • the antenna unit 11 comprises a first antenna array 40, a second antenna array 41, a third antenna array 42 and a fourth antenna array 43.
  • the antenna arrays 40 - 43 are each supplied with individual signals for each antenna of each antenna array.
  • the first antenna unit 11 comprises individual antennas 50 - 53, which are each supplied with an individual signal.
  • each antenna unit can represent only a single antenna, or a number of antennas, as shown in Fig. 6. Also it is possible that one antenna unit represents one antenna array or a plurality of antenna arrays as shown in Fig. 5.
  • the interference generator 31 focuses noise/interference power to the IR 2 (directly on its position or simply in its direction), through any digital and analog methods (e.g., antenna beamsteering, SDMA, precoding, digital beamsteering, hybrid precoding).
  • any digital and analog methods e.g., antenna beamsteering, SDMA, precoding, digital beamsteering, hybrid precoding.
  • Possible embodiments are: MIMO BS with precoding, LOS multi antenna transmitter with beam- steering, multi point transmission through relays, distributed precoding through coordinated multi point transmitters (D-MIMO).
  • the interference generator 31 is implemented in a MIMO BS, adopting classic precoding strategies (MF, ZF, multi point coordination, etc.).
  • MF, ZF, multi point coordination, etc. the power of the transmission increases in the surrounding area 130 of the IR 2, as depicted in Figure 12.
  • the interference remover 32 can be implemented in a multi antenna transmitter built from several realizations of Entity 1, e.g., a set of relays or a distributed set of transmitters.
  • the interference remover 32 In order to cancel the interference at the IR 2, the interference remover 32 must be able to estimate the CSI of the IR 2. This is simple in MaMIMO networks, where the IR 2 transmits pilot symbols that can be received and then exploited to compute the channel quality indicator.
  • the two entities, the interference generator 31 and the interference remover 32 are not necessarily independent and can be realized in a communication system as follows:
  • the available antennas of a communication system are divided into groups, where each antenna belongs to one and only one group.
  • Each group represents one "Entity 1".
  • the "one and only one" requirement might be abandoned for more advanced implementations, where additional signal processing becomes necessary. At least two groups are required.
  • the number of groups and antennas per group are dependent on the security requirements: More antennas per group generally allow for better artificial noise/interference cancelation at the IR 2. Better meaning that less residual interference is observed at the IR 2.
  • More groups generally allow for better artificial noise/interference generation around the IR 2. Better meaning that less transmit power is required at the BSs and the interference area can be defined more accurately.
  • Having more antennas per group is generally more desirable than having many groups, i.e., it is often not necessary to have more than the minimum required two groups. Exceptions might be, that one group cannot create shadowing at the IR 2, due to shadowing (no physical transmission path because of obstruction) or other physical phenomena.
  • Each group creates a beam of interference in the direction of the IR 2, increasing the level of interference around it.
  • a larger area means less interference power (given constant transmit power).
  • the possible shapes of the beam generally depends on the number of antennas in the respective group. More antennas allow for more control over the beam shape.
  • Entity 2 measures or calculates the short term channel properties between these "virtual antennas" and the IR 2.
  • entity 2 calculates global projection weights for its "virtual antennas" that form a null space for the IR 2, given the short term channel properties.
  • null space projection methods and how to calculate the associated weights are common knowledge (e.g. ZF, orthogonal projection matrix).
  • the BS 4 (or a set of BSs) takes care of creating both the interference in the surrounding of the IR 2 and to cancel the negative effect to the IR 2.
  • Multiple Input multiple output (MIMO) refers to the fact that the BS 4 has multiple antennas, and it serves one or more IRs 2 with one or more antennas each. Note that this will happen with no extra cost from standard communication since the CSI acquisition is a standard feature of MIMO BSs.
  • MIMO Multiple Input multiple output
  • the interference unit 10 is not integrated into a base station.
  • the interference unit 10 is connected to a separate base station 70, which comprises a first antenna unit 12, a second antenna unit 13 and a third antenna unit 14.
  • the interference unit 10 generates the interference signal and the interference removal signal and hands them to the base station 70.
  • the base station 70 then takes care of assigning its antenna units 12 - 14 independently to the different signals to be transmitted.
  • the CSI acquisition is a standard feature of such systems and can is used in the invention to cancel the noise at the IR.
  • the communication system 1 comprises an interference unit 10, which is connected to a first base station 80, a second base station 81, and a third base station 82.
  • Base station 80 comprises a first antenna unit 12
  • base station 81 comprises a second antenna unit 13
  • base station 82 comprises a third antenna unit 14.
  • the interference unit 10 generates the at least one interference signal and the at least one interference removal signal and assigns them to the individual base stations 80 - 82.
  • the interference unit 10 assigns the base station 80 to transmit the interference signal.
  • the interference unit 10 then sends the interference signal to the base station 80, which transmits it using the first antenna unit 12.
  • the interference unit 10 assigns the second base station 81 and the third base station 82 for transmitting the interference removal signal.
  • the interference unit 10 then generates the at least one interference removal signal and hands the at least one interference removal signal to the base station 81 and 82, which transmit the signals using the first antenna unit 13 and the second antenna unit 14. It is important to note that each antenna unit/base station is supplied with signals dependent upon the specific location/orientation of the respective antenna units 12 - 14.
  • a set of relays transmit in a coordinated manner a message or a set of messages to the IR 2.
  • other relays or other multi antenna BS needs to be coordinated to create the interference area.
  • an interference unit 10 is connected to a base station 91, which in turn is connected to a first relay 90 and to a second relay 92.
  • a first antenna unit 12 is located within the first relay 90.
  • a second antenna unit 13 is located within the base station 91.
  • a third antenna unit 13 is located within the second relay 92.
  • the interference unit 10 generates the at least one interference signal and the at least one interference removal signal and hands them all to the base station 91.
  • the base station 91 is in charge of dividing the signals between itself and the relays 90 and 92.
  • the base station 91 decides that the relays 90, 92 are in charge of generating the interference and therefore hands the interference signal to the relays 90, 92, which transmits these signals using the antenna units 12, 14.
  • the base station 91 generates the interference removal signal itself and transmits it using its antenna unit 13.
  • the security need may be such a factor.
  • the higher the security need the higher the number of antennas used for transmitting the interference signal. This on the other hand reduces the reception quality of the intended receiver 2.
  • Another factor can be the actual transmission conditions. If the intended receiver 2 even without the interference signal is already faced with harsh reception conditions and therefore a low signal-to-noise ratio, it might be prudent to assign especially many resources to generating the interference removal signal so as to not further hinder the reception by the intended receiver 2.
  • the long-term channel quality indicator and the short-term channel quality indicator can be used as factors influencing the dynamic allocation of resources.
  • LOS-MIMO Line of sight MIMO
  • a multi antenna transmitter is in line-of-sight (LOS) with the IR 2.
  • the transmitter consist of electronically steerable antenna arrays (e.g., uniform linear arrays; ULAs) and the arrays are tuned with the geometric information of the IR 2. All available antennas (i.e., all except the ones needed for signal transmission / entity 1) are used to create the interference in the interference area. This is done by using the ULAs to beam the output of a (single) interference source in the direction of the IR 2. By adjusting the weighting of the input of each ULA, it is possible to cancel the noise at one (or more) specific spatial points.
  • ULAs uniform linear arrays
  • the global amount of available antennas is divided into N different groups. Each group is used as an "array", i.e., as if it was a single antenna. Their relative channel gain 9n is henceforth estimated via pilot schemes. For example, the IR 2 transmit pilots that allow the multi antenna transmitter to estimate the channel gains.
  • the antenna-arrays/groups transmit the output of a (single) noise source (possibly pseudo random sequences), focusing the power in the direction of the IR 2; this can be done by following standard techniques borrowed from phased arrays.
  • Each antenna- array/group is also controlled by a parameter c k. These parameters are set in such a way that:
  • a solution that gets sufficiently close to zero should be adopted.
  • a first step 100 at least one interference signal is generated. It is supplied to at least one first antenna unit in a second step 101.
  • the at least one interference signal is transmitted by the at least one antenna unit, in order to generate interference in an interference area around an intended receiver.
  • a fourth step 103 at least one interference removal signal is generated.
  • the at least one interference removal signal is transmitted by the at least one second antenna unit in order to cancel out interference generated by the interference signal at the location of the intended receiver.
  • a critical area 130 around a location of an intended receiver 2 is depicted. In the diagram, the reception conditions are shown. When the reception conditions are better than the detection threshold, it is possible to detect the signal. This is indicated by the critical area 130.
  • the interference level at a location of an intended receiver 2 when using a communication system according to the first aspect of the invention, is shown. Within an interference area 9, a high interference level is achieved, in order to prevent malicious users 3 from receiving the payload signal.
  • a very low interference level is generated by cancelling out the interference signal using the interference removal signal. Therefore, only at the exact location of the intended receiver 2, it is possible to detect the payload signal, since only there the interference level is low enough, so that the payload signal is stronger than the detection threshold.
  • Fig. 14 a further diagram showing the reception conditions at different locations is shown.
  • the interference signal is generated from two different locations, visible as bright spots in the diagram.
  • an interference area 9 is depicted.
  • the reception conditions are artificially bad so that the payload signal is lower than the detection threshold.
  • the interference removal signal cancels out the interference and enables the payload signal to emerge over the detection threshold.
  • the invention is not limited to the examples and especially not to a specific number of antennas or antenna arrays or base stations or relays. Also, there is no limitation to specific communication standards, by which the communication system communicates with the intended receiver. The characteristics of the exemplary embodiments can be used in any combination.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système de communication (1) comprenant une unité d'interférence (10), au moins une première (12) et au moins une seconde unité d'antenne (13). Le système de communication (1) transmet un signal de charge utile (17) à un récepteur prévu (2). L'unité d'interférence (10) comprend un générateur d'interférence, destiné à générer au moins un signal d'interférence (15), et à le fournir à la ou aux premières unités d'antenne (12). De plus, le générateur d'interférence génère le ou les signaux d'interférence (15) de sorte qu'une interférence est générée dans une zone d'interférence autour du récepteur prévu (2). L'unité d'interférence (10) comprend en outre un dispositif d'élimination d'interférences destiné à générer au moins un signal d'élimination d'interférence (16), et à le fournir à la ou aux secondes unités d'antenne (13). Le dispositif d'élimination d'interférence génère le ou les signaux d'élimination d'interférence (16), de sorte que l'interférence générée par le ou les signaux d'interférence (15) est supprimée à l'emplacement du récepteur prévu (2).
PCT/EP2017/059143 2017-04-18 2017-04-18 Système de communication et procédé de communication avec amélioration d'interférences ciblée Ceased WO2018192637A1 (fr)

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CN113037346A (zh) * 2021-03-12 2021-06-25 重庆邮电大学 Irs与人工噪声辅助的mimo系统物理层安全设计方法
CN114598363A (zh) * 2022-02-09 2022-06-07 国网电力科学研究院有限公司 一种面向3d空间无线信道的大规模mimo安全预编码方法
CN115314094A (zh) * 2022-05-30 2022-11-08 安徽师范大学 一种基于级联IRSs与合法用户协同安全传输策略分析方法

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Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN113037346A (zh) * 2021-03-12 2021-06-25 重庆邮电大学 Irs与人工噪声辅助的mimo系统物理层安全设计方法
CN113037346B (zh) * 2021-03-12 2023-07-18 重庆邮电大学 Irs与人工噪声辅助的mimo系统物理层安全设计方法
CN114598363A (zh) * 2022-02-09 2022-06-07 国网电力科学研究院有限公司 一种面向3d空间无线信道的大规模mimo安全预编码方法
CN114598363B (zh) * 2022-02-09 2023-03-17 国网电力科学研究院有限公司 一种面向3d空间无线信道的大规模mimo安全预编码方法
CN115314094A (zh) * 2022-05-30 2022-11-08 安徽师范大学 一种基于级联IRSs与合法用户协同安全传输策略分析方法
CN115314094B (zh) * 2022-05-30 2024-05-24 安徽师范大学 一种基于级联IRSs与合法用户协同安全传输策略分析方法

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